

# WHO KNOWS WHAT'S RIGHT ANYMORE?

**A Guide to Personal Decision-Making**



**TRAFFORD**  
2002

by  
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Ph.D., LL.D., D.Sc.

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## **DEDICATION**

**To**

**Richard Fox, Michael Bayles, and John Kekes**

**(I am grateful for the many helpful insights I gained  
from their writings on applied ethics.)**

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## PREFACE

This book is designed to provide you, the reader heading into the 21st century, with an introduction to ethical decision-making. It can apply readily to both your personal and professional life--if such a dichotomy can be established in connection with ethics and morality in one's life pattern. In the final analysis, of course, everything is "personal."

Any new book being recommended for use by a great many people needs solid justification. In *Who Knows What's Right Anymore?*, I believe strongly that an excellent case can be made for use of this basic, multi-phased (1-2-3-4) approach to ethical decision-making offered here. Faced with the prevailing "ethical chaos" of the late 20th century--and keeping firmly in mind the vital need to preserve our individual freedom and civil liberties--it starts in a relatively simple fashion in Phase One--the three steps that might actually "do it" for you (and for me!) in most situations! Then it moves progressively and sequentially through Phases Two, Three, and Four that are assuredly desirable, but *optional*.

Although I say "optional," it is true that they could serve to confirm or negate your Phase-One decision. Interestingly, and importantly nevertheless, all four phases of this approach to ethical decision-making can be carried out successfully by a reasonably intelligent layperson. (Phase Four, a case method technique, can presumably be pursued best in a group discussion of the issue at hand by those concerned.)

Basically, I argue here, for several basic reasons, that the child and young person in society today is initially missing out completely on a *sound* "experiential" introduction to ethics and morality. This is true whether we are referring to that which typically takes place in the home, the school system, or the church--actually an experience that *doesn't* take place adequately!. In fact, the truth is that typically no *systematic* instruction in this most important subject is offered at any time. (And I refuse to accept the often-heard "osmosis stance"--i.e., that such knowledge is "better caught than taught!".)

In Part I, to improve the prevailing situation, you will learn initially how this all came about, how and why such a terrible gap exists. Where previously, for many at least, a relatively strong, orthodox, religious indoctrination prevailed, the situation has steadily deteriorated in our present multi-ethnic, secular culture to a point where "confusion reigns" as to ethical conduct (see Chapters 1). This topic will be elaborated still further through a brief narrative explaining how such a confusing miasma came into existence on the topic of ethical values and problems in our society today (Chapter 2).

Next the "good" and the "bad" will be explained briefly in *historical* perspective (in Chapter 3). Next, because this subject can become confusing unless the terms used are understood and one's reasoning is sound, *elementary* reasoning (i.e., informal logic or "critical thinking" was planned for Chapter 4--but it is now in the **Appendix** (for ease of reference). So Chapter 4 offers now a quick look at six of the major ethical routes or approaches extant in today's confusing Western-world scenario. Finally, in Part I, it is explained how a person's ethical outlook should be an implicit/explicit experiential approach that necessarily moves daily from personal to professional ethics (Chapter 5).

In Part II, one basic philosophic approach to applied ethics--a three-step one--is offered as Phase One of a total four-phase, experiential plan that may be applied to a specific problem-solving ethical situation (Chapter 6). This plan of attack moves sequentially from the time-proven thought of three great philosophers of the past (i.e., proceeds from Kant to Mill to Aristotle). Then, a second, legal or jurisprudential approach (Phase Two) is introduced as a (possible) follow-up to Phase One using a four-step technique). This can be employed by those who wish to consolidate and support their embryonic decision-making process of Phase One somewhat more with a (jurisprudential) law argument (Chapter 7).

Next, in Phase Three, you are presented with the possibility of strengthening and supplementing (i.e., verifying) his or her (Phase One) decision by carefully superimposing or blending the results of the three-step, philosophic approach onto the (jurisprudential) law argument developed in Phase Two (Chapter 8). Finally, in Phase Four, if you wish to carry this analytic process one step further, a more detailed *case method approach* to ethical decision-making has been added (Chapter 9). Here one sample case will demonstrate the possible progression through the FOUR phases resulting in ethical decision-making of a personal nature.

At this point you will move into Part III of the book. Here, after a brief explanatory discussion, in Chapters 10, 11, and 12, a variety of ethical problems will be offered for your consideration and "laboratory" practice. It was decided to divide these ethical problems into three reasonably discrete categories: (1) personal, (2) professional, and (3) environmental. (Of course, we appreciate that each of these categories is "personal" in nature, in that it would be an individual who would be making ethical decisions related to the case problems offered under each category. However, I will make every effort through initial consideration of the nature of the ethical problem at hand to have a specific problem be (a) "largely personal" (e.g., one's private sex life); (b) "largely professional" (e.g., one's professional conduct on the job); or (c) "largely environmental" (e.g., one's involvement in combatting environmental degradation). Of course, there is bound to be some overlap among these categories. Exercises will be provided with each category (e.g., professional). The case situation or problem will be explained briefly but succinctly. Then, after a brief analysis, I will ask you to follow the same progression through the one or (possibly) more of the four phases resulting in the making of a defensible ethical decision.

I have observed that many books of this nature propose a number of different philosophical stances, often in a semi-neutral fashion, recommending that the reader ultimately make his or her own personal decision about which to follow. In this book I planned to follow this "striving-to-stay-neutral" approach. But then I decided, also, that first I would provide an "easy-entry" approach as well, one that can be used BEFORE a person makes a final decision (i.e., as more experience and maturation is obtained during life).

In addition, in Part IV, I felt also that I had a responsibility to make my own position on ethical decision-making known at some point (see Chapter 13). I did this because I felt--especially since the turbulent 1960s when most students demanded it as a right--that (a) I owed that to you, and (b) I felt that so-called "scientific ethics" possibly offers the best hope for the entire world in the 21st century (or as soon as possible thereafter).

A final, brief concluding discussion (Chapter 14) will urge you to follow through and to take it from this point in your own personal and professional life. The need for critical evaluation will be stressed as you strive to form an evolving, possibly fluid, basis for sound ethical decision-making in what are bound to be difficult years ahead in the 21st century.

If time is of the essence in the resolution of a pressing ethical problem of either a person or professional nature, you may well decide that Phases No. 2, 3, and 4--which can be considered as optional--are not absolutely necessary for you. However, by adding Phases 2, 3, and even 4 to your complete decision-making process, it should be possible for a person (or a group in Phase 4) to ultimately feel much more secure about proceeding with (i.e., acting on) a decision that has been crafted more carefully than the use of only Phase 1 might indicate.

At this point I feel it appropriate to call to your attention a device that I hope will be helpful as you read this book. In certain chapters (e.g., Chapters 2 & 3), you will come across various philosophic words, terms, or definitions. *They will typically--not always!--be followed immediately by a "superior asterisk" (\*).* Thus, it will be possible to check the precise meaning or definition of such a word or term in the Glossary at the back of the book. (If no superscript is present, and the meaning is unclear, check it in the Glossary anyhow.)

Still further, I want to express my appreciation and gratitude to those who have helped at specific periods along the way in developing this material. In this respect I am referring to the three people to whom this book is dedicated: Professor Richard Fox for the Phase-One approach, Professor John Kekes for his unique assessment of the present moral dilemma society faces, and finally to the late Dr. Michael Bayles whose work on professional ethics has been so helpful to me.

The folks at Trafford, especially Joti Bryant and Terry Lussier, were most helpful moving this project along and in getting material formatted properly for Trafford's online, on-demand printing service.

As I conclude, I emphasize that I have made every effort to use non-sexist language, a truly difficult task where writing style has been one-sided for so long. Also, to the best of my knowledge, fictitious names and places have been employed in the case situations included.

Finally, I have found this to be a fascinating area for study, reflection, and ethical practice. I wish the same level of experience for you, the reader. The experiential nature of this recommended approach can be so helpful--indeed vital--as one matures in what is indeed a troubled and perplexing world. It is my most sincere hope that you will find this approach helpful as you face seemingly ever-present ethical problems in the years ahead.

Earle F. Zeigler, Richmond, BC, Canada, 2002

## PREAMBLE

Throughout this book you will be exhorted to develop what Ayn Rand (1960, p. 36) called an "intellectual roadbed," a competency that is needed for ethical decision-making. As you approach this subject, I want to make very clear, also, my personal belief about how vitally important it is for a person to learn to make *rational* ethical decisions. As an essential complement in the effort to do this effectively, I recommend also an implicit/explicit experiential approach that means--stated simply--**we learn by doing!**

Rand offered us her interesting analysis of what occurs in the life of a young person before any semblance of a rational philosophy develops. Western world religions often impress on the young child the idea that God is "watching over" him or her, and that He (She?) knows and makes note of every misdeed through some sort of supernatural recorder. Rand's reaction to this and her subsequent personal explanation were that she regarded this as a myth. However, she explained that interestingly this myth is true, not existentially, but from a *psychological* standpoint!

This "psychological recorder," she argued, is truly the integrating mechanism of the young person's subconscious. She called this the individual's "sense of life" and described it as "a pre-conceptual equivalent of metaphysics, an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and existence. It sets the nature of a man's emotional responses and the essence of his character" (p. 31). Thus, this human being is making choices, is forming value judgments, is experiencing emotions, and in a great many ways is acquiring an *implicit* view of life. All of this young person's conclusions or evasions about or from life, she explained, represent an implicit metaphysics.

It is important for us at the outset, also, to take a few moments to consider how a child's personality typically develops in early life prior to maturity. This same child as a maturing person subsequently gets a further opportunity through formal and informal education to develop his or her rationality. The hope is, of course, that such reasoning power will enable the individual to make sound ethical decisions as problems of this nature present themselves in daily life.

All people should be interested in the entire educational process, of course, our own and that of others with whom we might come into contact. Our hope is that young people will have the chance to develop their rational powers. If this occurs, reason can then act as the programmer of the individual's "emotional computer." The "hoped-for" outcome is that the earlier "sense of life" will develop into a reasonably logical philosophy. If not--that is, if the maturing child does not have the opportunity to develop a considerable degree of rationality, or somehow evades the opportunity--then unfortunately chance takes over.

What is society faced with then? We have a person who has matured chronologically, but who is "integrating blindly, incongruously, and at random" (p. 33). (And don't we all know people where this seems to be occurring daily--and often to the extreme?) Thus, we can see how really important it is that in the process of developing a fully integrated personality the young person's sense of life matches his or her conscious, rationalized convictions?

As individuals we can either drive this powerful integrating mechanism that we inherently possess--or be driven by it! Accordingly, we should inquire assiduously as to the role of philosophy in our lives, asking ourselves how a sound philosophy can help in the formation of a fully integrated personality. Truly, can we deny that the goal of education should be an individual whose mind and emotions are in harmony, thereby enabling the maturing person to develop his or her potential and accordingly achieve maximum effectiveness in life?

Taking the matter of the individual's development one step further, we need to keep in mind that we are dealing with a social animal, a person who in all probability will need sound and consistent help to bridge the gap from an early sense of life, where embryonic, plastic value integrations occur, to the making of ethical decisions in life's many activities of both a personal and professional nature. We should be helping this young person to develop conscious convictions in which the mind leads and the emotions follow. To put it another way, the developing IQ (intelligence quotient) ought to assist what Goleman (1995) calls the developing EQ (emotional quotient) to function optimally. In the process the embryonic, steadily adapting MI (moral "intelligence") of the growing child, to coin a term based on the work of Coles (1997), should enable the young person to relate to the values and moral norms that prevail in society.

Keeping in mind the difficulty of defining the term "good," adequately and satisfactorily, the key concept in the formation of a person's sense of life may well be the term "important." Rand argued that in this context "important" is a metaphysical term that serves as a bridge between metaphysics\* and ethics while the young, immature person is learning what values are important individually and socially. In summary, "the integrated sum of a person's basic values is that person's sense of life" (p. 35). Then, during the period of adolescence, a certain amount of rebellion occurs typically. At this point parents are apt to encounter a situation characterized by often quite frantic irrationality on the part of the young person as he or she is confronted by a set of adult-imposed values and norms.

As was said above, what the young person truly needs in his or her development is "an intellectual roadbed for one's course of life" (p. 36) in which both emotional intelligence and moral intelligence are integrated as well. **The eventual goal, we trust, will be a fully integrated personality, a person whose mind and emotions are in harmony a great deal of the time.** When this occurs, we have helped to create a situation where the individual's sense of life matches that person's conscious convictions.

In this struggle that takes place to a greater or lesser extent in each person's life, a sound philosophical approach can help in the setting of criteria of "emotional" and "moral" integrations. If the young person's view of reality has been carefully defined and is logically consistent throughout, the result should be a gradual, but steady, growth and development from *implicit*, emotionally based reactions to life's many problems and issues to reactions that are truly *explicit*, conceptually derived value-judgments.

Such, then, is undoubtedly the goal for which we must strive both as mature individuals directing and guiding our own lives, as well as for those times when we are guiding others either as offspring or as young people in our charge when we are serving in

a professional capacity. Now we can move ahead to the topic at hand--the making of ethical decisions.

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## CHAPTER 1

### ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING: A PERSONAL DILEMMA

A reasonably intelligent person today understands that most of the world's nations have won a recognizable semblance of victory over what is often a harsh physical environment. Yet many of the world's peoples living within these nations' boundaries have not yet been able to remove much of the insecurity evident in their efforts to live together constructively and peacefully. Why is this so? The "questioning" title of this book provides one significant answer to this question. The dilemma posed by the "Who Knows What's Right Anymore?" question of this book's title opens the door to an understanding of much of the fractionating division that exists in the world. The awesome power exerted by the "inherent" ethical systems of the world's organized religions needs to be fully understood before the situation can be improved.

Organized religion has continued for millennia as a social force that almost automatically controls the lives of billions of people of the world to a greater or lesser extent. One might argue that this is a good thing, that humankind truly needs the guidance provided by, for example, the "original-sin group" (i.e., the promulgators and adherents of many of the more conservative elements of the world's 13 great religions, along with the innumerable sects within these enterprises). Indeed the need for this "guidance" appears to have been vital in the distant past. It could be argued further that there is evidence that similar conditions still exist today--but to varying degrees

A second group is increasing in number daily. This second group believes that the "great" religions have had their day, and that humankind had best devise a more effective and efficient way to decide what is right and good in contrast to what is wrong and evil, respectively. This could well be called the "scientific-ethics group."

Finally, there is another truly substantive group of humans--many who are nominal members of one of the 13 (or more!) religions mentioned above--who typically live their lives as though these major religions don't even exist. This is what I am identifying loosely as the "common-sense group."

### ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING: A PROVOCATIVE SUBJECT

The title of this book was meant to be disturbing, mainly because ethical decision-making--i.e., deciding what is right and good--can indeed be a most provocative subject. When you get right down to it, the "trichotomy" of "original sin or scientific ethics or common sense" is a capsule analysis of the basic choices that the majority of humankind is facing. On the one hand, there are those who believe that some external power, God or whatever, made this basic decision about right and wrong--good and evil--for humankind eons ago. On the other hand, there are those who consider such pronouncements to be largely myth or fairy tale.

The latter group argues that it is up to us today to create our own "heaven and/or hell." This is to be done presumably through a steady, evolutionary, scientific search for what is good (workable) and what is bad (unworkable) or what is right or wrong. A third group, perhaps the majority, don't really spend much time worrying about it all. When an ethical problem arises, they use their common sense to arrive at a solution and then "muddle their way through."

Consequently, as a result of this "original sin," "scientific ethics," or "common sense" plight, people of all ages and backgrounds in most societies still find significant disagreement on the subject of human values, morality, and ethics. Nevertheless, there is also substantial evidence that many men and women are diligently and resolutely seeking a sensitive understanding of themselves and their fellows. Yet, as a result of the most divisive, long-standing, basic intra- and intercultural differences in belief that prevail, there is reason to believe that the future of the world society may well be in danger as the 21st century progresses.

Indeed, it may well be that our "distorting emotions and destructive passions" created by these and other seemingly unlovable differences represent the "greatest danger" for the future (Burt (1965, p. 311). If such a danger does indeed exist, the development and application of a sound, but not too complex, approach to cross-cultural, ethical decision-making in personal and professional living could be of inestimable assistance to people everywhere. This will not occur, however, unless the present inability to shed many archaic beliefs and ideologies is overcome.

#### NO UNIVERSAL ETHICAL FOUNDATION AVAILABLE

Unfortunately, even though many philosophers have searched persistently throughout history for a normative (i.e., standard) ethical system on which people could and should base their conduct, there is still no single, non-controversial foundation accepted universally on which the entire structure of ethics can be based. This need for an acceptable, workable ethical approach is especially true at a time when developments in the field of communications, for example, have thrust us into a situation where the concept of the world as a "global village" has become a reality in the developed world. Any event that is newsworthy becomes almost immediately available through satellite communication to television stations at all points of the globe. As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to view humanity as only an indistinct amalgam of separate cultures able to proceed on their own.

Despite the above, we have witnessed a steadily rising tide of often unreasonably chauvinistic nationalism in recent years throughout the world. This development has been occasioned by an evident need for people to retain strong cultural identities through independent national status. However, because of an accompanying tide of rising expectations, we find many people within these nations--many of dubious political status--becoming part of disenfranchised populations where strife and revolt often prevail. As a result a certain percentage of these men, women, and children are seeking to move where they believe they and their offspring will have a better opportunity for "the good life."

This turmoil in both developed and/or underdeveloped nations has created serious problems for the world, at large. Of course, this holds true, also, for the United States, Canada, and Mexico here in our North American culture. On this side of the Atlantic, we were supposedly entering an age of leisure in the industrialized world in the 1960s, but today there's a completely different outlook confronting us as we struggle in the throes of emergence as post-industrial nations. Resultantly, this continent is rapidly becoming a vast multi-ethnic culture peopled by individuals who as they came here originally brought with them religious and ethical backgrounds. It would be too visionary, of course, to expect that cultural differentiation would cease tomorrow, and that overnight all would become enthusiastic Americans or Canadians, or Mexicans, respectively. However, it should be possible to work in that direction specifically in a much better manner than we find today.

Also, it does bring home the need to promote steadily improving international relations. Whether the "global village" concept working in certain aspects of society (e.g., economics) will lead to the eventual establishment of one "recognizable" world culture is anybody's guess. However, cross-cultural understanding must be cultivated with great diligence. I believe this is vital because our "global village" with its blanketing communications network is steadily and inevitably viewing human values, ethics, and morality in at least a similar manner. This could well be the only hope for human civilization on Earth if people are to live together peacefully in the future.

Further, as if the need for such "harmonization" will not be difficult enough in itself, we are at present also witnessing the origins of a new science called evolutionary psychology. This developing field, based on the investigations of evolutionary biologists and a variety of social-science scholars, presents a strong possibility (probability?) that the end result will be a sharply revised view of human nature itself. Assessing contemporary social reality, Wright (1994) argues that a new understanding of the imperatives required by human genes is needed. Resultantly, it could be that the very foundation of our human concept of goodness will never be the same again.

With thoughts such as these as a backdrop, I have personally "survived" as a presumably ethical, dual citizen of the United States and Canada, a person who has worked professionally for a total of 60 years in both countries (first one, then the other, etc.). Yet I have also long since come to the conclusion that we all face a confusing "Tower of Babel" daily when we are confronted with everyday decision-making about problems of an ethical nature. I say this because in our relationships with others we so often seem to be speaking "different languages" about what's right and what's wrong, as well as which actions are good and which are bad.

I have found this statement to be true for many reasons: whether a parent is speaking to a son or daughter about a social-relationship problem in school, whether that same parent is facing a marital problem in the home, whether a member of that family confronts someone with an issue on a neighborhood street, or whether the same man or woman has an ethical decision to make at work as a professional practitioner or tradesperson. Let's face it, these

examples cited just scratch the surface of the many issues and concerns about which the individual is required to make rapid decisions daily.

## A "DOWN-TO-EARTH" APPROACH TO ETHICS

Seeking to improve what basically amounts to a "cultural impasse," in this book I offer you, the reader, what I believe to be a down-to-earth approach looking to the resolution of the many personal, social/environmental, and professional problems facing us all from one day to the next. I must confess immediately that I have wandered far afield from the stated or implied "religious ethics" of my upbringing as a Protestant (Lutheran, Baptist, and agnostic Unitarian-Universalist in that order). Over time I have found present in me a strong, steadily growing belief that we (all people in the developing world) must somehow--and relatively soon--rise above this or that sectarian religious or ideological position. As the world is turning, indeed we must--if we ever hope to have a peaceful world--seek a workable level of normative consensus among the often conflicting ethical beliefs of the world's leading religions and ideologies.

Trained philosophers, especially those of the "analytic persuasion"\* [see "analysis"] may well view this practical approach as reductionistic (i.e., abridged and overly simplified). Such an assessment would only be true to a degree, since the first phase of this approach to ethical decision-making should not be new or completely antithetical to them. In fact, it is a well-considered plan that one of the persons to whom this book is dedicated used for many years with college undergraduates. He did so because he felt that an elementary, straightforward plan at least got reasonably intelligent students off to a good start with the subject of applied ethics. Of course, how they subsequently approached ethical decision-making as they matured could well be another matter.

So, if you, the reader, will grant what I stated originally above as an apparent truth--i.e., the moral confusion that prevails currently in North America and elsewhere in much of the world--I will assume further that all who read these words will be interested also in improving society's educational process in this aspect of general education. Basically, I am arguing that all children and young people in our society should have the opportunity to develop their own rational powers through the finest possible, competency-based educational experience relating to ethics and morality. (I might add that I am not for a minute recommending any retroactive change in the basic separation of church and state where it already exists, but I do believe that some agreement regarding the subject-matter of ethics and morality, as well as about an appropriate, accompanying teaching methodology, is needed urgently so that this subject may be taught within public education at all levels.)

Any new approach being recommended needs solid justification. I believe strongly that such a case can be made for the approach recommended here for North America--as a point of departure. In the first place, I have tried it out personally and professionally over a period of years in class with my own university students, and it worked very well basically. Experience indicated where certain modifications were advisable, and these changes were made and have also been incorporated here.

Secondly, I want to make clear that no effort will be made to indoctrinate you, the reader, to accept finally any one of the numerous approaches to ethical decision-making that are available in the Western world today. Yet I do recommend here initially one approach (a three-step one) of a normative nature for experimentation with the exercises included because it is quite consistent with the historical values and norms of North American society to this point. However I make it crystal-clear, also, that each person should, in the final analysis, work this out for himself or herself. (This seems only fair since sensitive understanding is essential to treat a subject that is undoubtedly highly controversial and taught "at one's peril" presently in public education.)

In the experiential educational process recommended here, the hope is that reason will begin to act as the programmer of the young person's "emotional computer" as soon as possible in his or her life. Our primary concern as parents or teachers should, of course, be to help the boy or girl to develop conscious convictions in which the mind leads and the emotions follow. In this way the maturing person would gradually learn what values are important to him or to her. As Ayn Rand (1960) explained, "the integrated sum of a person's basic values is that person's sense of life" (p. 35).

To cite one important example where improved ethical decision-making is needed, permit me to describe a subject that I know very well, competitive sport. It has become increasingly apparent to me that there is an urgent need for those involved in highly competitive sport to understand and then to develop a greatly improved approach to sport ethics and morality. Social institutions (e.g., religion, economics, education) are presumed to be beneficial to society as a whole--not detrimental! Yet as I see it, if we expect beneficial transfer of training to occur, highly competitive sport as a social institution may currently be doing more harm than good in the promotion of sound human relations and development. (This assertion is made about sport in public education and professional sport in the United States especially, but it undoubtedly applies to professional sport everywhere).

Thus, because of what I have assessed as a steadily deteriorating situation in U.S. competitive sport, I strongly believe that the development of a proper understanding of the prevailing "immoral" situation in U.S. is very important for athletes, coaches, athletic administrators, game officials, teachers, students, educational administrators, governing board members, local citizens, state or provincial legislators, and all the citizens of the nation. As I see it, also, a farsighted plan should be developed first from the standpoint of the possible contribution of ethical instruction to the general education of young people who may strive to be athletes in society. Also, it should be developed insofar as this subject might be introduced as a requirement into professional preparation programs in which coaches and physical educators are trained.

### THE YOUNG PERSON'S "SENSE OF LIFE"

Bringing this discussion back to the developing young person and a general education perspective, consider this analysis of what occurs before any semblance of a rational

philosophy develops. In this analogy, offered by Ayn Rand, she delineates first the youthful human's possession of a "psychological recorder," that which is truly the person's inherent subconscious, integrating mechanism. This so-called sense of life she views as "a pre-conceptual equivalent of metaphysics, an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and existence." As she sees it, this determines "the nature of a man's emotional responses and the essence of his character" (p. 31).

So what the young person really needs at this juncture of his or her development, she explains further, is an "intellectual roadbed" that provides a "course of life" to follow. The eventual goal should be a fully integrated personality, a person whose mind and emotions are in harmony a great deal of the time. When this occurs, we find a situation where the individual's sense of life matches his or her conscious convictions. It is fundamental further, of course, that the young person's view of reality be carefully defined by himself or herself and is reasonably consistent. And, the argument continues, if ethical instruction was planned more carefully and explicitly, the quality of living would probably be greatly improved for all.

As I believe it is happening today in North America, we have been led, most unfortunately, to the point where the child or young person typically learns to make rational ethical decisions poorly and inadequately. I strongly believe that this is a tragic condition because the young person's all-important personality development is so often misdirected, misguided, and at least temporarily stunted.

## CONCLUDING STATEMENT

In summary, I have argued here that we require a steadily improving crop of young citizens and professional people whose general education and professional education is undergirded by sound theory based on solid research and scholarly endeavor. Moreover, and perhaps more important ultimately, I have argued further that all of this will be in vain if we do not turn out high-calibre young people with high ethical standards. Accordingly, we are faced with the urgent need to make certain that such ethical sensitivity will be attained as a required competency by those who emerge from our educational system.

So there it is. Recognizing and appreciating that values, ethics, and morality are a vital part of our heritage, present living, and our future, I hope that you, the reader, will be helped by this volume to forge an improved personal and professional approach to ethical decision-making in your life. I hope you have read and assessed this introductory section carefully. Keep in mind Anderson's admonition ((1997, p. 155) that "all ethical and moral systems are created by people, and by people as they are at a certain time and place."

Now please follow through with the subsequent chapters in which many issues and problems of a controversial nature are introduced. If you do, the end result of such an "experiential" effort should be a more satisfying and rewarding existence for you. It should also have implications for your family, as well as for your friends and business associates. Chapter 2 that follows explains what a confusing miasma we are confronted with as we consider human values, ethics, and morality today.

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## CHAPTER 2

### A CONFUSING MIASMA: ETHICAL VALUES AND PROBLEMS TODAY

In considering humankind's basic problems, the late Edwin A. Burt (1965) believed that:

The greatest danger to his future lies in the disturbing emotions and destructive passions that he has not yet overcome; the greatest promise lies in his capacity for a sensitive understanding of himself and his human fellows, and his power to enter the inclusive universe in which the creative aspirations of all can move freely toward their fulfillment (p. 311).

If our "distorting emotions and destructive passions" do indeed represent the greatest danger for the future, the application of a sound approach--whichever one is finally chosen--to personal and professional living can be of inestimable assistance to people who are truly seeking a "sensitive understanding" of themselves and their fellows.

This need for greater ethical awareness and understanding became especially pertinent to me in the late 1960s. At that point, and then continuing through the intervening decades, there is evidence from a variety of sources that others saw this need for study about ethics as well. For example, The New York Times reported in 1978 that "nowadays students in many disciplines are enrolling in new ethics courses in a variety of undergraduate departments and professional programs . . . part of the impetus for new programs stems from the social consciousness of the 1960s" (Feb. 26). Whether this enrollment in such courses could have been shown to have had a direct relationship with the earlier social consciousness felt by some in the late 1960s and early 1970s is an interesting, but probably debatable question.

Nevertheless, it is true that there were many indications then that people's interest in ethics was increasing. Some examples of this heightened interest, selected from the 1975-1978 period, are (1) Geoffrey Hazard's (1978) article on "Capitalist Ethics"; (2) Henry Fairlie's (1978) book titled *The Seven Deadly Sins Today*; (3) James Chace's (1977) piece inquiring "How 'moral' can we get?"; (4) Michael Blumenthal's (1977) statement that societal changes have occasioned "questionable and illegal corporate activities"; (5) The New York Times' (1976) article asking whether the growing dishonesty in sports was just a reflection of the American society; Derek Bok's (1976) request, as president of Harvard University, that courses in applied ethics be taught; and (7) Amitai Etzioni's (1976) assertion that the "hottest new item" in the Post-Watergate curriculum was "moral education".

And, if the above indications from the 1975-1978 period aren't sufficient to indicate the heightening interest in ethics, there were also (8) Gene Maeroff's (1976) review stressing that "West Point cheaters have a lot of company"; (9) Russell Baker's (1976) spoof implying that good "sports went out with bamboo vaulting poles; (10) Rainer Martens' belief that kid sports may at that time be a "den of iniquity"; (11) Ann Dennis' (1975) article explaining that the



Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association was considering the adoption of a code of ethics; (12) The Saturday Review (1975) special report titled "Watergating on main street" that assessed the ethics of congressmen, lawyers, businessmen, accountants, journalists, physicians, and educators; and (13) Fred Hechinger's (1974) query as to "Whatever became of sin?" And the reader should keep in mind that these references are just an unreliable sampling of the many articles and other statements that surfaced during that period of approximately three years.

## ETHICS YESTERDAY AND TODAY

There are a number of scholarly philosophic texts that treat ethics and morality in great detail. However, they would not serve the purpose I have in mind here. I want this book to help popularize a subject that should have now, as well as in the past, much greater attention in the area of general education within the public schools and college. (In Chapter 3, a very brief outline history of this branch of philosophy in the Western world will be introduced.)

Here the first point to be made is that, in ethics typically, the terms "right" and "wrong" apply only to the acts of a person, whereas "good" and "bad" refer to (1) the effects of acts; (2) the motives from which the act was done; (3) the intention of the person carrying out the deed; and (4) the person who is the agent of a particular act. So, to offer an example, we might say correctly that "although Mike Smith is a good person, he acted wrongly--with good motives and intentions--when he struck Tom Jones and broke his nose. The consequences of Smith's act were bad, even though Jones had made threatening gestures at Smith's smaller brother" (adapted from Hospers, 1953, p. 451).

Interestingly, but confusingly, as is the case with so many words and terms that we use nowadays, the term "ethics"\* is employed typically in three ways. Each of these has a relation to the other, and all three ways will be used throughout this book. First, the term "ethics" is used to classify a general pattern or "way of life" (e.g., normative Christian or Jewish ethics). Second, it refers to a listing of rules of conduct, or what is also called a moral code (e.g., the ethics of a priest, a teacher, or a physician). Thirdly, it has come to be used when describing inquiry about ways of life or rules of conduct (e.g., that subdivision of philosophy now known as metaethics\*).

History substantiates that ethics is a description of "irregular progress toward complete clarification of each type of ethical judgment" (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, III, 1967, p. 82). If this is so, how does one judge exactly, or even generally, how much "irregular progress" has been made since the early development of ancient Greek ethics with--say--Socrates in the fifth century B.C.E.? One could argue, for example, that the changing political, economic, and other social forces of that time required the introduction of a new way of conduct. Yet, one could also state that today starting the 21st century there appears to be an urgent need for altered standards of conduct during what is often called a transitional period.

It would be an obvious exaggeration today to say that there are as many views of ethics and/or moral philosophy as there are philosophers. Conversely, however, there is no single,

non-controversial, foundation stone upon which to build the entire structure of ethics. This is not to say that there are not some aspects of this branch of philosophy upon which there have been fairly wide agreement. As Noel-Smith (1954) explained in mid-century, moral philosophers in the past offered general guidance as to what to do, what to seek, and how to treat others--injunctions that all of us could well keep in mind still today.

As a rule, philosophers have not preached to their adherents in the same way that theologians of most religions have felt constrained to do. However, down through the centuries many did offer practical advice that included pronouncements on what was good or bad, or right and wrong. Further, many have searched persistently for a true moral code, a normative ethical system upon which people could and should base their conduct. With the advent in the Western world of what has been called philosophical analysis\* in an "Age of Analysis"--in the Western, English-speaking world at least--as a distinct emphasis or approach during the 20th century, the contemporary analytic philosopher was thrust into the middle of the struggle between the ethical objectivist\* and the ethical subjectivist\*. (The ethical objectivist had been working toward the creation of a true moral code, whereas the subjectivist argued conversely that such objectivity was not reasonable--or even possible. As the subjectivist saw it, the achievement of objectivity in a true moral code was definitely not possible. Thus, it simply not possible to state that any such knowledge could prescribe how people should live.)

As a result of such indecision and controversy, and at the very time when the world society appears to be in the throes of a momentous transition, the large majority of philosophical scholars are almost completely silent on the subject of morality and ethics. Further in a period when the world's turmoil is also characterized by "hot" wars, "cold" wars, expanding treaty organizations, terrorists, or what have you, in place of offering a "guide to the perplexed" (with thanks to Maimonides, the great Jewish philosopher and physician of the Middle Ages), the practitioners in this same profession of philosophy avoid the rational justification of any type of moral system for public consumption. Admittedly there has been some movement in the direction of rectifying this imbalance, but the bulk of these scholars continue to analyze the meaning and function of moral concepts and statements in a more or less scientific and/or logical manner. In the process the average intelligent adult with a college degree, much less a high-school degree, is receiving no help in coping with life's great questions from the field of philosophy.

While this analytic approach was growing and strengthening typically in the eyes of most members of departments of philosophy in North America, others in diverse fields have been filling the gap created by offering prescriptive and normative advice freely down through the years of the twentieth century to the present. Accordingly, also, because some of us were evidently afraid to be challenged as illogical, hortatory, careless thinkers by our own colleagues within philosophy and its departmental philosophies, the field of ethics and morality as applied to life generally--in politics, in business and economics, in science, in medicine, in education, and even in sport and fitness--was left to people who usually have given the topic much less careful thought than we as individuals within the field have. This present volume represents a visible attempt to correct this perceived imbalance.

Here I am referring, of course, to dramatists, theologians, novelists, poets, physicians, politicians, educational administrators, business leaders--in no special order of importance--who offer a great variety of opinions, ranging from suggestions to recommendations, to prescriptions, and to dogma, about what is good and bad, right and wrong, about all aspects of life. Most notable among these categories of "philosophers" recently are scientists, politicians, and comedians, people who may have earned justifiable fame--or even notoriety.

### THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PHILOSOPHY IS INTOLERABLE

This point should not be carried too far; so, I will simply state that this present situation, one in which there has developed such a sharp distinction between the relatively few moral philosophers concerned with normative ethics and the much larger number involved with some form of critical or analytic philosophy, should in my opinion be rectified as soon as possible. The matter of values that ultimately govern our social system and culture is far too vital to leave almost completely to those who can be classified as laymen with no training or professionals from other fields with quite possibly a built-in bias. What I would hope is that a steadily increasing number of trained philosophers would spend more time on providing helpful advice to the public and accordingly less time on what often seems to be "scientific pedantry."

I am pleased to be able state parenthetically that there are others who tend to agree with this opinion. These are qualified philosophers who felt that the pendulum had swung too far in one direction in the "Age of Analysis." One example of such a belief was Rorty's 1982 essay titled "Philosophy in America today" in which he decried those who concentrate only on philosophical problem-solving in a "scientific" manner. He explained that "The situation in moral and social philosophy, admittedly, is not the same as in the so-called 'central' areas of philosophy. Here we have Rawls' Theory of justice as a genuine inter-university paradigm, a book whose importance and permanence are deservedly recognized on all sides" (p. 216).

Another example, speaking in a similar vein as Rorty about the same time, was John E. Smith (1982) In his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, also complained that "the decline of philosophy as an influential voice in the intellectual exchange within our culture has been the result of several questionable conceptions that have dominated much of modern philosophy since the seventeenth century" (p. 7). Before offering specific conditions that he believed might contribute to the "recovery of philosophy as a significant force in American society" (p. 10), Smith also bemoaned the fact that so many questions of importance to humanity had been abandoned by the bulk of scholars "doing" philosophy (p. 8).

Further, many of us who are specializing in what have been called "departmental" philosophies need scholarly guidance in the subject of ethics as applied to our professions. Here I am referring to such specialties as medical ethics, business ethics, legal ethics, sport ethics, educational ethics, or what have you. We need to understand more fully what the relationship could be, or even should be, between normative ethics and meta-ethics. There are extremists, of course, but a more reasonable approach to follow would seem to be one in

which a moral philosopher or ethical theorist--whether he or she is employed in the mother discipline or in, say, a department of educational philosophy (such as existed formerly)--can engage in metaethical analysis if desired, or can become involved in a scholarly approach to normative analysis without fear of unreasonable reprisal in one way or another by colleagues of an opposite persuasion.

Rorty (1982) would support this position, since he explicitly stated that philosophers of the analytic persuasion "should relax and say, with our colleagues in history and literature, that we in the humanities differ from our natural scientists precisely in not knowing in advance what our problems are, and in not needing to provide criteria of identity. . . ." (p. 218). In other words, all should be working toward the elimination of irrational ethical beliefs while attempting to discover the soundest possible approach to ethical decision-making for our evolving society.

## NORMATIVE ETHICAL INQUIRY

As we move ahead in our consideration of ethical decision-making, I should make clear that the task of normative ethical inquiry can also be difficult, especially when complex issues and specific conclusions tend to stray into the realm of meta-ethics\* as well. (Meta-ethics may be defined as inquiry as to the nature of human morality and conduct with regard to the definition, purposes, presuppositions, methodology, and limitations of the subject. Of course, it is not the purpose of this book to follow this approach solely, or even largely.)

For example, it is quite simple to distinguish between a normative ethical statement such as "Harsh teaching methods have no place in education" and a meta-ethical statement such as "A teacher knows through intuition whether his/her beliefs about teaching ethics are fundamentally true." Further, when a normative ethical theory such as hedonism--i.e., an ethical doctrine that states humans should guide their conduct on the basis of personal pleasure (however defined) such conduct will bring--such as "Religious teaching is good because it brings pleasure," the non-hedonist could well challenge this statement solely on the meaning of the terms "good" and "pleasure." Obviously, the difficulty of justifying a normative ethical theory brings to the fore penetrating questions about meta-ethical relativism and subjectivism. And when such questions as these are carefully pursued, they point up the present severity of the "subjectivist threat" to what may be called "normative objectivism."

Basically and fundamentally, then, justification of an ethical theory, or even an incomplete set of ethical statements about education, religion, sport, or any other aspect of life revolves around the ability of the theorist to (1) state correctly, (2) elucidate sufficiently, and (3) defend adequately his or her moral or ethical values and claims. This means answering a variety of questions. For example, is a moral judgment objective or subjective? Does a moral judgment differ from a factual judgment? Is an ethical statement about right conduct in medicine, law, or education publicly warrantable? (In other words, is there some publicly acceptable procedure for verification that reasonable people would be willing to accept?) Finally, should ethical claims be objectively verifiable, and should they be universalizable? (If so, this would make such claims practical for use in everyday life.)

## DEFINITIONS AND CLARIFICATION

Moving ahead to further basic information about ethics and morality, there are several further points that require definition and clarification. For example, we should keep in mind the distinction between statements of fact as opposed to statements of value. In the first instance, I might argue that "health is desired" (a fact in this instance), whereas I might also state that "health is desirable" for everyone (actually a statement of value on my part).

We should keep in mind, also, that there are two fields of value theory in philosophy--ethics and aesthetics. As explained earlier, in ethics we are involved with matters of good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation, and moral responsibility. In aesthetics\*, however, value is viewed somewhat differently. In this case we take into consideration matters or doctrines of taste or beauty, meaning, and truth--all typically considered within an art context.

From another standpoint, we need to keep in mind that, although the word "good" is central to the subject of ethics, most of the times we use it we are actually not expressing moral judgments (e.g., "good apple," "good road," "good game of tennis"). Thus, if we say, "this is a good X," usually we mean that X fulfills, to a higher or greater degree than most X's, the criterion (or criteria) for which this particular X is designed or intended.

However, it is when we use the word "good" in moral discussions that a variety of problems arise. For example, we might state that Jones exhibits "good" character when he plays tennis, or that Jones shows "good" intentions when he helped Thompson up after accidentally driving the tennis ball into his face. Further, Jones might also have made "good" moves when he later played a doubles match in tennis. And so it goes. . . . Nevertheless, the main moral words used in ethics are "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong," but confusion often develops when we use one or more of them in specific contexts.

Still further, we need to keep in mind that ethics today is typically divided into two main categories, only the first of which will be discussed here: (1) normative ethics is an attempt to discover a rational and possibly acceptable view that may be defended concerning those things that are good in this world (i.e., worth aiming at or working for) and what kinds of acts are right (and why this is so); and (2) metaethics is a field of inquiry that considers the meaning of words regarded as ethical and moral, as well as the actual inter-relations of such meanings. In this latter area, there appear now to be three distinct metaethical theories that have gradually emerged:

- a. Ethical naturalism\*, a position in which it is argued that ethical sentences can be translated into non-ethical ones without losing their meaning (usually a difficult accomplishment),
- b. Ethical non-naturalism\*, a position in which it is argued that at least some ethical sentences cannot be translated into any other kinds of sentences (this constitutes an autonomous class), and

c. Ethical non-cognitivism\*, a position in which it is argued that ethical sentences do not express any propositions at all.

## THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN LIFE

With this introductory material behind us, we are in a better position to consider the essence of "the ethical problem" as it appears in life. My personal belief is that an ethical problem cannot be correctly delineated unless there is also prior analysis and basic understanding of the values and norms of the prevailing social system and culture in which a person lives.

What is most important for our understanding at this point is that the various subsystems of society together compose a hierarchy of control and conditioning. For example, in Parsonsian "action theory," these subsystems total four: (1) culture, (2) social system, (3) personality, and (4) behavioral organism. Moreover, just as there are four subsystems within the total action system (as defined by Parsons and others), there appear to be, also, four levels within the particular subsystem known as "social system" (indicated as the second level immediately above).

These levels, proceeding from "highest" to "lowest," are (2a) values, (2b) norms, (2c) the structure of collectivities, and (2d) the structure of roles. Typically, the higher levels are more general than the lower ones, with the latter giving specific guidance to those segments or units of the particular system to which they apply. These "units" or "segments" are either collectivities or individual in their capacity as role occupants.

This delineation no doubt seems to be complex, and it is; however, the important thing to keep in mind is that the hierarchy of control and conditioning operates or functions in both downward and upward directions! Typically, the greatest pressure for conformity is exerted downward by the values and norms operative within a social system at a given time. In the United States the most important social values are (1) the rule of law, (2) the socio-structural facilitation of individual achievement, and (3) the equality of opportunity.

Similar to values, but which should be distinguished from them, are the norms of the social system. Norms are the shared, sanctioned rules that govern the second level of the social structure. People often find it difficult to understand the differentiation between the concepts of "value" and "norm." Keeping the above listing of values in mind, compare and contrast them with the following examples of norms in the United States; (1) the institution of private property; (2) private enterprise; (3) the monogamous, conjugal family; and (4) the separation of church and state (Johnson, 1969, pp. 46-47).

Keeping the above discussion in mind, and understanding that there are a number of cultures and social systems in the world, you can now comprehend how a great many problems involving the stability of values and norms can spring up just about any day at any time in any place. For example, consider the gradual shattering of the amateur ideal that has

occurred in Olympic sport, an ideal propounded before the revival of the Olympic Games in 1896. Or, as another example, think how we witnessed displays of unbridled nationalism when top North American professional hockey players had their titanic struggles with Russian "amateurs" for supremacy in a sport that since then has become increasingly marred by undue violence at every turn.

Of course, sharp diversity of opinion and belief can exist--publicly, that is--only in a social system within a culture characterized by pluralistic (i.e., a number of) philosophies both within the philosophical mainstream or in the various departmental philosophies of the mother discipline (e.g., educational philosophy). Such a condition is not necessarily bad, of course. It undoubtedly requires a political state in which a considerable amount of participatory democracy is present. Interestingly, the paradoxical opinion is often expressed that North America functions in a materialistic fashion despite being described typically as possessing an overarching, almost inherent philosophic idealism.

Many people today are absolutely convinced that all of the old standards and morals have been completely negated. As a result they believe that the world is "going to Hell in the proverbial hand basket." Accordingly, they argue, only a return to earlier (presumably!) halcyon days can prevent impending disaster. So they decry what they believe are evident "situation" ethics,\* because they sense an uncharted course ahead on a rocky road leading to perdition (i.e., total disaster).

Oddly enough, as described above briefly, at the very time when people seem to need guidance, many have turned away from organized religion. Also, a very large percentage of philosophers, in the English-speaking world at least, seemed to have quite completely abandoned a function accepted formerly for their field for today's strictly disciplinary (analytic/metaethical) approach to their work. Of course, this latter development (i.e., a strictly disciplinary approach to their task) was actually a direction followed by many other disciplines to a great extent since mid-century. In the 1960s, for example, a similar disciplinary orientation occurred in educational philosophy and then, during the 1970s, this trend spread to sport and physical activity philosophy as well.

As I see it, the swing of the pendulum was too great (it was ever thus!). And, to confuse the issue even further, the general public has incorporated such words as pragmatism\*, idealism\*, realism\*, and existentialism\* into their vocabulary. As a result the original meaning of these philosophic terms or stances have been (possibly) forever distorted beyond recognition. The result is that current use of these terms today now requires extensive qualification.

All of the above adds up to the conclusion that society has now moved to the point where unanimity is often lacking in regard to "what's good," "what's bad," or whether such distinction makes all that much difference any more. This conclusion is obviously extreme, of course, but it is true that the distinction between the everyday concepts (or meanings) of "good" and "bad" has indeed become blurred at present--no matter what phase of life is under consideration.

I well recall this point being brought home forcibly a generation ago by Cogley (1972) when he wrote:

Every major institution in the land and most of the minor ones as well seemed to have been caught up in an identity crisis. Upheavals in the church were front-page news for almost a decade. The revolt against the prevailing idea of a university which began in Berkeley in 1964 kept erupting with dismayingly frequency. Veteran army officers found themselves at a loss as to how to deal with rebellious troops. The Democratic debacle at the Chicago convention four years ago dramatized a widespread disillusionment with the political parties. . . .

And, if all of this wasn't bad enough, he continued as follows:

The once sacrosanct public school system came under severe attack. Working newsmen who took to producing their own underground newspapers after hours voiced bitter disenchantment with the established press employing them. So prevalent was the discontent within the academic and professional communities that the "radical caucuses" within them were given semi-official status. Bishops, university presidents, military brass, publishers, politicians, school principals, and other established "leaders," it became increasingly clear, were no longer leading. . . . (p. 2).

In retrospect we now appreciate that the values, norms, and standards of morality of the 1960s did indeed undergo an identity crisis that has endured to a considerable extent since that time. To be sure, there was some swing of the pendulum in the other direction in the 1980s and 1990s. But many of the same problems, often in slightly "different clothes," have emerged again in the late 1990s. No one can deny that the subject of personal and professional ethics is today still in a state of flux and will warrant careful monitoring on into the indeterminate future.

### CONCLUDING STATEMENT

It is indeed true that the world seems to be more "rudderless" than previously, and who can argue against this position successfully? The implications for us all personally and professionally is that we need to develop a greatly improved understanding of, and approach to, possible solutions for these ongoing, ever-changing moral and ethical problems and issues. The "waves will flow to and fro" indefinitely for better or worse. It seems obvious that all of us need to become more seriously involved in this matter of ethical decision-making. That is the goal we have set for this book: to help young people and men and women of all ages to devise their own personal and professional approach to the making of moral and ethical decisions in their lives. In Chapter 3 that follows, you will find a brief look at the "good" and the "bad" placed in historical perspective.



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## CHAPTER 3

### THE "GOOD" AND THE "BAD" IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter a very brief outline history of that branch of philosophy known as *ethics* is presented. Basically, you will find the problem of the "good" and the "bad" (and also that of the "right" and the "wrong") in the *Western* world traced for your review. (The study of ethics and morality in the East will not be discussed at this point, but a brief comparison of the two approaches has been made below.<sup>1</sup>)

The primary focus at this point in our discussion will be on *metaethics*<sup>\*</sup> and its central questions. What is meant when one searches for the meaning of the "good" or the "bad?" What guarantee is there that when a person says her intentions are good that they really are so? Can there be *correct* standards for use in judging whether things are good or bad, or whether actions are right or wrong?

If such value judgments are indeed made, how do they differ--if at all--from judgments that are value free (or value neutral)? Also, in any such search for answers, it is difficult additionally to know whether to proceed from the general to the specific or vice versa (i.e., from the good *in general* to right conduct or justice *in particular*, or in the opposite direction).

Even a cursory examination of the history of ethics substantiates that it is a description of "irregular progress toward complete clarification of each type of ethical judgment" (*Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The*, III, 1967, p. 82). It is indeed difficult to judge even generally how much irregular progress has been made since the development of Greek ethics beginning with the fifth century B.C.E. contributions of Socrates (as reported by Plato). It could be argued that the changing social influences (political, economic, and others) of the time demanded the development of a new way of conduct--just as there appears to be a need for altered standards of conduct today.

The emergence of professional teachers of philosophy were in a sense the byproduct of more advanced civilization. As Sidgwick (1960) explained,

If bodily vigour was no longer to be left to nature and spontaneous exercise, but was to be attained by the systematic observance of rules laid down by professional trainers, it was natural to think that the same might be the case with excellence of the soul (p. 21).

### THE ANCIENTS

Recalling that "the soul" as denoted above actually meant what we today think of as "mind," Socrates began the development of standards for the qualities of goodness. \* justice,\* and virtue\*. Plato added a spiritual dimension to such thought since he believed that these timeless qualities or idea(l)s had been defined in a world beyond the sphere and knowledge of

humans.

Conversely, Plato's pupil, the great Aristotle, sought his answers typically in what now have been designated as the sciences, both natural and social. Plato's approach to goodness was through comparison with universal idea(s), while Aristotle's "happiness" resulted from the accomplishment of more natural goals. Individual good was related to the social good, but the ideas of moral responsibility and free will were not viewed with the same importance as was to be the case later in Christian thought.

(Note: Our discussion here will not be a detailed consideration of the ideas of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, nor will we treat later Hellenistic and Roman ethical tendencies that have come to be known as *Epicureanism*\*, *Stoicism*\*, and *Neoplatonism*\*.

Further, moving forward in time precipitously, it could be argued that for the next 2000 years ethical thought was oriented much more to practice than to theory. This was indeed true typically and explains why the meanings of the various ethical terms and concepts were not altered to any significant extent. This is not to say, however, that down through the ages moral codes and life purposes were not viewed quite differently.

## THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

As it developed, the Hellenistic (later Greek) and Roman ideas were lacking in the necessary insight required to advance beyond the intellectual genius of the earlier Greeks. However, it was during this subsequent period that the seedbed of later, all-encompassing Christian philosophy was established. As a result the Western world went into a long period during which time philosophy and religion were most closely interwoven. During this somewhat dormant period in the history of ethics, there was *one* system in which human reason and God's purpose for man were combined to produce *one* ultimate purpose for the human race--ultimate union with the Creator.

During this period, often called the Early Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas eventually "overwhelmed" medieval ethics by bringing together Aristotle's scientific and philosophic thought with the theology of St. Augustine. A highly significant and fundamental concept of the ethical system created by St. Thomas was his doctrine of *natural law*\*. Here he invented, one might say, an accommodation of two different ethical systems so that there was a "*natural domain*" and a "*theological domain*." The theoretical merger began with the underlying assumption that human reason and conscience were *somehow* fused inherently in man and women. The next postulate was that natural law contained God's ethical standards, standards to which a human might elevate himself or herself by the application of God-given reason. The reader should understand that religious dogmas at this point were considered infallible and, accordingly, they could negate what some might deem to be valid scientific advances. (This is still true today in the eyes of The [Roman Catholic] Church. However, from time to time the Church takes cognizance of scientific advances and adjusts earlier dogma to a certain degree.)

## EARLY MODERN ETHICS

What may be called early *modern* ethics began to flourish during the significant social change that characterized the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This philosophical watershed appears to have occurred as a result of a series of major social changes in society. As is the case today, many at the earlier time also considered the prevailing system of ethics to be in a state of disarray. This resulted in various attempts at reconstruction.

Thomas Hobbes made a strong effort to release ethics from its prevailing almost total servitude to theological law. He postulated that ethics was unreliable unless it was grounded on the objective laws of biology and psychology. Therefore, if the experimental analysis of nature was to be conducted in an ethically neutral manner, he reasoned that ethics itself should necessarily be contrasted with science. Such radical thought brought reaction and counteraction from the early *Intuitionists*\* (e.g., Henry More), Benedict Spinoza, John Locke, Bishop Butler, David Hume, and the so-called *Common-sense Intuitionists* (e.g., Thomas Redi).

A similar theoretical struggle was occurring on the Continent in eighteenth century France through the ideas of Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the Encyclopedists (e.g., Diderot). However, it was argued that their varied political orientations often distorted the objectivity of their philosophical arguments. Montesquieu, the French jurist and political philosopher, added to this discussion, however by viewing values more as sociological and historical facts (or data).

Special mention should be made of the monumental role played by Immanuel Kant, a professor from Königsburg, Prussia within the movement that has been called the German enlightenment. His highly complex and often perplexing non-utilitarian analysis based moral principles on *a priori*\* laws by which the human's "practical reason" is guided. He postulated that the human feels no obligation to obey nature's laws, but that he or she does sense subjectively a duty to respond to certain moral laws that are inherent in the universe. Kant's ethical system had three basic premises: (1) analysis of the evidence of moral experience, (2) consideration of its underlying logic, and (3) construction of metaphysical principles undergirded or presupposed by such ethical analysis. Such practical reasoning was in contradistinction to generalization that resulted from scientific experiment typically.

Kant distinguished most sharply between naturalistic ethics and moral law. His *categorical imperative*\* implied a moral code above and beyond any law of nature (e.g., the human's strong desire for happiness). He postulated a *universalizability criterion*\* as the most fundamental moral principle--"Act only on that maxim which you can will to be a universal law." This more precise statement of the popular "Golden Rule" represents--despite certain weakness--Kant's greatest addition to the theory of ethics. Kant also envisioned an autonomy of the will that placed humans in a position to defy causal determinism grounded in regulative scientific principle. As he viewed it, humans were conceived as part of, and yet somehow also distinct from, the laws of both nature and science (another debatable assumption, of course).

The nineteenth century in the Western world witnessed a sharp struggle between the two great traditions of *utilitarianism* \* and *idealism*,\* the former looming large in England and the latter continuing to dominate in Germany. It is not surprising, therefore, that both developing systems met with favorable responses but from different quarters in the United States. The idealistic position was welcomed, of course, by the Protestant Christian church, as well as by certain philosophers and literary figures. Utilitarianism blended nicely with the burgeoning technological advancement and then was joined--and to a degree eventually supplanted--by the pragmatic ethics of Peirce, James, and Dewey. (The subsequent developments in England, Germany, and the rest of the Continent will not be traced here. The essential "battle lines" had already been drawn and were discussed briefly above.)

With a pragmatic approach, ethical considerations were extended to relate to all of human knowledge. The aim here was to avoid the almost ageless and perennial distinction between (subjective) value and (objective) fact. This was accomplished by a reinterpretation that blurred the controversial issues for those who were willing to disavow Kantian (universalistic) ethics and the traditional stance toward scientific knowledge as an approach including value-free facts only. Thus, it was argued that ethical judgment was simply a matter of applying reason to the results of scientific (empirical) investigation by ascribing value to those human acts so designated as valuable in daily life.

## THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

By now you may agree that there are almost as many views of moral philosophy and/or ethics as there are philosophers (an obvious exaggeration, of course). However, this does lead us to a conviction that there is no single, non-controversial foundation stone upon which the whole structure of ethics can be built. In fact, it can even be argued that the nature and function of the subject are themselves subject to vigorous dispute. This is not to say, however, that there are not some aspects of this branch of philosophy upon which there is fairly wide agreement. In mid-20th century Nowell-Smith (1954) pointed out that earlier moral philosophers sought to offer general guidance about (1) what to do, (2) what to seek, and (3) how to treat others. As we begin the twenty-first century, such guidance from the "mother discipline" is but a distant memory for old-timers.

Earlier philosophers as a rule did not try to preach to their adherents in the same way as theologians did, although many made strong efforts to offer practical advice that included pronouncements on the subject of good and evil. Many early philosophers did believe that there was indeed a *true* moral code--i.e., a normative ethical system upon which people could and should base their conduct. In this sense, therefore, philosophers saw their mission as the enunciation of basic principles of morality along with the provision of supporting justification. What is *good*? What is *the good life*? What are the limits of moral justification? How shall people live their lives? These were the types of questions to which philosophers spoke.

Others in society have, of course also offered advice to the public. Theologians, dramatists, novelists, poets, and even comedians have offered considerable insight into the

question of good and evil. However, such counsel was often characterized as pronouncements or dicta. It was usually different from distinctly philosophic accounts in that it was specific, unsystematic, and typically lacking in proof.

As mentioned previously, there has been strong disagreement with the traditional conception of the philosopher's task. Some believed that philosophers should not, or could not, discover new truths (e.g., Kant), while others felt just the opposite to be the case (e.g., Bentham). Down through the ages, there has been an effort to systematize the knowledge that humans already have and to demonstrate the ultimate rationale for these beliefs. Some were concerned with *objective* justification of any moral claims, whereas others (known as *subjectivists*) argued that true objectivity was neither possible nor reasonable.

As a result of these two diametrically opposed positions, one group was extremely skeptical about any body of knowledge that purported to tell people how they *should* live. Their opposition, the objectivists, worked away toward the achievement of their goal--the creation of a *true* moral code. In this struggle, the German iconoclast, Nietzsche, was a true revolutionary in that he contradicted previous objectivist thought violently, including even the common-sense moral principles unchallenged by most skeptics. In summary, therefore, the battle lines were quite sharply drawn: one group of ethical theorists agreed with what was presumably the traditional task of the philosopher (i.e., finding a *true* code), while the other (the subjectivists) denied that moralists could ever hope to achieve such a truly justifiable moral code.

## THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

It is difficult but not impossible to gain some historical perspective on the philosophical trends and developments in the second half of the twentieth century. What is now called "the analytic movement"\* (or "philosophical analysis" or "analytic philosophy") has been an interesting and most important development in the English-speaking world at least during era. However, despite the fact that scholars in the Western world have been engaged in philosophical thought for more than 2000 years, there is still controversy over the exact nature of philosophy (i.e., what it is and what it should be). And so into the struggle between the ethical objectivists and the ethical subjectivists came a third combatant, the contemporary "analytic" philosopher of the twentieth century. In retrospect, it seems fair to say that this person was one who asked, "What kind of an activity am I engaging in?"

Searching for the answer to this question in the first half of the century, philosophers of this persuasion developed three different approaches (or methodologies) that became known as (1) logical atomism, (2) logical positivism, and (3) ordinary language philosophy. Each looked at analysis somewhat differently, but there was agreement that philosophy must be approached through the medium of language analysis--to a greater or lesser extent. Logical atomists sought to rearrange our ambiguous language so that more logically arranged sentences would become crystal clear. The goal of the logical positivist was to subject statements to a verifiability principle. This meant that regular language statements were to be arranged in logical, consistent form to discover if they were *empirically verifiable* either

through mathematical reasoning or scientific investigation. Finally, the main goal of so-called ordinary language philosophy was to decide what the basic philosophical terms were, and then to use them correctly and precisely so that all might understand. Obviously, these developments had some relationship to the position of the ethical subjectivists, but were a far cry from the efforts of the ethical objectivists seeking to find *the one* true moral code.

Finally, in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, the specter of the unknown new century is looming directly ahead on the horizon in a world characterized by "hot and cold" wars and struggles. And what do we find at the very time when people of all ages are highly concerned about changing morality and ethical standards--about "what to do, what to seek, and how to treat others? Simply put, we find *brilliant* philosophers, the large majority of whom are silent on any answers to these basic questions. They simply avoid the rational (public) justification of any type of moral system. Instead they spend their professional time and energy analyzing the meaning and function of moral concepts and statements or some other so-called analytic approach to the doing of philosophy. (Fairly often, also, the thoughts of some long-dead philosopher are brought to light again resulting in revisionist conjecture!) The end result is an enormous chasm between traditional *normative ethics* \* of the avowed moral philosopher and the analytic (or critical or theoretical) approach of that branch of ethics now known as metaethics.

If the above sounds critical of those who pursue such an *intensive* analytic approach to the detriment of more "people-based" philosophizing, I will have achieved my purpose here. However, in the same breath, I repeat my earlier thought that careful analysis is necessarily important in any philosophical undertaking. Thus, I have an obligation to explain what I think the relationship should be between normative ethics and metaethics. For example, if I may use an instance from a subject I know well (i.e., competitive sport), people involved professionally in sport--whether they know it or not--need *metaethical* advice from philosophers on the concept of "violence." Moreover, the need is equally as important for the development of codes of ethical conduct for professional coaches and professional athletes. Such codes involving *normative* statements could provide important guidance at a time when firm counsel seems absolutely necessary.

By the above statements, I trust that I have made clear that I don't for a moment wish to imply that metaethical analysis is unimportant--far from it. Obviously, as is always the case, there are extremists on both sides of this puzzling question, but a more reasonable approach--and there has been movement in this direction recently--would be one in which a moral philosopher\* (or ethical theorist\*) engages in metaethical analysis if he or she wishes, and as necessary, but at the same time also works toward the elimination of irrational ethical beliefs while searching for as much normative consensus as possible.

Such general agreement, a normative consensus if you will, by the field of philosophy, to the extent possible, is most important at this time as the public struggles with a search for the "best" ethical system consonant with an evolving democratic society. A variation of this might be a situation where university departments of philosophy would deliberately engage scholars with strong inclinations in one direction or the other, the end result of which would tend to



strengthen both the sub-disciplinary and sub-professional aspects of the field (i.e., and accordingly that branch concerned with--hopefully--both the metaethical *and* normative aspects of philosophy). It is my feeling that the public, in the final analysis, would really appreciate the end result.

Following up on the above "pronouncement," I do nevertheless recognize, as you, the reader, may also recognize shortly, that the task of normative inquiry can be most difficult. And, admittedly, this is especially so when people are confronted with most complex personal and social issues, and this conclusions tend to stray into the realm of metaethics. For example, when a normative ethical theory such as hedonism\* (the position that a person's primary moral duty lies in the pursuit of pleasure) includes a statement such as "Going to church is good because it brings pleasure to the parishioner." In response, the non-hedonist might challenge this statement solely on the meaning of the terms "good" and "pleasure." The obvious difficulty of justifying a normative ethical theory brings to the fore questions about metaethical relativism and subjectivism, questions which when pursued carefully point up the validity of the "subjectivist threat."<sup>2</sup>

### CONCLUDING STATEMENT

In summary, I have sought to explain that historically we have no single, non-controversial foundation stone for the entire structure of ethics. Yet we are finding that ever more difficult ethical questions are being asked as the world grows increasingly complex. Here I have explained that early philosophers attempted to provide answers and advice to life's many problems, but today, sadly as I see it, ethical advice--dubious or otherwise--comes from any and all sources. The fact that precious little comes to help "ordinary" people from trained philosophers today is, as I see it, a tragedy. Thus, I argue that we need a much-improved balance between the attention paid by philosophers to normative ethics and that given to metaethics. I will strive to offer the reader such "balance" as we proceed here in this volume.

Basically, then, justification of an ethical theory, or even an incomplete set of ethical statements about any aspect of life, revolves around the ability of the theorist to state correctly, explain sufficiently, and defend adequately his or her moral (or ethical) claims and arguments. Is your moral statement objective or subjective? In what way does a moral judgment differ from a factual judgment? Is any ethical statement about right or wrong conduct in any life situation "publicly warrantable?" In other words, is there some publicly acceptable procedure for verification, a procedure that intelligent, reasonable people would be willing to accept?

**Note:** In an attempt to answer some of these fundamental questions, Appendix A treats the subject of informal logic, a topic known in some quarters today as "critical thinking."

Finally, then, as you move ahead with this "ethical" or "moral" experience, you must decide for yourself to what extent you personally want ethical claims or judgments to be (1) objectively verifiable (capable of being proved)<sup>1</sup>, (2) universalizable (acceptable worldwide)<sup>1</sup>, (3)

practical for use in everyday life, and (4) autonomous in the sense that the structure of the statements comprising the claim or judgment--its very fabric--does not solely on non-normative statements (i.e., theoretical explanations). You may not appreciate it yet in this book, but--both personally and professionally--this experience with ethical decision-making could well be extremely important to you in the years that lie ahead. So read on. . . .

#### NOTE

1. Because the world is "moving closer together" via the amazing communication network that has been established, the need for an "ethic" that is universalizable has now become vital for the future of the world community. Thus, if the original statement made above about moral disagreement and confusion generally makes sense in North America, there is reason to believe also that the argument holds water to a greater or lesser degree for the world at large.

To explain this point, let us make a brief comparison of the "moral mentality" that prevails in what the world has typically called the East and the West. A reasonable, but possible overly simplified, access to such a comparison was offered in mid-century by Northrop (1946) who wrote of the "intuitive mind" of the East and the "logical mind" of the West. He explained that Eastern morality tends to be provisional because people believe that ultimate guidance comes from a source infinitely greater than any of the various moral constructs of mere humans. The assumption is that such morality is implicit in the nature of things, whereas the many ethical approaches of the West have in contrast typically been devised explicitly by fallible men and women.

Interestingly, however, citizens of both the East and the West have figured out ways of "getting beyond" what has been called normative ethics (i.e., the ethical approach that includes the moral standards generally accepted within a culture). The East has done this by traditionally blurring the distinction between philosophy and religion; thus, the highest form of guidance comes from a supra-moral direction. With such an emphasis, there is an overriding mysticism that warns an individual never to become enslaved by man-made normative standards. On the other hand, the West has developed various types of accommodation for its "escape routes."

One of these escape routes, for example, is philosophical existentialism. This stance that emerged early in the 20th century on the European continent states that a person is free to establish his or her own personal essence, an approach that is definitely anti-normative in nature. Psychoanalysis, an analytic method developed by the psychiatrist Freud and his associates, has also blossomed greatly since the turn of the century in North America as a technique to treat neuroses and other mental disorders. It is another escape route or means whereby a person is helped to shed guilt feelings stored in the *id* for one or more possibly unethical actions taken by him or her in the past. (Such unethical action may also have been inflicted upon him or her by someone else, and needs to be resolved.)

A third example of "ethical accommodation" seen in the West is the assumption of a particular ideology (e.g., communism, socialism, religious fundamentalism) as a dominating

influence in an individual's life, a position that could well lead the person to commit presumably unethical actions contrary to the prevailing values of the culture. (Terrorists, for example, supposedly in the name of Islam, committed unethical *and illegal* acts while committing suicide in the bombing of the World Trade Center.)

And, if all of these means of accommodation are not sufficient for the avoidance of *normative* ethics, in recent decades the leading approach of philosophers in the West has been what has been called a metaethical or analytic approach (mentioned earlier) that downplays the whole idea of any normative ethical standards prevailing generally. At least they regard their anti-normative, analytic approach as fully justifiable because of the obvious "blind" character of an automatic or semi-automatic prescribed (normative) answer to an ethical problem requiring a decision. This lack of intellectual rigor applied in the determination of any given ethical decision had led them away from what many regard as "easy" answers.

2. *The moral animal* by Robert Wright was published in 1994. This startling, scholarly, extremely well-written work analyzes from a variety of sources over the past 20 years a new science that he calls evolutionary psychology. This approach, based on the work of evolutionary biologists and a number of other social-science scholars, presents in essence a sharply revised view of human nature. Interestingly, this relatively recent development is explained in the context of the life of Charles Darwin. Basically, Wright explains how Darwin's analysis of humankind has stood the test of time, but that only in the past few decades have scientists and scholars truly assessed his theory with its implications for human morality. In a sense a sort of a "paradigm shift" has occurred in which a more insightful analysis of human moral sentiments are believed to have an even deeper biological basis than postulated by Freud. Wright points out that we humans have perhaps fooled ourselves by our "goodness" because we have not yet truly understand our basic nature. The implications from these ideas for ethics and morality are obviously enormous and will be referred to from time to time in the pages that follow.

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## CHAPTER 4

### WHAT ARE THE MAJOR ETHICAL ROUTES AVAILABLE TODAY?

The main purpose of this chapter is to offer a bird's-eye view of six of the major routes to ethical decision-making that are available in the Western world today. Just before doing this, however, there should be no difficulty in reaching agreement on three points. First, a person in our society should be so educated that he or she can reason well--i.e. should have an opportunity to develop rationality as a "life competency." Second, it is most important for a young person to bridge the gap between immaturity and maturity insofar as ethical understanding is concerned. Third, we would expect further that the opportunity to achieve such comprehension within reasonable limits would be readily available to all aspiring young people in North American life today.

Unfortunately, I am forced to state that, despite the fact that you, the reader, may have nodded in agreement theoretically to the three points immediately above, actually achieving such agreement in practice as to what type of competency and how such competency is attained is a completely different matter. I say this because, based on my experience teaching young people over more than half a century, I am forced to concur with the late Ayn Rand's (1960) assertion that on all sides we find young people "integrating blindly, incongruously, and at random" (p. 33) about all aspects of life.

No matter whether the question is (a) taking (or not taking) drugs for presumably heightened experiences, (b) cheating (or not cheating) on examinations or term papers, or (c) breaking (or not breaking) the letter or the spirit of the rules in (e.g., competitive sport) in one or more than a dozen overt or covert ways, the evidence points to an upbringing in which the very large majority of young persons has not received a type of educational experience in which an acceptable level of "ethical competency" could be developed or has been the result.

I am arguing that it would be extremely difficult to obtain such competency at present. First, a chronological analysis of several sources indicates initially that there is great variation in terminology and emphases. Terms that appear include (a) ethical naturalism\*, ethical non-naturalism\* (or intuitionism\*), and emotivism\* (Hospers, 1953, p. 485); (b) a recommendation from Patterson (1957) that we can delineate correctly two division or categories of ethical theories (i.e., where the knowledge comes from, and the motive that prompts action), and (c) adjectives offered by Fletcher (1966, pp. 17-18) such as legalistic\*, antinomian\*, and situational\*; and (4) those offered by Fromm (1967, p. 37) called authoritarianism\*, relativism\*, and scientific ethics\*.

Moving ahead chronologically with (d) in this welter of terms and descriptive adjectives used to describe ethical stances, Titus and Keaton (1973, pp. 59-60) used a threefold classification, but in the process did their best to avoid an "ism" nomenclature by suggesting that there are those who lives under the aegis of codes (e.g., God's word); those who thrust codes aside and prescribe laws; and those who seek to establish ethical norms through the application of reflective moral judgment. Despite this plea to avoid "isms," Abelson and

Friquetgnon (1975) recommended ("e" in this progression) use of such terms as religious absolutism\*, conventionalism\*, rational absolutism\*, and utilitarian relativism\*. That there is a good deal of commonality in the thought of these ethicists despite different terminology becomes apparent as they are analyzed further.

To add to this review of what might be called secondary listings arising from the period between 1950 and 1975, I examined pertinent work of a primary nature as follows: John Dewey (1929, 1932, 1946, and 1948); G. E. Moore (1948); Simone de Beauvoir (1964); A. J. Ayer (1946); C.L. Stevenson (1947-48), Joseph Fletcher (1966); J. O. Urmson, (1968); Kurt Baier (1970); and John Rawls (1971).

Then I moved to what might be called the "next generation" of ethicists, those who were publishing from 1970 to 1990. Some of these philosophers whose work I checked were: J. Gouinlock (1972); D. McLellan (1977); T. C. Anderson (1979); W. Hardie (1980); J. Mackie (1980); J. Annas (1981); S. Starker (1981); R. Hayman (1982); R. Hibler (1982); P. Redpath (1983); M. Baron (1984); F. Berger, (1984); D. Farrell (1985); R. Martin (1985); P. Gardner (1988); and R. M. Fox & J. P. DeMarco (1990).

Finally, to assure that the above ethicists identified were standing the test of time, I reviewed the primary works included in the seventh edition of Great traditions in ethics by Denise and Peterfreund (1992). As a result of this analysis, six different approaches were selected for inclusion here. Each approach or "ethical route" is described according to:

- (1) underlying presupposition,
- (2) criterion for evaluation,
- (3) method for determination of ethical decision, and
- (4) presumed result.

## I. AUTHORITARIANISM\* (OR LEGALISM)\*

### Underlying Presupposition

Absolute good and rightness are either present in the world, or have been determined by custom, law, or code.

### Criterion for Evaluation

The criterion is conformity or compliance with rules, laws, moral codes, and established systems and customs in the society or culture involved.

### Method for Determination of Ethical Decisions

Ethical decision-making is carried out by application of the prevailing normative standard or law.

## Probable Result

The solution to any ethical dilemma can be readily determined by strict application of the evaluative criterion.

**Note:** Legalism has dominated Christianity (and other orthodox religions) since its early days; thus, it is usually a question of strict obedience to rigid rules and/or laws. For example, homosexuals were burned to death in the Middle Ages, and also condemned to death through some means of torture in Old Testament descriptions. This sort of treatment probably occasioned remarks such as the "immorality of morality" (Henry Miller) and "the moral Majority are the people our ancestors came from Europe to escape" (Gloria Steinem).

## II. RELATIVISM\* (OR ANTINOMIANISM)\*

### Underlying Presupposition

Good or bad, and rightness and wrongness, are relative and vary according to the situation or culture involved.

### Criterion for Evaluation

The needs of a situation there and then in the culture or society concerned are the determining factors as to the values or norms applied to a problematic situation.

### Method for Determination of Ethical Decisions

Guidance in the making of ethical decisions may come from "outside," intuition, one's own conscience, empirical investigation, reasons, etc.

### Probable Result

Each ethical situation will be adjudged in a highly individualistic way, since every situation has its particularity. There are no absolutely valid principles or universal laws.

**Note:** It is important not to confuse ethical relativism with cultural relativism. The former denies the presence of any one basic moral principle in the universe, whereas the latter relates to cultural mores (e.g., the South Sea tribe situation where elders are killed at a time when their bodies are still in quite good condition so that they will have a better afterlife).

### III. SITUATIONISM\* (AN ECLECTIC "NEW" MORALITY)

#### Underlying Presupposition

God's love, or some other summum bonum (i.e., highest good) is an absolute norm. As a result, reason, revelation, and precedent have no objective normative status.

#### Criterion for Evaluation

"What is fitting" in any problematic situation is based on the application of agapeic love (Christian love or God's love). There are subordinate moral principles that serve to illuminate the situation further, so that the most accurate evaluation of the problematic situation is made.

#### Method for Determination of Ethical Decisions

The resolution of an ethical dilemma results from the use of a calculating method in addition to what might be called contextual appropriateness. The Individual should act from loving concern for others (i.e., what is benevolent is right).

#### Probable Result

The best solution, everything considered, will result from the application situationally of the principle of God's love.

**Note:** Agape\* can be manifested only when (1) there is awareness of the relevant facts, (2) the likely consequences are calculated, and (3) the guidance of traditional norms is considered.

### IV. SCIENTIFIC ETHICS\*

#### Underlying Presupposition

With the application of scientific method to an ethical situation (to the greatest possible extent), there is no distinction between moral goods and natural goods. The presupposition is that scientific method can bring about complete agreement in due time based on factual belief about that constitutes the most effective and efficient behavior.

#### Criterion for Evaluation

Ideas that are helpful in the solution of problematic situations are therefore true. Thus, the empirical verification of a given hypothesis brings a union of theory and practice.

#### Method for Determination of Ethical Decisions

The scientific method is applied to problem-solving in ethics. First, reflective thinking results in ideas that then function as tentative solutions for concrete problems. These hypotheses are then tested experimentally to the greatest possible extent, keeping in mind that fallible human beings are involved.

### Probable Result

The assumption is that agreement in factual belief resulting from the application of scientific method will soon bring about agreement in attitude on the part of the majority of the people. In this way we would have continuous adaptation of values based on the culture's changing needs. In time this would effect the directed reconstruction of all social institutions as necessary.

**Note:** Considering the crisis in human values existing at present, this approach (or some variation thereof) should receive consideration at present. It is evident that earlier confidence in religion and philosophy has been undermined. Also, it is becoming increasingly obvious that science and technology have brought humankind to the point where human life on Earth could be destroyed permanently.

## V. THE "GOOD REASONS" APPROACH\*

### Underlying Presupposition

Baier's "good reasons" approach, which has also been called the "moral point of view," states that ethical action should be supported by the best reasons (i.e., good reasons, or facts some of which are superior to others). Moral reasons (good reasons) are superior to reasons of immediate pleasure and reasons that are selfish.

### Criterion for Evaluation

All must be subject to the same rules, and rules must be for the good of everyone alike. In the making of an ethical decision, the person involved should (1) not be selfish, (2) make a decision on principle, (3) be willing to universalize this principle; and (4) consider the good of everyone alike. Ethical rules employed in this fashion would quite frequently require people to make sacrifices.

### Method for Determination of Ethical Decisions

This approach to ethical decision-making may be implemented in two stages: (a) by surveying the facts to determine which are relevant, and (b) the weighing of the facts to determine their relative weight in the deliberations to follow. First, the decision-maker is confronted with "consideration-making beliefs" or "rules of reason." These are the major premises of the "inference-licenses" to be considered. The minor premises are other facts



which, when matched with the above, help the person to conclude which are the best reason(s). The presence of a specific fact as a consideration accordingly implies the context or outline of a course of action that is being planned by someone.

Second, the next step involves the weighting of the various "best" reasons that seemed relevant at the first stage. These reasons are "weighed" or evaluated according to what is believed about the superiority of one type of reason over another. Here the hierarchy of reasons is as follows:

- a. Reasons of self-interest are superior to reasons of momentary pleasure,
- b. Reasons of long-range interest outbalance reasons of short-range interest, and
- c. Reasons of law, religion, and morality outweigh reasons of self-interest.

#### Probable Result

The assumption with this approach is that the individual can reason his or her way through to a satisfactory method of ethical decision-making. The plan, one that implies first a class of good reasons, moves progressively from (a) reasons of immediate pleasure, to (b) those that are selfish reasons, and, finally, to (c) so-called moral reasons that correlate with the person's long-range interests.

**Note:** Morality, for Kurt Baier, involves doing things on principle and, as a result, a condition of universal "teachability" could well prevail. Further, the rationale is that moral rules are meant for everyone, and thus they must be for the good of everyone alike. Thus, the "moral point of view" has a relationship to Kant's thought in that the individual should be willing to universalize the principle underlying the action planned.

## VI. EMOTIVISM\*

#### Underlying Presupposition

Some have identified emotivism as analytic philosophy's response to the problems of ethics. In this approach, ethics is normative in the sense that there are indeed moral standards. This means, of course, that ethics can never be approached scientifically. The emotivist starts with a real problem, one in which the term "good" appears to be ultimately indefinable. This leads some to claim that use of the word "good" in an ethical sense merely reflects an emotion on the user's part.

#### Criterion for Evaluation

An ethical dispute must be on a factual level. It is vital--i.e., absolutely essential--that

value statements be distinguished from factual ones.

### **Method for Determination of Ethical Decision**

Typically, an emotivist approach involves logical analysis (to the extent that this is possible) of ethical (or normative standard terms, whereas the factual statement in the argument would be based on the most current findings of social science. Next there should be an analysis of conflicting attitudes to determine to what extent progress has been made.

### **Probable Result**

The assumption is that ethical dilemmas can be resolved reasonably through the combined efforts of the moralist and the social scientist. The hope is that the presence of commonly accepted beliefs will in time bring about change in conflicting attitudes.

**Note:** Undoubtedly this approach has much to offer and merits serious consideration. Its practicality for the average professional person in any field other than philosophy) seems questionable. However, one may not have much choice if he or she is having difficulty accepting a specific definition of that elusive term "good."

Before concluding this chapter, I decided to arrange the above information about the six different approaches to ethical decision-making in tabular form (Table 1 and Table 2 below) so that you could make some comparisons as to (a) the underlying suppositions, (b) the criteria used for evaluation, (c) the method used for determination of an ethical decision, and (d) the probable result of any deliberation

(See next page, please.)

**Table 1**  
**Comparative Aspects of Major Philosophical Approaches**  
**to Ethical Decision-Making (*Part A*)**

Decision-Making Approach	Underlying Presupposition	Criterion for Evaluation
I. <b>Authoritarianism</b> (or <b>Legalism</b> )	Absolute good and rightness are either present in world, or have been determined by custom or law.	Conformity to rules, laws, moral codes, established systems and customs.
II. <b>Relativism</b> (or <b>Antinomianism</b> )	Good and bad, and rightness and wrongness, are <i>relative</i> and vary according to the society involved.	Needs of situation <i>there</i> and <i>then</i> in a culture or society concerned.
III. <b>Situationism</b> (with certain similarity to #1 above)	God's love (or some other other <i>summum bonum</i> is an absolute norm; reason, revelation, and precedent have no objective normative status.	"What is fitting" in the situation is based on application of <i>agapeic love</i> ; subordinate moral principles serve to further explain it.
IV. <b>Scientific Ethics</b> (scientific method applied to ethics)	No distinction between <i>moral</i> goods and <i>natural</i> goods; science can bring about complete agreement on factual belief about human behavior.	Ideas helpful in solving problematic situations are therefore true; empirical verification of hypothesis should bring union in theory and practice.
V. <b>"Good Reasons"</b> (the "moral" point of view)	Implies that ethical action should be based on ( <i>good</i> ) reasons--i.e., facts superior to others; <i>moral</i> reasons superior to other types.	Same rules must good of everyone alike; unselfish decisions to be made on universalizable principle.
VI. <b>Emotivism</b> (analytic philosophy's response to ethical problems that arise)	Ethics is normative (i.e., moral <i>standards</i> ) and therefore cannot be a science; the term "good" appears to be indefinable.	An ethical dispute must be on a factual level; <i>value</i> statements are distinguished from factual ones.

**Table 2**  
**Comparative Aspects of Major Philosophical Approaches**  
**to Ethical Decision-Making (*Part B*)**

Decision-Making Approach	Method for Determination of Ethical Decision	Probable Result
I. Authoritarianism (or Legalism)	Application of normative standard (or law) to resolve the ethical dilemma or issue.	The solution to any ethical dilemma can be readily determined and then implemented (or acted upon).
II. Relativism (or Antinomianism)	Guidance in the making of an ethical decision may come either from "outside"; intuition; one's own conscience; empirical investigation; reason, etc.	Each ethical decision is highly individual since every situation has its particularity; there are <i>no</i> absolutely valid principles.
III. Situationism (with certain similarity to #1 above)	Resolution of ethical dilemma results from use of calculating method plus contextual appropriateness; act from <i>loving concern</i> ; benevolence = right.	The best solution, everything considered, will result when the principle of God's love is applied situationally.
IV. Scientific Ethics (scientific method applied to ethics)	Use of scientific method in problem-solving; <i>reflective thinking</i> begets ideas that function as tentative solutions for concrete problems; test hypotheses experimentally.	Agreement in factual belief will soon result in agreement in attitude; <i>continuous adaptation</i> of values in the culture's changing needs will result in social change.
V. "Good Reasons" Approach (the "moral" point of view)	Two stages: (1) determining which facts are relevant; 2) weighing facts to determine relative weight for consideration; a hierarchy of reasons needed.	Assumption is that person can reason way through to a satisfactory method of ethical decision-making using a class of good reasons.

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<b>VI. Emotivism (analytic philosophy's response to ethical problems that arise)</b>	<b>Involves logical analysis of ethical (normative) standard) terms; factual statements referred to social scientists; analyze conflicting attitudes to determine progress.</b>	<b>Ethical dilemma can be resolved through the combined efforts of the moralist <i>and the scientist</i>; common beliefs may in time change attitudes.</b>
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### CONCLUDING STATEMENT

After arguing that it is most important for a developing young person to achieve a level of competency that will enable him or her to employ rationality in arriving at ethical decisions in life, I proceeded to outline--most briefly!--six ethical routes that are available in the Western world at present. I must reiterate that these are not the *only* approaches available; nevertheless, a case can be made that they represent a consensual listing (in the West at least).

At this point some would argue that I owe the reader an indication of which approach I would personally recommend. There was a time when I made every effort to avoid any such recommendation, because I believed that it was unfair for a teacher to take a strong stand in a society where pluralistic philosophies were permitted and known to prevail. However, the 1960s decade seemed to change all that--for the time being at any rate--as students argued that they "paid their money and had a right to know" where the instructor stood on such-and-such an issue.

In keeping with that (psychological) attitude, a stance that I adopted always with the caveat that I would make every effort to avoid a type of "brainwashing," I freely confess my belief that the application of scientific method to ethical analysis seems necessary at present and on into the foreseeable future. I argue this way because many of us are discovering that there is indeed a "crisis" of human values at this time--in the Western world at least. The fact is that the confidence that most people had in either religion or philosophy, respectively, has been seriously undermined. Daily we hear on the one hand that science and technology are our great benefactors. Then in the next moment--a generation ago now (!!)--we learned that science and related technology had shown people ways to actually destroy life on this planet permanently--at least in the sense that we have known human evolution to this point (*Saturday Review*, 1975, p. 13).

Further, we have learned that the 20th century was a transitional one, that the old order has most definitely been replaced by the new! Additionally, what is not generally appreciated is that the *rate* of change in society appears to be gradually accelerating, and that this acceleration will probably continue to increase. All of this has led me--and innumerable others--to conclude that we must eliminate the persisting dualism that exists as soon as possible. What I am referring to, of course, is the dualism that has separated investigation

about the physical world from the study of human behavior in relation to moral values and virtues.

Frankly, in this evolving democratic culture within North America, I cannot personally find a strong rationale for *any* authoritarian or legalistic doctrine governing ethical behavior to prevail (i.e., a doctrine in which *ironclad conformity* is required because of any individual's or group's presumed knowledge of absolute good and rightness in the world. Such an assumption on my part is a personal one, of course, but I find myself increasingly repelled by the many greater or lesser "ayatollahs" who seek to invade our lives. Here I refer to ministers, priests, rabbis, or (literal) ayatollahs. It is fortunate for me, I suppose, that our North American society guarantees individual freedom in such matters as long as the laws of the land are not abrogated. (This is not to imply for a moment that the struggle for individual freedom can be given up even momentarily. Actually, *not a day goes by even here in North America* that some "enlightened" individual does not request the establishment of some law or regulation for the good of others, typically one that denies individual freedom in one way or another.)

Still further, I have considered the *antinomian*<sup>\*</sup>, *relativistic* position as well. As pleasant or intriguing as it may be on occasion to rebel against society radically--to the left or right!--antinomianism to me appears to be so far to the left on an authoritarian-anarchistic freedom spectrum as to be fundamentally out of key in the prevailing political environment.

Despite the appeal of the emotivist approach (the last of the six described above), including application of the logic of the language analyst, it is my position that society's present plight requires considerably more than just the implementation of this philosophic technique. Conversely, Baier's "good reasons" approach (the so-called "moral point of view") is highly appealing and seemingly has much to offer in today's world.

The above notwithstanding--and I fully realize the impossibility of invoking any one approach at this time--I believe strongly that society's failure to employ scientific method in the realm of so-called *moral* goods, as well as in the obvious realm of so-called *natural* goods, will keep the North American culture in a position where changes in value will continue to come about either accidentally or arbitrarily. Structural-functional social theory has alerted us continually about the powerful, controlling influence of societal values and norms. I believe that we should now strive to obliterate the idea that there is a difference *in kind* between what we have traditionally called "human nature" and what we have identified typically as the "physical world." With such a change in understanding and attitude accomplished (hopefully soon), we would then be able to bring the resources of science to bear more effectively on *all* human behavior than ever before.

Interestingly, the oft-maligned--but recently rediscovered!--John Dewey explained this almost 70 years ago when he asserted that what is needed:

is intelligent examination of the consequences that actually effected by inherited institutions and customs, in order that there may be intelligent consideration of the ways in which

they are to be intentionally modified in behalf of generation of different consequences(1929, pp. 272-273).

Thus, what I believe we need is a faith (1) that science can indeed bring about complete agreement on *factual belief* about human behavior, (2) that such agreement in factual belief will relatively soon result in agreement in *attitudes* held by people, and (3) that resultantly a continuous adaptation of values to the society's ever-changing needs will eventually effect the directed reconstruction of all social institutions (Dewey, 1948, p. xxiii).

In closing this chapter, what has been stated immediately above about the relationship between science and changing values is occurring already despite the efforts of many to hold back the hands of time (i.e., in the opinion of this author, at any rate; see, also, "God and science--New allies in the search for values," a special report in *Saturday Review*, Dec. 10, 1977). In Chapter 5 immediately following, as we close out Part One, you will be presented with an explanation of how each of us should move smoothly from an understanding of personal ethics to the application of professional ethics in our careers. Let us proceed.

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## CHAPTER 5

### MOVING FROM PERSONAL TO PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

Up to this point the objective has been to outline background information briefly to help you bridge the gap between immaturity and maturity in respect to achieving a minimum level of ethical understanding. Such understanding could now be applied to decision-making in everyday individual and social life. However, in this final chapter of Part I, keeping in mind the typical young adult's selection of a field of endeavor in life, it is time to introduce also the idea of *professional* ethics as a necessary supplement to personal ethics.

A very few professions are better than all others in regard to the availability of codes of ethics. By this I mean that they not only have codes of ethics spelled out carefully already, but they have also instituted ways and means of disciplining errant members who violate one or more provisions of their respective codes. Fortunately, in those professions where practitioners have an ever-present opportunity to "do harm" as well as to "do good" to their clients, society has instituted laws to protect people from malpractice (e.g., medicine, law).

#### RAPID CHANGE BRINGS ETHICAL CONFUSION

However, as explained previously, rapid change in society had caused general confusion about the subject of ethics. As Miller (n.d.) pointed out in his "The Tangle of Ethics," "Instead of having an impossible ideal confronting a practical necessity, we have such a diverse inheritance of ethical ways that no matter which one we choose, the others are at least to some degree betrayed." Obviously, this confusion has been exacerbated because of the complex of moral systems that we have inherited (e.g., Hebraic, Christian, Renaissance, Industrial--and now Islam too, for example).

This confusion has been gradually, but steadily, carried over into all aspects of life. Further, as we now comprehend that the 20th century was indeed one of marked transition from one era to another, some scholars are beginning to understand that America's quite blind philosophy of optimism about history's malleability and compatibility in keeping with North American ideals may turn out to be very shortsighted. At least the weapons stalemate between the U.S.A. and the former U.S.S.R. brought to prominence the importance of nonmilitary determinants (e.g., politics and ideologies). Most important, also, the world is conversely witnessing the gradual, but seemingly inevitable, development of a vast ecological crisis, a dilemma that is increasingly causing a number of health and financial problems to the highly industrialized nations especially.

It may well be impossible to gain objectivity and true historical perspective on the rapid change that is taking place. Nevertheless, a seemingly unprecedented burden of increasing complexity has been imposed on people's understanding of themselves and their world. Many leaders, along with the rest of us, must certainly be wondering whether the whole affair can be

managed. We should keep in mind the earthshaking developments of the decades immediately preceding the 1990s. Naisbitt (1982) outlined the "ten new directions that are transforming our lives," as well as the "megatrends" insofar as women's evolving role in societal structure (Aburdene & Naisbitt, 1992). Here I am referring to:

- 1) the concepts of the information society and the Internet,
- 2) "high tech/high touch,"
- 3) the shift to world economy,
- 4) the need to shift to long-term thinking in regard to ecology,
- 5) the move toward organizational decentralization,
- 6) the trend toward self-help,
- 7) the ongoing discussion of the wisdom of participatory democracy as opposed to representative democracy,
- 8) a shift toward networking,
- 9) a reconsideration of the "north-south" orientation, and
- 10) the viewing of decisions as "multiple option" instead of "either/or."

Add to this the increasing, lifelong involvement of women in the workplace, politics, sports, organized religion, and social activism, and we begin to understand that a new world order has descended upon us for the 21st century.

Moving ahead in time slightly, a second list of 10 issues facing political leaders was highlighted in the *Utne Reader* titled "Ten events that shook the world between 1984 and 1994" (1994). pp. 58-74). Just consider the following:

- 1) the fall of communism (USSR) and the continuing rise of nationalism,
- 2) the environmental crisis and the green movement,
- 3) the AIDS epidemic and the "gay response,"
- 4) continuing wars (29 in 1993) and the peace movement,
- 5) the gender war,
- 6) religion and racial tension,
- 7) the concept of "West meets East" and resultant implications,
- 8) the "Baby Boomers" came of age and "Generation X" has started to worry and complain because of declining expectation

- levels,
- 9) the whole idea of globalism and international markets, and
  - 10) the computer revolution and the specter of Internet.

Keeping these changes and developments in mind, in the realm of economics the world's "manageability" may have nevertheless been helped by its division into three major trading blocs: (a) the Pacific Rim dominated by Japan, (b) the European Community very heavily influenced by Germany, and (c) North America dominated by the United States of America.

### IMPENDING CULTURAL CLASHES

While economics may be helping the world's "manageability," some observers argue interestingly that perhaps something even more fundamental has occurred. Succinctly put, world politics seems to be "entering a new phase in which the fundamental source of conflict will be neither ideological nor economic." So stated Samuel P. Huntington (1993), of Harvard's Institute for Strategic Studies, who believes that now the major conflicts in the world will actually be clashes between different groups of civilizations espousing fundamentally different cultures.

These clashes, Huntington states, represent a distinct shift away from viewing the world as being composed of first, second, and third worlds as was the case during the Cold War that began after World War II. Thus, Huntington is arguing that in the 21st century the world will return to a pattern of development evident several hundred years ago in which civilizations will actually rise and fall. (Of course, this movement of civilizations is exactly what was postulated by the late Arnold Toynbee in his famous theory of history.) One thing is certain, however, the world's complexity will increase even more in the 21st century.

### VALUES OF A LIBERAL SOCIETY

Keeping growing intercultural complexity in mind, it becomes more important than ever that the values and norms of a liberal society be fully understood by an increasing percentage of the world's population. Such understanding has an obvious direct relationship to the present discussion of personal and professional ethics. I wish I could state, for example, that the field of professional education was ready to meet the challenge of the 21st century. Close to a generation ago, Chazan (1973) stated. "Civil, political, and educational leaders frequently cite education's crucial role in the transmission of those 'moral and spiritual values' necessary for life in today's complex world; yet few educational systems make formal provision for such value education . . ." (p. 1). If education is to serve society more effectively in the 21st century, it is absolutely vital that it become attuned to the greatest possible extent with the *values*\* and *norms*\* of evolving society in North America.

Values represent the highest echelon of the social system level of the entire social action system. These values may be categorized into such entities as artistic values, educational values, social values, sport values, etc. Of course, in the final analysis, all types or categories of values must be values *of*, or values held *by*, personalities. Such social values within our social system are an integral part of a hierarchy of control and conditioning that exerts pressure downward along with the established norms of the social structure (Johnson, 1994). Together they work to maintain the pattern consistency of the entire system while at the same time preserving a reasonable degree of flexibility (pp. 57-58).

The values of The United States' social system are those that are conceived as representative of the ideal general character that is desired by those who ultimately hold the power in this society (Bayles, 1981). Arguing from the premise that citizens are reasonable people, we can accept that "the chief values relevant to professional ethics are (a) governance by law, (b) freedom, (c) protection from injury, (d) equality of opportunity, (e) privacy, and (f) welfare" (p. 5). (You, the reader, should keep these values firmly in mind, because they will be called upon time and again as we search for the best subprinciples of ethical conduct in Section Two of this book.)

*Norms*<sup>\*</sup>, in this context a term not well understood generally, are developed in societies as a result of the values that are consensually held. In sociological perspective, they are the shared, sanctioned rules that govern the second level of the social structure. (Incidentally, the *laws* of a country are typically based on the norms held.) The average person finds it difficult to separate the concept of values from that of norms (Johnson, 1969). Some examples of norms in the United States are (a) the institution of private property, (b) private enterprise, (c) the monogamous conjugal family, and (d) the separation of church and state (pp. 46-58).

## THE PROFESSIONS--YESTERDAY AND TODAY

To place the topic of professions in brief historical perspective, recall that the idea of professions and rudimentary preparation for such occupations in life (e.g., military, religious) originated in the very early societies. Early centers for a type of professional instruction were developed in ancient Greece and Rome as elementary bodies of knowledge became available. It wasn't until approximately the midpoint of the Middle Ages, however, that universities were organized where the various embryonic professional groups banded together for convenience, power, and protection (Brubacher, 1962). The degree granted at that time was in itself a license to practice whatever it was that the graduate "professed"--a practice that continued during the Renaissance at which time the instruction offered became increasingly secularized. However, the term "profession" was not commonly used until relatively recently (p. 47 et ff.).

Such background provides a perspective; but what is a profession today? Many different meanings are offered, but a profession is usually described as a vocation (a word derived from Latin meaning a "calling") that requires specific mastery of knowledge of some aspect of learning before the prospective practitioner is accepted as a professional person. The now legendary Abraham Flexner (1915) recommended six criteria as being characteristic of a profession, but Bayles (1981)--on whose work I lean heavily immediately below--maintained

that there is still no definition of the term that is generally accepted at present. Keeping in that there are categories of recognized professions such as consulting, scholarly, performing, etc., he suggested an approach whereby *necessary* features are indicated along with a number of other common features that would tend to elevate an occupation to professional status.

A profession includes typically those people who are functioning in a subdisciplinary and/or subprofessional category within it (e.g., medicine, law, psychology). Merely stating that a group of people working within a field of endeavor at the public, semipublic or private levels represent a profession is only a beginning, of course. There is obviously much more to be accomplished than that (Bayles, 1981). It can be argued, however, that there is no generally acceptable definition for a profession today--i.e., it is evidently impossible to characterize professions by a set of necessary and sufficient features possessed by all professions--and *only* by professions (Bayles, 1981, p. 7). Nevertheless, the following is a brief attempt to define what constituted a profession in the last quarter of the 20th century:

(1) A profession can be defined as an occupation which requires specific knowledge of some aspect of learning before a person is accepted as a *professional* person.

(2) There are *categories* of professions as follows: consulting, teaching, research, performing, etc.

(3) The following may be considered as three *necessary* features of an occupation that can also be designated as a profession: (i) a need for extensive training; (ii) a significant intellectual component that must be mastered; and (iii) a recognition by society that the trained person can provide an important basic service.

Additionally, there are some other features that are common to most professions as follows: (d) licensing by state/province or professional body, (e) establishment of professional societies, (f) considerable autonomy in work performance, and (g) establishment of a creed or code of ethics.

(Note: A most important component of a comprehensive code of ethics is that the controlling body establish an ethics committee to which infractions of the ethical code may be reported for deliberation and possible disciplinary action.)

Also, most professions typically have a good deal of autonomy in their work, but those who work in large organizations often feel constrained in their efforts by too much red tape. Finally, there are additional salient features that characterize professions (e.g., near monopoly of services, research, and publication).

We need to keep in mind further that some professions are immediately recognized as such (e.g., law); some groups are striving for such status (e.g., management); and some groups

tend to call themselves professionals when uncertainty still prevails in the mind of the public. In the course of their development, the various, often embryonic, professional groups have gradually become conscious of the need for a code of ethics. By this is meant a set of professional *obligations* (i.e., duties) that are established as *norms* for practitioners in good standing to follow. The code of ethics itself is based on *standards* of virtue and vice (e.g., honesty, truthfulness) from which quite general *principles* of responsibility are outlined as a basis for specific *rules* of duty are detailed carefully.

Codes have usually conformed to one of two types or patterns that have been handed down over the centuries. As Hazard (1978) explained,

One pattern is that of a creed or affirmation of professional belief. The ethical principles of medicine or social work, for example, are stated this way. The creed is short and obscure, but lofty, expressing the aims of the profession and adjuring personal commitment to them--a kind of oath of vocational office. The other pattern is the legal code. Not surprisingly, this is the ethical format in the legal profession; to an increasing extent it is being adopted in accountancy. It may be described as a set of detailed administrative regulations. . . .(pp. 50-51).

Hazard explained further that in some cases the regulations are spelled out by the profession itself, whereas in others it is a governmental or public policy that take the lead. Further, the creed seems to have been accepted as a better approach than the code because of its generality, and since it doesn't confine the professional person unduly. However, he believed definitely that neither the creed nor the code has spoken too "intelligibly to the fundamental ethical problems arising in the professions" (pp. 50-51).

## A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE

We may be willing to grant that there is indeed a "tangle of ethics" as stated by Miller above. We can grant, also, that the field of education has been wary about the introduction of ethical and moral values in the school curriculum because of the separation of church and state tradition that has prevailed on this continent. Nevertheless, there is no sound reason for professional educators not to introduce a *required* course in professional ethics for every person preparing for one of the professions. By this point you, the reader, may well agree with the stance recommended here. A knowledge of right and wrong ethical behavior would appear to be vital for every prospective practitioner in a profession.

For those people already out in the field, interesting and informative programs about ethical behavior should be arranged at annual professional meetings--programs where matters of serious ethical concern and import are placed up front for in-depth consideration, deliberation, and decision. Regional and state (or provincial) clinics on ethical topics are another means whereby we can make up for lost time, for our possible sins of omission in this regard. Still further, we should make an effort to have discussions on ethical matters of all

types included in any certification programs that are being made available for practitioners.

When I, as a former university professor, first became involved with the question of professional ethics 30 years ago, I turned to the American Association of University Professors to which I belonged before moving back to Canada. I uncovered the "Statement on Professional Ethics" that had been endorsed by the membership at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the AAUP (1969). It was very brief and was in essence a creed rather than a code (as explained above).

As I learned, this "Statement" was "necessarily presented in terms of the ideal" and referred (a) to the responsibilities placed upon the professor as the advancement of knowledge is pursued; (b) to the need to encourage "the free pursuit of learning in his (sic) students"; (c) to the "obligations that derive from common membership in the community of scholars"; (d) to the obligation to seek "above all to be an effective teacher and scholar"; and (e) to the fact that he has "the rights and obligations of any citizen" (pp. 86-87). This is a fine statement of a *creed* (e.g., a brief statement of belief). Nevertheless, I challenge how often it is referred to by anyone. Also, I felt the lack of guidance offered because of the omission of any standards, principles, or rules that should flow from the statement of a professor's obligations.

Next I turned for possible assistance from statements that made available periodically by a selected number of professions. These statements varied in length and were often more specific than the creed offered by the AAUP. For example, in the law profession, the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Personal Conduct are lengthy and highly detailed. Conversely, the American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics are envisioned briefly as seven principles or standards of conduct underlying honorable behavior. The American Nurses' Association Code for Nurses is very similar to that of the AMA in regard to length and the approach taken.

The American Society for Public Administrators approaches this subject somewhat differently again, however. It offers a Workbook and Study Guide for Public Administrators that concludes with a discussion about the background, definitions, and recommended key principles of professional ethics. Finally, to confirm my belief that no standardization had occurred among the many professions, I examined the American Psychological Association's Ethical Principles of Psychologists and the National Society of Professional Engineers' Code of Ethics for Engineers. The former (APA) included a relatively brief preamble followed by a statement of 10 carefully defined principles, whereas the latter (NSPE) was somewhat more detailed and included preamble, fundamental canons or virtues, rules of practice, and professional obligations.

Despite the evident need for creeds and codes of ethics for the almost innumerable list of professions, trades, occupations, jobs, or whatever, my conclusion, based on discussions with colleagues in my field and in others, was that there is great room for progress or improvement. Practically no one with whom I talked knew anything about the subject as it applied to his or her own profession or occupation. Also, I discovered that, although many professional societies had at some point gone through the motions of establishing creeds and

(shorter or longer) codes of ethics, only a very small percentage of these professional groups has established standing disciplinary committees to deal with possible infractions of their codes of ethics (e.g., medicine, law, and psychology). In other words, we have "nowhere to go but up!"

## CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Today we often hear about the need for a pursuit of excellence in North America, about how we aren't living up to standards that have been set. To me this means that we do indeed want to develop outstanding students in our many education programs. Yet I also have serious concerns about *the type of* knowledge, competencies, and related skills that we expect students to master. Further, this statement applies strongly also to the *professional* education of students. We want all students to be motivated by a *desire* for excellence, to the limit of their potential.

However, and most importantly, over and above such "excellence," however defined, we must have students with a sound ethical approach *personally* who then go on to their lifelong careers with the necessary knowledge and attitudes that will result in their having a sound base in *professional* ethics as well. Failing this, any outstanding professional person--at any given moment--could deliberately or unwittingly by dishonesty, immorality, incompetence, or lack of correct action negate any technical excellence gained in a classroom, laboratory environment, or on-the-job experience.

This brings introductory section, Part I of this book to a close. In Chapter 6, the first one in Part II that treats *applied* ethics, you will be presented with Phase One, one approach to ethical decision-making, an elementary approach with which you will be asked to experiment initially as you move toward the eventual development of your own pattern or system of ethical analysis.



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## CHAPTER 6

### PHASE ONE: A THREE-STEP, PHILOSOPHIC APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING (FROM KANT TO MILL TO ARISTOTLE)

In this chapter a three-step, philosophic approach to ethical decision-making--from the thought of Kant to Mill to Aristotle--will be recommended for your study and application.<sup>1</sup> When you are confronted with an ethical problem in life that needs resolution, whether such a situation arises in your personal or professional life (both are "personal," of course), you may not recognize it as ethical in nature at first. One's first reaction is to say (perhaps implicitly to oneself), "What *should* I do?" (Note that "should" always applies to issues and problems of an ethical nature, unless the situation also has legal or quasi-legal ramifications; then it typically becomes "What *must* I do?" as well.)

You will recall that earlier I argued that today one hardly knows where to turn for some basis upon which to formulate an answer or even a response to a question of this nature. In Chapter 4, six major ethical routes or approaches, theoretical proposals that are extant in the Western world at least, were offered for your review and possible later adoption of one. (Of this number you may recall that I showed a personal preference for what might be called a scientific ethics approach; see Chapter 13.)

Nevertheless, here in Part II, I am first going to call upon the name and ideas of three philosophers who were mentioned prominently in Chapter 3 where in the brief history of philosophical ideas about the "good" and the "bad." I am referring to Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle. I am recommending this three-step approach first because I became convinced that some of their basic thought on ethical matters--not all, by any means--provides an easy and "palatable" entrance into this subject for most people--**in this culture at least.**

You may think that I am encouraging you to become a philosophical charlatan or sophist because it's the simplest way to get at a difficult subject. However, let me hasten to state that I have great respect for these men and the contributions that each one of them has made to the history and development of philosophy. Of course, as is the case always, no person is perfect nor has perfect knowledge either. However, the influence of each has been great and merits recognition for a variety of reasons. I must admit also that, as a creature of Western culture, their ideas have considerable appeal to me despite my strong inclination toward a scientific ethics approach as we move ahead in the 21st century.

The progression of major ideas to be presented moves from certain underlying principles that each has presented. It occurred to me initially that it might be helpful to draw an analogy with the sport of baseball. Thus, I originally decided to call the first phase (Phase One) of this overall plan of "ethical attack" by what is considered to be one of the most skillful

and fortuitous maneuvers in baseball, the triple play.

From Tinkers to Evers to Chance was an early combination of shortstop, second baseman, and first baseman in baseball in the execution of a double play. So, in a sense, I began earlier by initially suggesting that you, the reader, proceed from Kant to Mill to Aristotle to complete a triple play. But then, Don Morrow, a colleague, argued that these three baseball players were really a double-play combination (i.e., by their typical maneuver only *two* players were declared out). To make it a *triple* play, the first named player would have to catch a line drive (one out!) and then would have to throw to two different bases to make outs No. 2 and No. 3. At any rate, it all got too confusing, and I have now named it a *three-step approach*--from Kant (test of *consistency*) to Mill (test of *net consequences*) to Aristotle (test of *intentions*).

In other words, when you are confronted with the need or desire to make an ethical decision in your life, the conclusion you draw--or the course of action you plan to take--should be able to withstand the *three* tests of this approach. In the pages that follow, then, each of these three steps will be discussed in some detail. Then, in Chapter 7, I will demonstrate in Phase Two the strong similarity of these three steps to the layout devised by philosopher Stephen Toulmin for the construction of a sound jurisprudential argument that could stand up in a court of law. By this means (i.e., Toulmin's approach) you would be able to lend further support--or possibly discredit!--whatever conclusion you had reached in Phase One with the ethical problem or issue at hand.

(Note: Although I will not discuss the topic of ethical egoism\* specifically--a philosophical stance that argues, for example, that people should be concerned *only* about their own welfare, a position typically linked with *hedonism*\*. If this approach were to be followed, one might introduce a "test of *reward for the agent*" in which the goal is a person's own self-interest with complete indifference to all others.)

### KANT'S TEST OF CONSISTENCY (STEP 1)

Without going into any detail about Kant's overall position, it should be explained that he did distinguish sharply between what might be called *naturalistic ethics*\* and moral law. His *categorical imperative*\* implied a moral code above and beyond any law of nature (e.g., above the human's strong desire for gratification and happiness). Basically, he postulated a *universalizability criterion*\* as the most fundamental moral principle, and it is this that we are using for Step 1 or the test of consistency (or universalizability). In other words, you should "act only on that maxim which you can will to be a universal law."

The similarity between this dictum and our culture's Golden Rule is, of course, immediately apparent. Kant's more precise statement of the "golden rule" may well in time be viewed as his greatest contribution to the subject of ethics (despite what some people immediately draw to our attention as its obvious weaknesses). For example, George Bernard Shaw's cryptic retort to this admonition was: "Don't do unto others as you would have them do

to you--their tastes might be different." Also, Kaufmann (1973) felt that the negative formulation of the Golden Rule was far superior to the original, but that it too had serious deficiencies (p. 188). Further, in an ABC television political discussion (Jan. 16, 1983), George Will quipped, "Do unto others as fast as they do unto you." So it is true that there are maxims that *could not* be universalized, and also that there are ones that it *might not be desirable* to universalize. Thus, we must ask ourselves by what criterion (or criteria) are we to tell which maxim should be universalized? (By "universalizability" is meant, of course, whether it would be possible or desirable to extend an action to include *all* people on earth.)

To help you to get over this first major hurdle, I recommend the introduction of a number of subprinciples at this point, subprinciples that are based on the espoused values of North American culture. The late Michael Bayles (1981, p. 5) had suggested that we can turn to the chief values for help in our acceptance of ethical norms. So, when you attempt to implement the test of consistency to an ethical decision that you make (or intend to make), or perhaps encourage another to make, the following are a number of questions (phrased negatively; see Fox & DeMarco, 1990, p. 174) that you could well ask yourself:

1. Would my action or decision (or inaction) impose on another's freedom?
2. Would my action hurt another person?
3. Would my action impose on an individual's privacy?
4. Would my action deny an opportunity to another person?
5. Would my action be against the law?
6. Would my action be unfair?
7. Would my action be hurtful to another's welfare?

Then, assuming that you can answer--with reasonable assurance--all of these questions negatively, you are ready to proceed to Step 2.

### MILL'S TEST OF (NET) CONSEQUENCES (STEP 2)

Step 2 of our approach has been selected from the heritage of philosophic *utilitarianism*\*. For the maxim "Act so as to bring about the greatest good possible," we are in debt to John Stuart Mill, as well as another important early philosopher, Jeremy Bentham. Here we are recommending that you invoke what may be called a "test of (*net*) consequences"\*--that is, assessing what the *total* effect of your action (or inaction) would be. Also, you should keep in mind that our concern here is with the promotion of the maximum amount of *net*, not *gross*, happiness. In other words, try to weigh the good that would be done, the bad that would be done--and then determine whether more good than bad would be the end result.

At this point, once again, such thoughts come to mind as whether an action is fair, just, or beneficent, and also permits autonomy on the part of the other person(s) involved. Note that these criteria are the same (e.g., fair, harmful) as the questions raised in Step 1 above. Thus, we should determine what the best available evidence tells us. Additionally, recall that with

ethical considerations we are dealing with the concepts of good and bad, and right and wrong. Here Mill's (1861) famous definition answering the question "What is wrong?" can be of help:

We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his conscience. This seems to be the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency (*Utilitarianism*, V).

What then is the logic of this second step we are offering for your use in this initial three-step approach? Kalish and Montague (1964) offered the following formal definition: "An argument is valid if it is possible for its premises to be true and its conclusions false" (p. 3). Well and good; however, one is apt to say "Huh?" at first reading of this statement. So let's try something like, "If all the premises are true, *then* the conclusion will be true." Using basic *modus ponens logic*\*, then, the following premises and conclusion apply in this instance:

1. The act that--on the basis of the best evidence available at the time of acting--produces the greatest total good is right.
2. *This* act will produce the great total good.
3. *Therefore, this* act is right (*modus ponens*)

*Act-Utilitarianism*\*. This, then, is the basic utilitarian approach for what has subsequently been called *act-utilitarianism*. (A second utilitarian approach named *rule-utilitarianism* will be described immediately below.)

"So far, so good," you may be saying, "this second step seems quite simple compared to the first step recommended." Unfortunately, this is not quite true, because a number of questions may be raised to show that--as usual!--things are never as simple as they seem to be at first glance. For example, suppose that you had made a solemn promise to your best friend, and suddenly you realize that by keeping that promise you won't be doing the most good? Or, to consider another problematic situation, suppose you have a son who had turned out to be worthless. However, you also have a really intelligent, hardworking nephew. Assuming that both of them wanted to go to college, and that both needed financial assistance, should you help your nephew before your own son on the assumption that you could do more good that way? Or, to make the topic even more complex, the archetypic example of the dilemma that one might be facing as a strict act-utilitarian might be as follows: You are living in the family home with your crippled father, a wonderful old person. To help with finances, you have taken in a roomer, a brilliant, young cancer researcher. One evening you return home very late, and you find your home ablaze. Realizing that both your father and the young researcher are probably asleep on the second floor, whom do you attempt to rescue first?

*Rule-Utilitarianism*\*. There is a second type of utilitarianism known as *rule-utilitarianism* that you may find more appealing than the approach just described. With this approach you are admonished not to judge the rightness of an act by the act's consequences.

Now you are to judge the rightness or wrongness of an act by the consequences of adopting the *rule* under which the particular act falls. Following the consequences of a rule instead of a particular act often colors a problematic situation markedly. One reason for this, of course, is that it is often extremely difficult to find the best rule!

Let us suppose, for example, that the world has seen too much killing and bloodshed (and it most certainly has!). Accordingly you vow that you personally would never take another human life. Then, two days later, you find yourself in a situation where--if you don't act instantaneously and decisively to harm and possibly kill an attacker--you undoubtedly stand a good chance of being killed yourself. So you take a knife from a nearby drawer and plunge it into the attacker's body. He dies before the ambulance arrives, and somewhat later, after the initial excitement of the moment has past, you realize that you broke your vow about the sanctity of human life. Can you think of a better rule? How about pledging that you would never initiate violence of a possibly deadly nature against another--but that you do see the necessity and validity of self-defense? What we have with rule-utilitarianism, therefore, is an approach where you search for the best rules of ethics to adopt in human relations' situations--that is, rules that will ultimately do the most good.

There are undoubtedly other examples that you can think of to show that this second step, the test of *consequences*, is not infallible no matter whether you base your actions on the consequences of an individual act or on the consequences of adopting the best rule to follow prior to the actual "taking" of what you have decided is an ethical action. Nevertheless, the test of *consistency*\* (or *universalizability*\*) first, and then this test of *consequences*\*, do offer a person some criteria infinitely better than mere common sense upon which to proceed when one is confronted with the need to make the best possible ethical decision under a given set of circumstances.

**Note:** Before continuing with Step 3, the test of *intentions*\*, it should be explained that there are also theories of conduct *not* based on consequences only. These are commonly known as *deontological theories*\* (from the Greek *deontos*, that means "that which is necessary or binding"). This seemingly unfortunate choice of a term to describe an approach to ethical decision-making (i.e., deontological) contrasts with that of *teleological* (*telos* means goal in Greek) theories that are based on consequences only. With deontological theories, we often need to consider some of the *probable* consequences of an act (a future orientation), and often certain of the conditions also in which an act was carried out (a past orientation). Thus, deontological theories assert that the greatest good for a person is to be duty-oriented as in situations where duties of justice, fidelity, or gratitude are involved, for example. A duty of justice would be based on acting fairly by providing equal treatment, whereas a duty of fidelity would arise in a situation where you had made a vow or promise to another person. A duty of gratitude needs no further explanation.

### ARISTOTLE'S TEST OF INTENTIONS (STEP 3)

Step 3 of the this approach to ethical decision-making we may call the test of intentions. For this sage advice we turn to the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (the tutor of Alexander the Great). In his *Nicomachean Ethics* (Loomis, 1943) he asked, "What were the conditions under which the act was performed?" Virtue, as defined by Aristotle, "is concerned with emotion and action, and emotions and actions that are *voluntary* are objects for praise or blame, while those that are *involuntary* are objects for pardon and sometimes for pity" (p. 113). Aristotle's point here is that, in a study of virtue, it is essential to know whether a person's actions were voluntary or involuntary. (Of course, such knowledge is still most important when considering judgment in a court of law today.) Aristotle understood that such consideration was important for lawmakers and judges (e.g., an act carried out under compulsion or ignorance could be considered involuntary and perhaps pardonable).

A very practical example of these ideas would be a situation where a person has committed a crime (e.g., murder). Obviously (invoking Step 1 of our recommended three-step approach), we certainly would not wish to see such an act "universalized" and carried out against *all* people on earth. Further, this particular act of murder had most serious consequences (Step 2) and did not contribute to the greatest (net) good or happiness of anyone. In fact, the *opposite* was the case! Yet, if we wish to judge this seemingly heinous crime as good, bad, or neutral, Aristotle would argue that we need to know under what conditions the act was carried out.

For example, we read in the newspaper occasionally that someone has done harm to, or killed, another person who has earlier committed a major crime against the current attacker's relative (e.g., sexual assault). In such cases we might feel that justice had been done even though a law was broken in so doing. Or, depending on the specific circumstances, we might even feel sorry for the original perpetrator of the crime upon whom revenge had subsequently been carried out. Thus, even though this person (i.e., the original wrongdoer in this instance) had committed what we would call a major crime, we might still feel sympathetically inclined to him or her because we owed this person a personal debt of gratitude (or perhaps because we had been close friends in the past).

And, as it happens, the question of the intentions of the person who commits what is determined to be a wrong is evident typically when a law court considers a case of murder. A premeditated case of murder is called first-degree murder, whereas a so-called crime of passion (i.e., seemingly instinctive action) that results in the death of another may be identified as second-degree murder and presumably less blameworthy. Further, if someone accidentally kills another by hitting him with an automobile in a street accident, this is usually designated as manslaughter (person's laughter today?). Finally in this vein, we have read about the extremely low percentage of convictions in Italy when a husband commits murder in the case of his wife's accused lover. Evidently in certain countries many feel this is justifiable homicide ! However, this does not typically apply in the case of a wife who kills the "other" woman.

Finally, in relation to Step 3 (test of intentions), or behavior motivation, Aristotle stated

that people acted according to one or more of the following reasons: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, passion, and desire. Considering this proposed list, however, leads one to conclude that there are indeed some acts where it is questionable whether an act is indeed *voluntary* or *involuntary*. When such doubt arises, Aristotle called such an act one of "mixed character." Some actions, then, "are voluntary, although in the abstract they may be called involuntary, because no one would choose any such act in itself" (p. 114).

#### A SAMPLE SITUATION: "THE REQUIRED TEXT"

Now, before concluding this chapter, I decided to include a sample situation in which you can get an idea how the three steps of Phase One might be applied to the decision-making process where a problem of an ethical nature has arisen. Interestingly, the problem arose in a philosophy department of a large university where we might expect those involved to have a "special" awareness of ethical decision-making.

This is a case about a newly engaged instructor in philosophy in a large department in a major university who learns that all instructors in the several sections of a basic required course in philosophy *must* use the same textbook. The text was written by the senior instructor, a tenured full professor, who is also the coordinator of the philosophy courses within the humanities division of the college. The new instructor feels that this is an undesirable practice and wishes to analyze the situation in an acceptable manner.

*Application of Phase One, Step 1.* The first step in the recommended "three-step approach" is to employ Kant's *universalizability* criterion--his most fundamental moral principle--in what might be called a test of *consistency*. In other words, is the philosophy course coordinator "acting only on that maxim which he might will to be a universal law?" The question is whether all required course coordinators everywhere should have the right to require the use of *their own* texts in all sections of courses that are being taught. Obviously, the course coordinator in this case, the professor *who wrote the text and who stands to collect royalties based on the number of copies sold*, feels that there is nothing wrong with his decision to use his own text in *all* sections of the required course. (We might grant that this practice would be permissible in his own section of the course, but only if conflicting philosophical approaches and positions were presented and openly and freely discussed).

In addition to Kant's *universalizability* criterion, his (ethical) categorical imperative further requires that the "professor treat his student always as an end and never as a means merely" (Brubacher, 1978, p. 110). It could be argued, therefore, that the course coordinator/professor is treading on thin ice in this situation insofar as his personal ethical responsibility to all instructors teaching the course--and also to all students taking the course is concerned. Over and above making a decision that he will use his own text in *his* section of the course, he has also decided that it shall be used in *all* sections!

Shils (1983) sides with Brubacher in this argument by stressing that "the teacher has to be careful not to fall into *dogmatism*\* in the exposition of his subject or to attempt improperly



to exercise influence on his students by demanding that they become adherents of his own particular substantive and methodological point of view" (p. 45). Of course, the course coordinator in this case could conceivably argue that all major points of view on the fundamental issues are indeed presented in his text. This would place the onus on the complaining instructor, to a degree, to cite instances where such an argument was invalid. If the instructor could demonstrate such "invalidity" successfully, it would strengthen the position, also, that in this way the students were indeed being used more as means than ends. Of course, based on the denial of academic freedom, it does not necessarily follow that others are being treated as a means only.

However, everything considered, the new instructor who is forced to use this text disagrees with the position he finds himself in. He has used the book for two semesters and has found it to be too simplified and inadequate. The instructor can justifiably argue that continued, enforced use of this text also does not take into consideration the academic freedom that he/she has a right to expect in Western society. As if supporting this second argument, Commager (1963) had stated,

. . . . We require you to avoid the temptation to serve those who may suppose themselves your masters, and devote your affluent talents to your true masters--the whole of society, the whole of humanity, the great community of learning, the sacred cause of truth. In order that you may do this, we give you the precious boon of independence which is academic freedom . . . .  
(p. 37).

Shils points out further that "the relations between senior and junior members of the teaching staff now run across the entire range of academic activities--the design of a course of study . . . the fixing of the syllabuses for the teaching of particular courses . . ." (p. 52). However, despite the frequent "dispersion of authority within departments and within the university as a whole," some still seek to rule authoritatively in regard to various academic activities thereby distorting and often destroying desirable intradepartmental consensus on such highly important matters.

Thus, our conclusion in regard to Kant's test of consistency (Step 1) is that it is now not appropriate to encourage a practice such as this (i.e., mandatory assignment of the course coordinator's text) in Western educational circles where the principle of academic freedom (*Lehrfreiheit* und *Lernfreiheit*) has been presumed to prevail for both faculty and students for more than 150 years.

*Application of Phase One, Step 2.* Step 2 of this recommended approach has been taken from our heritage of philosophic *utilitarianism*\*. For the maxim "Act so as to bring about the greatest good possible," we are in the debt of John Stuart Mill who introduced the concept, but perhaps more in connection with hedonistic (as opposed to ideal) *act utilitarianism* to two other significant philosophers--Jeremy Bentham originally and Henry Sidgwick subsequently. With this *paradigmatic theory*\*, the assumption is that "what it is right to do on any occasion is

to maximize the total happiness (now and at all future times) of all sentient creatures. . . ." (Smart, 1986, p. 24). Viewed in this fashion, hedonistic act utilitarianism may be viewed as a *normative theory*\* and could have practical importance if adopted (as opposed to using common sense or traditional moral thought). Here, therefore, we have what may be called a test of *consequences* to invoke--that is, what the total effects of the course coordinator's action might be.

Further, concerned with the promotion of the maximum amount of *net*, not *gross*, good or happiness (appropriately interpreted). Such thoughts come to mind as whether the professor's action to require the use of his own text in all sections of the basic, required course is fair, just, beneficent, and permits a desirable amount of autonomy on the part of the other instructors concerned (not to mention what would be most desirable for all of the students involved). Unfortunately, only very rarely can numerical probabilities be applied so as to invoke a more precise type of "*consequentialism*"\* of which utilitarianism may be regarded as only one variety; thus, the resultant intuitive weighing of the various consequences tends to place utilitarianism in a weakened position.

The logic of this basic hedonistic act utilitarian approach--only *act*-utilitarianism as opposed to *rule*-utilitarianism will be offered here--could be simply basic logic where "if all the premises are true, *then* the conclusion will be true." Thus, the following premises and conclusion would apply in this instance;

1. The acts that--on the basis of the best evidence available at the time of acting--produce the greatest total good or happiness are right.
2. *These* acts will produce the greatest total good.
3. *Therefore, these* acts are right. (*modus ponens*)

Finally, then, we are asking the question whether the imposition of one instructor's text as the required text for all sections of a required course will produce the greatest total good insofar as the students' introduction to philosophy is concerned--not to mention how this will affect the attitudes of the other instructors who may (or may not) be disturbed by such an imposition.

On this basis, therefore, I believe that the application of the test of consequences (Step 2) shows us that the continuance of such a practice will evidently not produce the "greatest total good or happiness." Further, we argue also that the continuance of such a practice could easily result in students receiving inadequate, biased information. At the same time the other instructors might feel frustrated and embarrassed in the presentation of what they perceive to be inadequate course information (based on their own knowledge of the subject-matter and their preferred individual instructional methodologies).

*Application of Phase One, Step 3.* Step 3 of this approach we have called the test of *intentions*. For this advice we turn to Aristotle, who asked in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "What were the conditions under which the act was performed?" Virtue, as defined by Aristotle, "is concerned with emotion and action, and emotion and actions that are *voluntary* are objects for praise or blame, while those that are *involuntary* are objects for pardon and sometimes for pity" (in Loomis, 1943, p. 113). Thus, the question to be asked typically is whether an act is voluntary or involuntary. Because of the seniority of the course supervisor and humanities coordinator holding the rank of full professor, it must be assumed that the professor carried out the text assignment through voluntary imposition of his/her will.

Despite what has been argued in Steps 1 and 2 above, it may well be that the course supervisor, who saw to it that his own text was used as the required text in all sections of the required course, was absolutely convinced on the basis of his experience that in this situation such a standardized course structure was the best approach. Also, he could argue that he had examined his own intentions in the matter and felt that they were pure. He might well argue further that other approaches had indeed been tried, and in his opinion they had all been found wanting.

The course supervisor might also explain that he had been most careful to present all sides of the various questions and issues that were to be discussed throughout the course. Still further, he might argue that he himself was not profiting materially from the sale of the text that he wrote, that the profits were being used to purchase books for the department's reading room.

Conceivably the professor in question might also argue that the various instructors using his text have the opportunity for a full measure of input into the course's planning, and that this is worked out democratically so that the end result is a reasonably standardized approach both as to what content is to be included in the course *and* to how the course is to be taught. He might argue that this is considered to be the most desirable approach because it insures that all students in the course receive a similar, high-quality educational experience. Thus, the professor's intentions should not necessarily be regarded as *disjunctive*\*. Cumulatively, they undoubtedly offer more strength to the position taken by the senior professor.

## CONCLUDING STATEMENT

In bringing Chapter 6 to a close, I should explain that the utilitarian theory of punishment (i.e., assessment of consequences) is *retributive* in nature--that is, an offender against the prevailing ethical mores deserves to be punished according to the severity of the crime committed. Most Western societies have advanced beyond the Old Testament's "eye for an eye" dictum; nevertheless, a thief in Iran may still have his hand cut off. Also, changing times have brought about many cries for the return of capital punishment in countries where the death penalty had been abolished (especially for terrorists, police killers, etc.).

A generation ago, John Rawls (1971) presented a significant conception of "justice as

fairness." This was considered by some as a "rescue effort" for what has been called *distributive justice*\*. Shortly thereafter, however, Walter Kaufman argued that distributions can never be just no matter how carefully we might try. In his *Without Guilt and Justice: From Decidophobia to Autonomy*, he attempted to lead us one step farther away from both retributive and distributive justice. Explaining that he envisioned four cardinal virtues: honesty, courage, "humbition" (i.e. a fusion of ambition with humility), and love (involving the sharing of plights of others), he stated that a person's life goal should be what he called "creative autonomy."

Finally, then, as we move along to Chapter 7, I am recommending that you approach each ethical situation with which you may be confronted in what I am calling an "experiential" approach. In the *first, basic* phase in ethical decision-making, you should apply the three tests explained in this chapter (e.g., universalizability) in sequence. Then, as will be explained in Chapter 7, I will be asking you to carry out your analysis further by using a quite precise layout for a jurisprudential argument recommended by the British philosopher, Stephen Toulmin. Proceed at will.

#### NOTE

1. The basic three-step approach in this chapter (i.e., proceeding from Kant to Mill to Aristotle) was recommended by Professor Richard Fox, Cleveland State University as a viable *initial* method of ethical decision-making for undergraduate university students. I have amplified it somewhat with various "sub-principles" and then, in Chapter 8, I also superimpose the "approach" on Toulmin's "layout for a jurisprudential argument" that is presented in Chapter 7. Professor Fox should not be "responsible" for any subsequent additions in this plan after the original approach (i.e., moving from Kant to Mill to Aristotle, etc.). I did want to make certain, however, that he was recognized for the basic three-step approach.

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## CHAPTER 7

### PHASE TWO: DEVELOPING A FOUR-STEP, LAYOUT APPROACH FOR SUPERIMPOSING A LEGAL ARGUMENT

In this chapter (No. 7), you will find the second phase of the overall plan for ethical decision-making that is being recommended for your study and possible implementation. Recall that there were three sequential steps (tests to apply) to the first phase--that is, proceeding from Kant to Mill to Aristotle so as to assess (a) consistency (universalizability), (b) consequences, and (c) intentions. Now I am introducing a second phase for your consideration.

You could "survive" (i.e., achieve a reasonably satisfactory result) by the making of ethical decisions with the first phase only. This second phase can (should?) be employed as possible to strengthen your decision (i.e., in serving as verification, if you will). It happened that the three initial steps (a, b, and c) of the first phase can be quite neatly superimposed on a "reinforcement mechanism" for your Phase-one decision. So now I am introducing what Stephen Toulmin (1964) called his "layout for a jurisprudential argument" (p. 95).

Interestingly, Toulmin's approach is a formally valid argument in proper form that is similar to arguments employed daily in law (jurisprudence) and mathematics. As he explains, it is "laid out in a tidy and simple geometrical form" (p. 95). At this point I will simply introduce the "bare bones" of this argument for illustrative purposes.

Toulmin explained that an argument is like an organism. He then proceeded to designate the "chief anatomical units of the argument--its 'bodily organs,' so to speak" (p. 94 et ff.). After assessing it carefully, you will see that his logical apparatus--i.e., the logical form of a valid argument as one in which there is a combination of a formal, procedural argument in proper form with a straightforward, elementary geometrical design--has considerable merit for use in everyday personal and professional ethical decision-making.

#### STEP 1: FROM DATA TO CONCLUSION

You should understand that this phase (with *four* steps) is not being presented as formal logic in which D (Data) by definition leads us to C (Conclusion). In other words, this is not what logicians call a modus ponens\* situation in formal logic. It is simply the beginning of a rational argument that one might expect to hear in a court of law any day of the week. You are simply being asked to move forward gradually, steadily, and reasonably from D to C, from the data (D) to what appears to be a reasonable conclusion (C). In this particular example, taken from commercialized intercollegiate athletics in the United States, these initial steps might appear as follows:

D (DATA)     $\longrightarrow$     SO,     $\longrightarrow$     C (CONCLUSION)

A head coach in the U.S. is in a position to exercise undue interpersonal power over recruited, subsidized athletes

Universities should act so as to control the potentials for undue use of such power

Power here is defined by Wilson (1978) as "the ability or official capacity to exercise control or influence over others" (p. 303)--that is the leverage that the coach can apply in regard to whether an athlete takes stimulants, painkillers, or bodybuilding agents regularly to improve performance. What are the sources of this power? Actually, there are at least nine different ways that a head coach in these circumstances might employ the interpersonal power that he or she has at hand, elements that I believe should be employed very carefully *if at all*.

Examples of these "sources of power" are the concepts of love and fear, either of which might be a feeling that the athlete has for his or her coach. Either of these sources can be overt or subtle, and is often irrational. A third source of interpersonal power that could well place the coach in too strong a position vis à vis the athlete is that the athlete may have too strong a desire, or too pressing a need, to make the grade athletically. This list has been extended to at least nine sources (Zeigler, 1984, pp. 245-248).

(**Note:** At this point, because it is often necessary to convey different degrees of intensity or force, you will need to introduce--i.e., make use of--a qualifying term immediately prior to the statement of your conclusion (e.g., necessarily, presumably, probably, under "x" condition). All of this makes the development of a valid argument more difficult and complex, of course, but not unreasonably so. This qualifier is needed because any such distinction or qualifier will affect the import of the conclusion (C) that may be drawn. For example, in the argument that has been developed thus far about the head coach, I might ask myself whether data (D) necessarily (interpreted as needfully or essentially) leads to C (conclusion). This question could be answered affirmatively even more strongly after the introduction of Step 2 below, the warrant.

This qualifying term, called the Modal Qualifier\* (Q) by Toulmin, obviously helps to both clarify and make more complex the nature of the argument. Q relates to C; yet, it is distinct from it in that it speaks about W's (the warrant's) "ability to sound authoritative" (or not) about the relationship between D and C. In this example, I have been bold enough to recommend that the modal qualifier (Q) should be interpreted to mean "necessarily" (thus viewed as needful or essential).


I reason that I can be so forceful, because I firmly believe that, over the years of the 20th century, there has developed a truly substantive body of evidence of all types indicating that both coaches and athletes have been subjected to great pressures. Accordingly, a great variety

of rules and regulations have been promulgated by the many athletic conferences in an effort to keep athletics "educational," whatever that may mean today. And yet we find conditions are no better now at the turn of the 21st century than they were in 1929 when a starkly condemnatory report was published. This confirms to me that in many instances the situation is truly "out of hand." I actually believe that conditions are so out of hand that it is questionable whether any person, group of persons, or institution can do anything to remove the evil that exists. Therefore, this is my rationale for using the modal qualifier (Q) necessarily. (Please see Step 2 of Phase Two immediately below where "Q" has been introduced.)


### STEP 2: INTRODUCING THE WARRANT\*

Step 2 in the Toulmin argument layout involves the creation of "general hypothetical statements," which can act as "bridges," and thereby authorize the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us (p. 98). Such a statement is called the Warrant (W) so that it may be distinguished from both Data (D) and Conclusion (C). A warrant may be explained further as a sanction, justification, practical standard, canon, or argument, value, or norm. So, on our way to the conclusion of the argument started in Step 1, I am now asking you to add a warrant (a "How do you get there justification?" if you will) to the basic question mandated initially--"What conclusion might you draw from the facts on hand?" (i.e., the Conclusion [C] derived from the Data [D]).

With the present argument, therefore, the warrant (W) could be a statement such as "In a democratic society it is considered morally wrong to use another person as a means to an end entirely or largely through the employment of exploitation, deception, and/or treachery." If I were now to symbolize the relationship among the three elements introduced to this point (i.e., D, W, and C), it could look as follows:



Or, to carry the present example through Step 2:





subsidized athletes

for undue use  
of such power

SINCE

W




In a democratic society it is considered wrong to use another person unduly as a means to an end entirely or largely through the employment of exploitation, deception, and/or treachery

The warrant here is designated as "incidental and explanatory," its function "being simply to register explicitly the legitimacy of the steps involved and to refer it back to the larger class of steps whose legitimacy is being presupposed (p. 100). Thus, warrants are general, but data are specific. Warrants are used--but rarely called by that name--in all aspects of life, including people's occupations. Quite simply, they help us to judge on a rational basis any ideas or arguments we may encounter daily.


**STEP 3: CONSIDERING THE REBUTTAL\*  
(OR CONDITION OF EXCEPTION)\***

Step 3, which has been called the Rebuttal (R) (or Condition of Exception), has a relationship to the warrant, also, because it may influence the strength of the warrant markedly. In fact the rebuttal (R), or condition of exception, can offer particular circumstances of greater or lesser import that might negate or even refute the authority of the warrant (W). However, I must be careful to characterize the degree of force or intensity that each rebuttal (R) can exert on the conclusion (C) being drawn. For example, some coaches in highly commercialized programs seem to be arguing for complete freedom of action as they use the "survival of the fittest" argument put forth by Plato (1961) in the Gorgias (p. 73). However, I would be inclined to call such an individual either psychopathic or megalomaniacal.

In Step 3, therefore, the relationship--to this point--among a total of five elements (D, Q, C, W, and R) can be symbolized as follows:



Or carrying the present argument through Step 3 literally, it might look something like the following:



#### STEP 4: ADDING THE BACKING\*

In Step 4, the final step in the "rounding out" of the argument that I have been developing, we return to a further consideration (i.e., an extension) of the nature of a warrant. The warrant, as explained in Step 2, is a general, hypothetical, bridge-like statement used to authorize or justify the conclusion being drawn on the basis of the data (evidence) on hand. Recall that the warrant used here explained that it is wrong in this society to use a person through some form of exploitation, deception, and/or treachery.

Despite what has been said above, an inquiry should be made as to the applicability of


the warrant as stated in *all* cases in a democratic society. This is why some possible conditions of rebuttal or exception (R)--and also some possible delineations of the coach's intentions are listed. (The question of intentions will be treated below shortly.)

One condition of rebuttal (R) points out that North American society seems unwilling to curb the undue use of interpersonal power by the coach. This argument may also be placed in another context altogether--for the sake of this discussion in a different society or culture. This warrant may actually be relevant and applicable in what is called the Western world. Further, I should also ask to what extent it would be relevant and applicable in all countries in other cultures. Of course, I hope it is most relevant and applicable there too, but then I need to ask additionally if society "looks the other way" there too--as it seems to do all too often in the United States especially.

At any rate, in Step 4 my aim is to present the idea of providing Backing (B) for the warrant that I choose to use in developing the pattern or layout for this jurisprudential argument. Here the backing (B) supplements or strengthens the warrant even further. Thus, I state that the strength of the warrant becomes even greater when it is appreciated that the use of interpersonal power through exploitation, deception, and/or treachery involves *entrapment* and *manipulation* as well! As a result it is now possible to add the following backing (B), preceded by the words "On account of," to strengthen the warrant (W) even further: "The written and unwritten rules and laws of society. Manipulation of this type usually involves deception (or even coercion) to which there is a moral reaction because of the effort to control or elicit behavior through interference with another's operative goals and thereby to destroy or seriously damage his/her personal dignity."

Invoking the additional Step 4 completes the presentation of the recommended layout to be employed in the ethical analysis of a *jurisprudential* argument. Of course, it is recognized that there is a "field-dependence" for backing of this type (i.e., it matters a great deal whether one is dealing with the subject of ethics, the discipline of physics, or the profession of law, to name three areas of human involvement). It might have been sufficient simply to state the warrant (W) and leave it at that without adding the backing (B). As Toulmin explained, "the warrant itself is more than a repetition of these facts; it is a general moral of a practical character, about the ways in which we safely argue in view of these facts"(p. 106). Finally in this second phase of the pattern of argument that began as "D, SO C," it ought to be possible to reverse the structure and move from right to left, or "C, *BECAUSE* D."

In Step 4, then, a sixth element called backing (B) has been introduced. Thus, D, Q, C, W, B, and R are all worked into the presentation of the complete argument and are symbolized as follows:



W

R

ON ACCOUNT OF

B



Or, to carry the argument forward in detail through the final Step 4:

D



SO, (Q)




C

A head coach in the U.S. is in a position to exercise undue interpersonal power over recruited, subsidized athletes

Universities should control undue use of such power in this country

SINCE



W

UNLESS



R

In a democratic society it is considered wrong to use another person as a means to an end entirely or largely through the employment of exploitation, deception, and/or treachery

1. Athlete is actually not hurt by use of such power
2. Athlete doesn't believe he/she is being used
3. Athlete is not unhappy about being used
4. Coach didn't fully appreciate the extent to which he/she was using athlete
5. Coach was being pressured inordinately to win
6. Society sees no great harm being done and is unwilling to curb what seems to be undue use of such power

ON ACCOUNT OF

B



The written and unwritten rules, regulations, and laws that exist in our society. Such manipulation usually involves deception (or even coercion) to which there is a moral reaction because of the effort to control or elicit behavior through interference with another's operative goals and

thereby to destroy or seriously  
damage his/her personal dignity

### CONCLUDING STATEMENT

In concluding Chapter 7, I trust that you have also found appealing the possibility of testing your initial ethical decision-making (i.e., from Kant to Mill to Aristotle) further by devising a layout for the further application of a jurisprudential (law-court) argument. Next, in Chapter 8, I will introduce Phase Three--i.e., a narrative and symbolic description of how a "superimposition" (i.e. "blending") of the three-step, Phase-One approach and the four-step, Phase-Two approach can conceivably fit together neatly. If Phase One and Phase Two do not mesh or seem quite fully consistent with each other, this will present you with a good reason for further reflection before carrying through with the ethical decision or action that you have been contemplating. You may even decide that you should carry through with Phase 4 and try to arrange for a full-fledged case discussion with relative, friends, or colleagues (as appropriate, respectively).

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## CHAPTER 8

### PHASE THREE: BLENDING THE PHILOSOPHIC APPROACH (PHASE ONE) WITH THE LEGAL-ARGUMENT APPROACH (PHASE TWO)

Now that Phase Two, the recommended layout for a legal-argument (jurisprudential) approach, has been discussed in some detail, I am proposing that we continue with the "blending" of the two phases of this "united plan of attack" (i.e., superimposing Phase One with its three steps on Phase Two with its four steps). This blending--to the extent possible--should reinforce (or possibly challenge!) your initial solution to any specific Phase-One (three-step) decision about an ethical (decision-making) problem in your personal and professional life.

As I make this "superimposition" or "blending" recommendation, I am well aware that *most* people in *most* circumstances will be inclined to say, "Hey, if I have an ethical decision to make, and I manage to at least get through the three steps of Phase One, I'll be doing very well." I agree. However, a significant percentage of you, my readers, will not be satisfied at stopping there. And--depending on (a) the importance of the ethical decision to be made *and* (b) the time available before a decision *must* be made--you will want to take the matter through the four steps of Phase Two. Actually it would not be that difficult to do, or even that time consuming.

I hope you will agree that Toulmin's recommended layout for an argument can be used as a model (or template) to assist with the delineation (at least) of just about any type of problematic situation, theoretical or practical, that may arise in your life. However, the primary concern for us here is with personal decision-making of an ethical nature; so, it is necessary for you to determine also the merits or demerits of the ethical situation at hand. Accordingly, when you are confronted with an ethical problem, the recommendation is that you *first* apply the three steps of Phase One--that is, the three tests of consistency (universalizability), (net) consequences, and intentions (or rebuttal)--before considering the implementation of Phase Two with its four steps of Toulmin's recommended jurisprudential (law-court) argument.

When these two phases have been completed separately, it would then be a relatively simple matter to *superimpose* the elements of consistency, consequences, and intentions upon the layout diagram that you have developed (in Phase Two). In an effort to summarize the essence of the three tests, and thereby clarify them in regard to a situation or problem present today in everyday life. I am referring to the presence of amateur, semiprofessional, and professional boxing in society, as well as the question whether boxing has a place in an educational environment (e.g., high school or university) anyhow. As we consider the following situation, for example, keep the following three thumbnail assessments in mind as we work from DATA (D) to CONCLUSION (C):

1. *Consistency (Universalizability)\** To apply Test 1, the data (evidence)

would have to indicate--and it does--that what is called the "sport" of boxing can cause permanent damage to the brain of a fighter because the head is one of the primary targets of his/her opponent. If so, we certainly would not wish to UNIVERSALIZE a situation where one person does permanent damage to another in the name of sport.


2. *Consequences (Net)\**: To apply Test 2, we need to assess if such involvement were *consistently* encouraged and carried out in society generally, whether the (NET) CONSEQUENCES of such continued activity would promote the greatest (net) good or happiness of those involved.

3. *Intentions (Rebuttal)\**: To apply Test 3 successfully, it would have to be shown, for example, that learning the skill of boxing is so important in today's violent society that educators, recreation directors, and professional promoters believe its acquisition overrides the possibility of permanent brain damage to the participants. Further, even if such importance was demonstrated, the promoters of such activity would also be obligated to discover whether some means are available whereby sufficient safety measures would prevent the occurrence of such injury (i.e. brain damage).

Proceeding here in Chapter 8, the "assignment" is to explain how to put ethical decision-making in practice. The task is to devise the "best fit" between the tests of consistency, universalizability, and intentions in Phase One and the four steps of the jurisprudential argument in Phase Two. At the end of Chapter 7, recall that the following Table 3 was the symbolic description offered of how this *blending* or superimposition of the three-step, Phase-One approach and the four-step, Phase-Two approach might be correctly meshed.

Table 3

**SYMBOLIC DESCRIPTION OF THE  
BLENDING OF THE THREE-STEP APPROACH  
WITH THE LEGAL-ARGUMENT APPROACH**



TEST No.1

(ON ACCOUNT OF B)  
BACKING

(consequences)  
TEST No.2



1.  
2.  
3. *etc.*  
(intentions)  
TEST No.3

**Key to Jurisprudential Argument Terms:**


- D =** Data (A statement of a situation that prevails including evidence, elements, sources, samples of facts)
- Q =** Modal Qualifier (adverbs employed to qualify conclusions based on strength of warrants (e.g., necessarily, probably))
- C =** Conclusion (claim or conclusion that we are seeking to establish)
- W =** Warrant (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question, "How do you get there?")
- B =** Backing (categorical statements of fact that lend further support to the bridge-like warrants)
- R =** Conditions of Exception (arguments of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)



**Note:** Immediately below, then, to take this overall approach to ethical decision-making one step further, I will complete the development of the several phases of the approach by actually introducing a specific case situation and following through with the superimposition or blending of Phase One on (or with) Phase Two. The question asked is the same as introduced earlier, "Should competitive boxing be permitted in society?"

**Table 4**

**SUPERIMPOSING PHASE ONE ON PHASE TWO:  
SHALL COMPETITIVE BOXING BE PERMITTED IN SOCIETY?  
(LAYOUT FOR A JURISPRUDENTIAL AND ETHICAL ARGUMENT)**  
(S. Toulmin) (R. Fox)



and expert opinion indicating that such damage does occur and is cumulative over the life of the participants and takes their attention away from the development of job-training skills

any permanent damage to the participants

*(Intentions Test [Aristotle])*  
(Step 3)

*(Consequences Test [Mill])*  
(Step 2)

**Key: Jurisprudential Argument Layout** (Toulmin, 1964)

- D** = data (a statement of a situation that prevails, including evidence, elements, sources, samples of facts)
- C** = conclusion (claim or conclusion that we are seeking to establish)
- W** = warrant (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question. "How do you get there?")
- Q** = modal qualifier (adverbs employed to qualify conclusions based on strengths of warrants--e.g., necessarily, probably)
- R** = conditions of exception (conditions of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute the conclusion)
- B** = backing (categorical statements of fact that lend further support to the 'bridge-like' warrants)

**Note:** Now please keep the above in mind as you proceed to Chapter 9 where Phase Four of the overall ethical decision-making approach is explained by the introduction of a case method discussion technique for possible use with small groups (i.e., from two to ??? people).

## CHAPTER 9

### PHASE FOUR: ADDING A CASE-METHOD APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

#### INTRODUCTION

In this chapter--since I believe that it might be useful to you with your ethical decision-making--you will be introduced gradually into Phase Four of this overall approach recommended for ethical decision-making. You will find here one example (a case situation) of a case-method (human relations) approach to ethical decision-making that can be understood and applied by any reasonably intelligent person.

As we can all appreciate, applying the case method technique with an "ethical orientation" to the analysis of an ethical problem in no way resembles an exact science. I do believe, however, that many more find such a "deficiency" desirable and wholesome. The inexactitude of the results of a case analysis of an ethical problem in today's ever more complex world is inevitable. Yet, as a way to further the making of the "best possible" decision, we really need some reasonably sound basis upon which to formulate an answer to the myriad of ethical problems that arise daily. This is why I began about 30 years ago to look into the subject of personal ethics and then gradually developed the overall sequential approach recommended in previous chapters--i.e., from Phase One to Phase Two to Phase Three.

In an effort to improve this then-prevailing, unsatisfactory situation for my undergraduate and graduate students, I sought earlier to provide them with an opportunity to develop rationality as a "life competency." As explained in Chapter 4, I set out to place before them the prototypical, major ethical routes to decision-making that are available to undergraduate students today. Obviously, analysis of current sources may result in great variations in emphases and terminology. So I decided to organize these routes in tabular form under specific headings and took pains to present this material to my students in some detail.

In the process, admittedly not executed in great depth (see Table 1 and 2 on pp. 46-48), I emphasized (a) the underlying presuppositions, (b) the criteria for evaluation, (c) the method for determining ethical decisions, and (4) the probable result of each of six approaches (i.e., authoritarianism, relativism <arguably an approach>, situationism, scientific ethics, the "good reasons" approach, and emotivism).

It became apparent that I could not get the students involved in depth with every one of these approaches to ethical decision-making in a first course of this type. Nevertheless I was determined to help students approach (both personal and professional) ethical decision-making in as explicit a manner as possible as a point of departure. I wanted this to be an approach that could be useful to them as developing young people as well as throughout their adult lives--and yet it had to be one that they could build upon as required or desirable as well.

Thus, I explained earlier that, over a period of approximately five years, based on the recommendations of Professor Richard Fox (to whom I owe a debt for this approach to ethical decision-making), I gradually incorporated an overall four-phase plan of attack for ethical decision-making in my work with my own students. As I made clear to them, also, this was just one basic approach with which they were being asked to experiment as they move toward greater sophistication in this subject within their lives. As we have seen--a quick review again!--this plan of attack in its entirety includes the following four phases:

**Phase One.** Determine through the employment of a "three-step approach"--from "Kant to Mill to Aristotle"--what the ethical or moral issue is in the specific case at hand. That is, the person analyzing an ethical problem proceeds from a test of universalizability (Kant) to one of (net) consequences (Mill/Bentham), and finally to a test of intentions (Aristotle).

**Phase Two.** Once Phase One has been carried out, if you wish to "reinforce" (or "strengthen" or "vett"), proceed with Phase Two, or the layout of the argument (recommended as a jurisprudential argument in S. Toulmin. *The uses of argument*. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1964).

**Phase Three.** Then, in Phase Three, if you wish to strengthen your potential decision still further, seek to compare Phase One and Phase Two by superimposing (1) the universalizability maxim (Test 1) onto Toulmin's warrant, (2) the net consequences result (Test 2) onto the presumably unethical action for the backing, and (3) the intentions analysis items (Test 3) as possible conditions of exception or rebuttal. With this type of comparison, you will quite soon discover whether you have a "good" or a "bad" fit. If your comparison (i.e., Phase One on Phase Two) seems to mesh poorly, you can readily see where you may have possibly gone awry.

Now I will move on to the main purpose of Chapter 9--that is, the introduction of the case method technique (**Phase Four**) as a possible tool to assist you still further--in confronting either personal, professional, or social/environmental problems--with the making of a decision in a situation with ethical ramifications.

#### PHASE FOUR: ADDING A CASE METHOD TECHNIQUE TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

With the introduction of Phase Four, therefore, I am recommending that you consider the use of the case method technique that has been employed extensively in legal and medical training since the turn of the twentieth century. It is also true that the case method has been

used as a teaching technique by business schools dating back to the 1920s. Notable examples of this are the Harvard Business School in the United States and the Ivey School of Business Administration at The University of Western Ontario in Canada.

Teachers in various professional training programs know that the need to develop knowledge, competencies, and skills on the part of students in such programs is obvious and ever-present. A common complaint of students in these programs is that adequate laboratory and/or field experiences are typically not available. And yet, somehow, this approach within professional preparation programs was not introduced to the field until the 1950s. Furthermore, oddly and interestingly, due mainly to several social influences (e.g., onrushing science and technology) and subsequent, prevailing educational essentialism, it is not used as extensively as it should be presently).

Experience and past literature have shown that people react most favorably to this teaching technique. Accordingly, a sample case (an actual situation that occurred), along with a recommended, detailed analysis is presented below. This particular case and analysis includes ethical implications, a topic that is also being considered widely in professional training at this time. (However, this approach to the case method technique of decision-making can be used very well also without special consideration being given to the ethical aspects of any given case.)

This is the reason why I have recommended that the person fundamentally concerned with a problem of ethical decision-making, along with significant "others," work their way through an even more detailed, overall approach (see Phase Four below) to ethical decision-making (as adapted (1) from my own investigation related to case analysis (see Zeigler, 1982, 1984, 1995), and (2) from P. T. Manicas, and A. N. Kruger, *Essentials of logic*. NY: American Book Company, 1968.)

#### THE EIGHT STEPS OF PHASE FOUR

**Note:** Upon the completion of Phases One, Two, and Three, then, if there is time--and I suggest that you make time if the opportunity and/or need arises--discuss the ethical problem at hand in detail with "significant others." I believe this approach is vital whether the problem has arisen in either your personal or your professional life. There is simply no escaping the fact that *human relations* play a significant part in our lives. It may seem to be a truism to state, but more people lose jobs because of inadequate human relations than because of the quality of their work. Additionally, as we all recognize, maintaining solid friendships of all types revolves around the question of human relations once again.

The eight steps to this overall approach of Phase Four, steps that I gradually refined through hundreds of case method discussions over the years, are as follows:

- 1) Determine the main ethical problem after consideration of all conceivable sub-problems taking care to denote which of the latter have definite ethical implications,
- 2) Explication of any "knowledge base carry-forward" that may exist already in the mind of the participant(s) in connection with this sort of case problem (including pertinent ethical implications).
- 3) Analyze the main ethical problem keeping in mind employing the application of the "three-step approach" above (Fox), as blended with or superimposed on, the four-step layout of the argument (Toulmin).
- 4) Analyze carefully the various personalities and their relationships with others involved.
- 5) Formulate only those alternative solutions to the ethical problem that appear to be relevant, possible, and meaningful. (A certain amount of subjectivity is inevitable at this point.)
- 6) Elaborate the proposed alternative solutions involving the framing of warranted predictive statements (i.e., both pro's and con's). (Here an effort is made to look at both sides of the various alternative solutions deemed worthy of further consideration before a final decision is made.)
- 7) Select the preferred alternative solution (including initial tentative postulation of the ramifications of the proposed solution prior to its actual implementation). This is especially important if the case is actually a true one to be resolved as soon as possible.
- 8) Assess and determine currently useful generalizations for possible future use in similar ethical situations as "knowledge base carry-forwards" in subsequent case discussions.

What I am recommending here, therefore, is that typically the person primarily concerned with the ethical problem at hand serve as the "chairperson" of a small group of relatives and friends. This is especially important if the problem is a *personal* one. If the problem is a *professional* one, then try to bring a small group of close associates together for a similar discussion, once again serving as the chairperson of a group. (Seat people preferably in a circle or around a square table so that a more open and democratic discussion will result).

I believe it would be wise for you, as the chairperson of the discussion group (and as the person primarily involved in the situation), to write up the case situation beforehand in as factual a manner as possible. This may take some time--and it is most important to outline the facts at hand of the case carefully and sequentially (as they occurred)--before you begin to write (see the case problem below as written by William Sanders, a fictitious name). Try to avoid introducing your (or any!) prejudices into the case--or at least "confess" openly to having or sensing this or that prejudice. Or, if you believe you made a tactical and/or ethical mistake at any point as a case participant, say so in your case write-up. Basically, however, keep in mind that you are striving to be a good "reporter" telling the facts--the "who, what, where, when, and (possibly) why"--to the potential readers who will be helping you through analytic discussion to arrive at a decision.

Thus, as you sit down with your friends or associates to discuss the ethical problem at hand, hand each person your very carefully prepared, space-and-a-half summary of the situation to be discussed. Try to keep the length of the case situation to approximately (no more than!) four pages.

**Note:** The case situation below (explained by William Sanders in Section I below) is followed by a written summary and analysis of the discussion about the problem that subsequently took place. The aspect of "ethical implications" was added for the purposes of this book.

## A CASE METHOD APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING: COACHING ETHICS AND THE TENDERED ATHLETE

by

Robert L. Case, Sam Houston State University  
Steve Timewell, The Univ. of Western Ontario  
Earle F. Zeigler, The Univ. of Western Ontario

### SECTION I: A Case Situation: Grading Practices for Athletes at Midwestern University

**Note:** William Sanders is an instructor working on his doctoral degree at Midwestern University. On February 1, 1997, he sent the following letter to

Prof. T. C. Collins, Chairperson, Department of Sport and Physical Education,  
Midwestern University:

Dear Dr. Collins:

As you know, Head Coach Tom Courtney and I have just completed the teaching of PE 156 (Wrestling), a course that we have handled jointly for the past few years. This year I had developed a new grading scheme that we presented to the students at the first class period. We agreed that I would determine the written work to be completed, and the skills we were to teach were those that Head Coach Tom stresses typically.

Both of us graded students at various times during the semester on their achievement with the skills. Tom asked me, as usual, to grade all of the written work. This I did, and all grades, including attendance, were listed on a large chart kept in Mr. Courtney's office. (Near the end of the term, incidentally, a number of the students were complaining to both Tom and me that he [Tom] had been marking them absent incorrectly.)

While grading the written work, I noticed that one student, a prominent Midwestern athlete, turned in someone else's class notebook (a regularly assigned project) under his own name. I actually remembered grading this particular notebook over Xmas vacation a year ago. He also handed in several other assignments at this time, ones that were actually due at the middle of the semester. He explained that injury during the fall season had prevented him from getting them in on time. As it happened, this was not his own work either. I notified Coach Courtney immediately since he is, of course, technically my superior (holding professorial status). He suggested that I give him the papers and the notebook, and that he himself would confront the student and his coach together.

The following day Coach Tom informed me that, despite the young man's plagiarism, Courtney and Slaughter (the student's coach) agreed that the athlete should re-work his notebook and assigned papers. As punishment he would be asked to complete an extra assignment recommended by me. In this way his failing grade could be raised sufficiently so as not to make it impossible for him to get off academic probation. The student came to see me; received the extra assignment; and was to return everything to me when it was completed. Then I would change the grade if his work merited such revision.

My complaint is that I never saw the results. I asked Coach Tom about it, and he explained that he had received the work, graded it, and had misplaced it at home. I decided to check out the grade submitted and learned that this person, and many other varsity athletes, received a grade of A in the course, while others more deserving received B's and C's.

Regretfully, as a result of this experience, I must charge Coach Tom with dishonesty and a lack of professional ethics.

Very sincerely yours,  
William Sanders, Asst. Coach



**SECTION II: Analysis of a Case Situation  
(Including Ethical Implications)**

**(Step 1. Determination of the main problem *after* consideration of the various sub-problems denoting those sub-problems that have ethical implications.)**

**Step 1. Sub-Problems & The Main Problem:**

- 1. The seemingly evident plagiarism of the athlete athlete--ethically wrong.**
- 2. Courtney, despite predetermined grading agreement with Sanders that the latter would grade written work, grades Sanders' written work himself and doesn't even allow Sanders to see the submission --ethically wrong.**
- 3. Athlete evidently was using his "athletic profile" for a special privilege (i.e., to be able to get away with handing assignment in late)--ethically wrong.**
- 4. The fact that upon examination Sanders discovered that various varsity athletes received A's in the course, while others that Sanders felt actually did better received only B's and C's--ethically wrong.**
- 5. The fact that Courtney initially went to the athlete's coach to discussed the athlete's predicament (a person who was already on academic probation) and seemingly took his plagiarism so casually; one wonders whether they (Courtney and Slaughter) ever even intended that he should complete his work for the course--ethically wrong.**
- 6. The fact that Coach Courtney granted a truly unfair advantage to a varsity athlete, allowing him to escape any punishment for an offense that some other student might be severely punished for doing, or even dismissed from the university for such conduct ethically wrong.**
- 7. Sanders may have erred by accepting the "substitute plan" recommended by Courtney after the initial plagiarism had been detected and reported by Sanders to Courtney.**

**The Main Ethical Problem was determined to be  
Sub-problem #f above (Courtney's Ethical Conduct)**

**(Step 2. Explication of any “knowledge-base carry-forward” that may exist already in the mind**

of the student in connection with the analysis of this sort of case problem, including ethical implications.)

**Step 2. Knowledge Base Carry-Forward (Prevailing Principles or Generalizations)**

1. Plagiarism is cheating, an unacceptable practice in higher education.
2. Unless there are truly extenuating circumstances, we must live up to commitments we agree upon with others.
3. Granting "special" privileges to some people and not to their peers is unfair and will create problems.
4. Athletics is but one of many aspects of university life, and should be kept in proper perspective with the overall educational function of higher education.

(Step 3. Analysis of the main problem through application of the "three-step approach" [i.e., the three tests listed above as recommended by R. Fox]; this is then integrated with a layout of the argument [based on Toulmin's approach].)

**Step 3. Employment of the Three-Step Approach:**

1. **Universalizability or Consistency (Test No.1)**  
Based on society's values and norms, and that universities are regarded as pattern-maintenance organizations where honesty and integrity are absolutely essential, proven plagiarism is most serious.
2. **(Net) Consequences (Test No.2)**  
Proven dishonesty by teachers and coaches that is somehow not punished could seriously damage the university's reputation and place the institution's future in jeopardy
3. **Intentions (Test No.3)**  
The voluntary and/or involuntary nature of Coach Courtney's actions must be ascertained, and then appropriate action should be taken based on the findings (e.g., dismissal for cause)

**Step 4. Integration of Triple-Play Approach with Argument Layout**

Data (D)     $\longrightarrow$     So (Q)     $\longrightarrow$     Conclusion (C)

necessarily)

Head Wrestling Coach Courtney is reported by his teaching assistant as having shown extreme favoritism to a ten dered athlete from another sport, a man who is on academic probation and who has evidently committed plagiarism

The department head should make every effort to learn the true facts of the situation, and then should take appropriate action based on his findings (e.g. dismissal for cause).

Since  
Warrant (W)

Unless  
Rebuttal or Exception (R)

Based on society's values and norms, and that universities are regarded as pattern-main tenance organizations where honesty and integrity are absolutely essential, an offense such as proven plagiarism is most serious

It turns out that Courtney actually did forget and did grade the manual him- self, and it was excellent in all regards

and/or

Universalizability  
(Test No. 1)

Courtney was under some external pressure; felt that he simply had no re- course other than to help the athlete who was on academic probation

Because  
Backing (B)

Proven dishonesty by teachers and coaches that is somehow not punished could seriously damage a university's reputa- tion and place the institu- tion's future in jeopardy

and/or

Consequences  
(Test No. 2)

Courtney was old, near re- tirement, had an excellent record otherwise, offered an apology; corrected the well-intentioned error; thus, clemency was felt to be in order

and/or

It turned out that the whole problem has been greatly exaggerated by

**Sanders who had it in for  
Courtney & perhaps hoped  
to succeed to the position  
if Courtney were dismissed**

**Intentions  
(Test No. 3)**

**Key: Argument Layout (Toulmin, 1964)**

- D = data (a statement of a situation that prevails including evidence, elements, sources, samples of facts)**
- C = conclusion (claim or conclusion that we are seeking to establish)**
- W = warrant (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question. "How do you get there?")**
- Q = modal qualifier (adverbs employed to qualify conclusions based on strengths of warrants--e.g., necessarily, probably)**
- R = conditions of exception (conditions of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute the conclusion)**
- B = backing (categorical statements of fact that lend further support to the 'bridge-like' warrants)**

**(Step 5. Analyze the various personalities and their (ethical and working) relationships with others involved.)**

**Step 5. Personalities and Ethical Relationships:**

- 1. There appears to be a difference in the way which the coaches at Midwestern University regard academic work and offenses and infractions that might occur. Courtney evidently felt it was more important for a top athlete to be eligible than to be honest, as did Slaughter--but Sanders obviously didn't agree.**
- 2. At least some athletes at Midwestern figured you could get away with handing in someone else's work--or else this one wouldn't have tried it. If this is true, this could affect a professional program most seriously.**
- 3. Even if everything that Courtney said was true (e.g., he had found it to be worth an A grade), what about the other varsity athletes who Sanders felt were receiving grades that were too high (relatively speaking, that is).**

4. If Courtney had been under some external pressure to see to it that the athlete became eligible again, one would think that Sanders might be aware of this--but perhaps not.

(Steps 6 & 7. Formulation of only those alternative solutions to the ethical problem that appear to be relevant, possible, and meaningful.)

**Steps 6 & 7. Relevant Alternatives Open to One of the Case Participants:**

**(Note: In this instance, we chose to view the matter from the standpoint of Wm. Sanders, the Asst. Coach who faced this difficult situation.)**

1. Initially, Sanders should have taken a stand against Courtney when he first learned how the matter was to be handled (i.e., he should have asked to go along with Courtney when he discussed the matter with the athlete's coach). It could be argued that he had a responsibility (ethical?), also, to challenge Courtney "immediately" when he somehow did not see the results of the assigned work designated as "punishment."

Pro--maybe he could have convinced Courtney to quickly retrace his steps and change what he had just done (i.e., submit a false grade, etc., without showing the material to Sanders according to the arrangement).

Con--Courtney might have been angry at being challenged and would have attempted to somehow "cover his tracks".

2. After Sanders discovered the plagiarism, he should have quietly referred it to Collins and not become so openly involved.

Pro--by "playing it safe" his position might have been more secure.

Con--his conscience might have bothered him because somehow in this culture a (unethical) "sneaky Judas" is especially condemned when an action becomes generally known.

3. Before taking any action (i.e., writing the letter), Sanders should have confronted Coach Courtney

about this matter; he should have also asked him to justify the especially high grades for all the tendered athletes (with lower grades for others). This would have been somewhat more ethical than "going over his head" immediately.

**Note:** See pro's and con's in Question No.6 below in (Preferred Alternative Solution).

4. Sanders could have contacted Coach Slaughter to discuss the situation. Slaughter's reaction might have provided additional evidence (one way or the other).

**Pro--**this would have to be handled most carefully. It could have caused him to get back to Courtney rapidly to call the whole affair off. It would also have given Sanders a stronger case either way it turned out.

**Con--**Sanders would have been "sticking his neck out" even further, and this might cause a violent reaction from the authorities in the Athletic Association directed at injuring Sanders' job-standing and his future.

5. Sanders could check grades over the most recent years to see if there had been a pattern indicating that athletes were consistently being treated in a special manner.

**Pro--**this might also have strengthened Sanders' case, or it might have dissuaded him from writing the letter if nothing seemed to have been wrong. It could also have been used in connection with "c" above to help convince Courtney of the error of his actions.

**Con--**it might have been difficult to get the former grade books without arousing suspicion on Courtney's part.

6. Once the complaint has been filed, Sanders should have left the matter at that and removed himself as far as possible from having anything to do with it (ethical?).

**Pro--**one is tempted to do this if possible, and it does leave the accuser somewhat less tainted by the whole affair.

**Con--**this possibility rarely develops, mainly because the accuser is needed as a witness and thereby is forced to take a

stand.

7. Sanders should somehow have sent the information to Dr. Collins anonymously; in this way he might conceivably have escaped from any responsibility in the matter.

Pro--this could really be playing it safe, and it might work.

Con--Sanders' conscience would probably have bothered him, and also receipt of such an anonymous accusation might well be ignored.

Step 6 & 7 (cont.). The *Preferred* Alternative Solution

**Note:** A difficulty with the recommended "preferred alternative solution" is that it is *retrospective*--that is, we know already what Sanders did do. He reported the matter directly to the department head. Typically, however, we are recommending that the person concerned with the making of a decision might wish to employ Phase Four before taking action.

**Recommendation:**

Confront Courtney before reporting him  
to departmental chairperson (Alternative "c" above)

Pro's

- i. Would have gone through proper channels
- ii. Courtney would have known that Sanders was aware of his unethical practices and might be reporting his unfair practices to the administrator
- iii. Sanders would have given Courtney a chance to explain what he had been doing by offering

Con's

By confronting Courtney there might have been some a strong "backlash"

Improper grading might have led to punishment of Courtney and his dismissal anyhow

If Courtney could not have explained, he would working be working mightily

some rationale for his having done what he did

to harm Sanders by having him "black-balled" by the Athletic Association.

iv.. If Sanders could have convinced Courtney that his grading practices were grossly unfair, then something might have been worked out before the chairman was notified

If an investigation had taken place, and Courtney somehow was innocent. Sanders would have been in a most precarious position to say the least

### Step 8. Currently Useful Principles or Generalizations

**Note:** These are recommended typically as a result of the case analysis, being added to the Knowledge Base Carry-forward in No.2 above for future analyses that are similar in nature.

1. Keep in mind that there is a considerable range of opinion in this culture as to how ethical conduct is perceived
2. It is vitally important that teachers/coaches set high ethical standards for themselves, as well as for their charges
3. Every effort should be made to keep the lines of communication open with colleagues in a work situation
4. When team teaching is being carried out, it is especially important to have the policies and procedures in use spelled out most carefully in advance of the actual teaching situation

### CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Now that you have read (and perhaps re-read) the results of the discussion that was held to analyze the case explained above, we will move ahead in Chapters 10, 11, and 12 to the matter of ethical decision-making in (1) *personal*, (2) *professional*, and (3) *environmental* situations that a person might encounter daily.



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## INTRODUCTION TO PART III:

### A BRIEF REVIEW OF THIS APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

Part III has a separate introduction because what is presented immediately below applies directly to the approach that you are being asked to follow in each of the three chapters in this final section of the book (Chapters 10, 11, and 12).

In Chapter 10 you will be introduced directly and "experientially" (so to speak) to what I have called *personal* ethical decision-making (Category I). By the word "experiential," is meant that here you will have the opportunity to test your knowledge and skill in the analysis of specific *personal* (Category I) problems that are fundamentally ethical in nature (e.g., one's relationships with parents, siblings, or close friends).

In Chapter 11 following, the emphasis will be primarily *professional* (Category II) in that the ethical problems considered there will relate to an individual's professional relations with others primarily at his or her place of employment or in related locations. This second professional category will include case situations where the need arises for ethical decision-making in the course of his or her employment as a practicing professional or tradesperson (perhaps even as a manager).

The third and final category, *environmental* (Category III) contains a selection of case situations in which the individual should make a decision of an ethical nature--either as a "private" person or as a professional--about his or her relationship to the "social" or "natural" environment.

**Note:** I am fundamentally agreeing, as I explained above, that all ethical problems are ultimately problems encountered by *persons* typically in relationships *within himself or herself, with other persons at home or work, or with the social or physical environment*. Nevertheless, I have chosen to make this tripartite subdivision of all possible ethical problems for purposes of ease of understanding and convenience.

Having decided on this tripartite, categorical division of problem situations of an ethical nature, however, I do appreciate that you might still say that *all* ethical problems in the final analysis are basically personal. I agree. Nevertheless, I felt that such a "tri-categorical" decision was necessary for purposes of clarity and the best delineation possible.

### VALUES (STANDARDS) IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Any formally stated codes of ethics, as well as informal ethical practices that prevail, are inevitably grounded in the evolving society or culture from which they have sprung. The social environment of the United States has inescapably "created" an unwritten code of ethics (and an ensuing set of laws) mandated to a large degree by the fundamental societal values

and norms that exist. (A very similar code of informal ethics [and set of laws] apply to the Canadian scene, also, because of the two countries' location and the resultant daily exchange of information of all types.)

To understand the the importance of values, consider, for example, the Parsonsian "general system of action" that may be regarded as an empirical system composed of four subsystems:

(1) *culture*--that serves a *pattern-maintenance* function--and also that required for creative pattern change! As Johnson (1969, 1994) explained, it "provides the figure in the carpet"--the structure and the 'programming' for the action system as a whole."

(2) *social system*--that is a theoretical concept explaining the articulation of social relationships. The social system;s structure has to be more or less harmoniously related to the functional problems of society through a process of *integration*.

**Note:** The social system will itself be explained more fully immediately below.

(3) *the personality*--the primacy here is *goal-attainment* through the personality as the agent. This drive toward goal-attainment creates the action processes that bring about the optimization of satisfaction to personalities.

(4) *the adaptive subsystem* (the behavioral organism)--here is the locus of the primary human "facilities" that underlie the other systems the other systems (i.e., a set of conditions to which any action *must* adapt); it comprises the primary mechanism of interrelation with the physical environment.

These four subsystems within a society compose *A Hierarchy of Control and Conditioning* in which the subsystems interact to resolve the four basic types of function problems experienced in society (e.g., see pattern maintenance above).

Because of the vital importance of *values* in relation to both personal and professional ethics, I am continuing a bit further with this brief discussion of classic social theory. Interestingly, and coincidentally, there appear also to be four levels within a social system or structure (Johnson, 1969, 1994; see category b immediately above). These levels, proceeding from "highest" to "lowest," are (i) values, (ii) norms, (iii) the structure of collectivities, and (iv) the structure of roles. Typically the higher levels are more general than the lower ones, with the latter group giving quite specific guidance to the innumerable "segments" or "units" of the particular system to which they apply. These units or segments are accordingly either collectivities or individuals in their capacity as role occupants.

*Values* represent the highest echelon of the social system level of the entire general action system. These values may be categorized into such "entities" as artistic values, educational values, social values, sport values, etc. Of course, all types or categories of values

must be values *of* (i.e., held by) personalities. The social values of a particular social system are those values that are conceived of as representative of the ideal general character that is desired by those who ultimately hold the power in the system being described.

The most important social values for the United States have been:

- (1) the rule of law,
- (2) the socio-structural facilitation of individual achievement,
- (3) the equality of opportunity
- (4) the right to privacy,
- (5) freedom,
- (6) welfare, and
- (7) protection from injury.

*Norms* (as the term is employed in this sense by Johnson) are described as the shared, sanctioned rules which govern the second level of the social structure. Keeping in mind the examples of values offered immediately above, some examples of second-level norms are:

- (1) the institution of private property,
- (2) private enterprise,
- (3) the monogamous, conjugal family, and
- (4) the separation of church and state.

**Note:** The average person finds it difficult to separate in his or her mind the concepts of values and norms. Over time these norms (or practices) become "actualized" as laws created by legislators at the various political levels within the several jurisdictions.

*Collectivities* (i.e., associations, groups, organizations, clubs, etc.) at the third level are human interaction systems that may be distinguished by their goals, their composition, and their size. A collectivity is characterized by conforming acts and by deviant acts, which are both classes of members' action which relate to the structure of the system. Interestingly (and oddly) enough, each collectivity has a structure that consists of *four* levels also (not discussed here). In a pluralistic society one finds an extremely large variety of collectivities which are held together to a varying extent by an overlapping membership constituency. Thus, members of one collectivity can and do exert greater or lesser amounts of influence upon the members of the other collectivities to which they belong.

*Roles* down at the fourth level refer to the behavioral organisms (the actual humans) who interact within each collectivity. Each role has a current normative structure specific to it, even though such a role may be gradually changing. For example, the role of the medical doctor, or lawyer, or state legislator, or whomever, could be in a transitory state in that certain second-level norms could be changing. Nevertheless, each *specific* person in that particular role (profession or trade) would still have normative obligations that can be

delineated more specifically than the more *generalized* second-level norms (examples of which were offered above).

***Finally, then, and most importantly, it should be understood that these four levels within the social system do not form a static relationship either. These four levels of social structure themselves also compose a strong, ever-changing hierarchy of control and conditioning. As Johnson (1969, p. 49) explained, the higher levels in both instances "legitimate, guide, and control" the lower levels, and pressure of both a direct and indirect nature can be--and generally is--employed when the infraction or violation occurs and becomes known. Of course, it is also possible and probable (!) for pressure to be exerted upward. The most extreme example of "upward pressure" on a social system is exerted by a successful revolution!***

## RECOMMENDED (PRIMARY) APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

Now that the vital importance of *values* within a society and its social system has been stressed, it is definitely time to get down to the business of ethical decision-making based on a large variety of occurrences from case situations drawn from everyday life. In each instance (i.e., personal/interpersonal, personal/professional, personal/environmental), I will describe *two* case situations briefly and succinctly.

Following the two brief analyses (with accompanying diagrams) *in each chapter*, you will be asked to get directly involved in ethical decision-making by using Phases One through Three in ten briefly described case situations involving many of the typical ethical problems encountered daily under each category (e.g., personal & interpersonal).

**Note:** The technique of analysis introduced in Phase Four (a case method technique of analysis, including ethical implications where noted) was described carefully in Chapter 9 and will not be repeated here. It is there for your use when appropriate with one or more friends and/or colleagues (see p. 88 et ff.).

Briefly then, based on the methodological approaches recommended in Phases One, Two, Three (Chapters 6 through 8), the following are the basic steps (*phrased as questions*) recommended here for ethical analysis of moral problems:

**Note:** With each step the question being asked implies that an intended decision or action is being contemplated.

### *Step 1. Universalizability (Consistency):*

To apply Test 1, ask the question, "Would I wish to *universalize* a situation where, for example, one person does permanent damage to another (e.g., in the so-called sport of professional boxing)?" (Or would I be able to apply this criterion--that is, make the same decision--in all circumstances?)

### *Step 2. Consequences (Net):*

To apply Test 2, ask the question, "If such involvement (i.e., in professional boxing) were *consistently* encouraged and carried out in society generally, would the (*net*) *consequences* of such continued activity would promote the greatest (net) good or happiness of (or for) those involved?"

### *Step 3. Intentions (Rebuttal):*

To apply Test 3, ask the question that seeks to discover the intentions of those

promoting competitive boxing *despite* negative response to questions 1 and 2 above, "Can I show, for example, that learning the skill of boxing is so important in today's society that educators, recreation directors, and professional promoters believe its acquisition overrides the possibility of permanent brain damage to the participants?" Or, can the prevailing scientific evidence of brain damage for those involved be disproved? Or, further, ask a third question, "Can we possibly discover whether some means are available whereby sufficient protection and safety measures would absolutely prevent the occurrence of such injury?"

### RECOMMENDED (SECONDARY) APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

Next--if you want a more careful analysis of the ethical situation you are confronting--I urge you to follow through by carrying out the steps of the "layout for a (jurisprudential) law-court argument." In this way you may be able to provide support (backing) for the initial decision you made in Phase One. (See Chapter 7.)


### RECOMMENDED (TERTIARY) APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

Keep the above in mind, then, as we proceed to devise the "best fit" between the tests of consistency, universalizability, and intentions in Phase One and the four logical steps of the jurisprudential argument in Phase Two. (See Chapter 8.)

To refresh your memory before you begin analyzing the various cases, the symbolic description is repeated as to how a *blending of* the three-step, Phase-One approach and the four-step, Phase-Two approach might be carried out.

After you quickly review the steps involved in Phases One, Two, and Three of Table 5 below, you will be ready to begin with the actual process of ethical decision-making. It should be an enjoyable and profitable experience. . .

**Table 5**  
**Symbolic Description of the Super-Imposition**  
**of (1) the Three-Step Approach**  
**on (2) the Jurisprudential Argument Layout**



**Key: Jurisprudential Argument Terms:**

- D =** Data (A statement of a situation that prevails including evidence, elements, sources, samples of facts)
- Q =** Modal Qualifier (adverbs employed to qualify conclusions based on strength of warrants (e.g., necessarily, probably)
- C =** Conclusion (claim or conclusion that we are seeking to establish)
- W =** Warrant (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question, "How do you get there?")
- B =** Backing (categorical statements of fact that lend further support to the bridge-like warrants)
- R =** Conditions of Exception (arguments of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)



## CHAPTER 10

### APPLYING ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING TO PERSONAL PROBLEMS

In Chapter 10 you will be introduced directly and "experientially" (so to speak) to what I have called ethical decision-making for *personal* problems. By the word "experiential," I mean that here you will have the opportunity to test your knowledge and embryonic skill in the implementation of decisions about specific *personal* problems (i.e., Category 1 of three Categories covered in Chapters 10, 11, and 12, respectively) that are fundamentally ethical in nature. For example, one's relationships with parents and/or siblings would be included here. It would also include ethical problems with friends and acquaintances.

When the term "personal" is used along with the term "ethics" in decision-making about moral problems, it seems to imply that you as an individual are a separate entity with your own set of standards, principles, and moral rules isolated from the general moral code followed by others. However, maintaining such "individuality" would necessarily be too narrow--and actually just about impossible. I say "impossible," because such a stance would simply not be tenable if you and other persons and groups are functioning daily *interpersonally* within the same society.

Thus, a personal problem of an ethical nature faced by an individual often very easily merges into one or more ethical problems in which the concerns of others are involved in an interpersonal situation within a social environment. Then, in turn, these concerns relate directly or indirectly back to the ethical problems of that one individual. In sum, in this chapter the emphasis will primarily be on how a person thinks and acts ethically in his or her private life.

Of course, this arrangement in Category I (personal) doesn't mean conversely that you and perhaps someone next door are unequivocally bracketed and "branded" with the ethos or "social mentality" or value structure of your society. Accordingly, also, it doesn't mean that you and your friend or acquaintance cannot each have your own informal, yet "personalized," informal creed and/or code of ethics. You may indeed disagree strenuously with your friend about one or more personal or social issues. Nevertheless, unless you and/or your friend have literally decided to become "outlaws," you are both typically bound by prevailing societal norms that have often been converted into legislation as well. These laws emanate basically from the present values operative within the society (e.g., the rule of law, freedom of speech, right to privacy).

Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending upon your present concerns with the way our society seems to be heading in relation to your own personal philosophy and outlook, you may hold one of several beliefs about the status quo in regard to the prevailing direction of affairs. This "direction," in this instance the prevailing morality, will be discussed immediately below as a lead-up to the personal (interpersonal) case situations presented in the chapter for analysis.

## IS HUMAN MORALITY DISINTEGRATING?

Morality and ethics have been "hot topics" during the final quarter of the 20th century. *The New York Times* reported, for example, that "our morality is disintegrating because its foundation is eroding." Another national newspaper, *The Washington Post*, asserted that "the core of U.S. national character has been damaged because we've lost our sense of virtue!" "How so?" you well may ask.

John Kekes (1987), a U.S. philosopher, calls the argument that "the world is going to Hell in a hand basket," morally speaking, "The Disintegration Thesis." He explained this position as follows:

- (1) the value system of the culture no longer offers significant rationale for subordinating one's self to the common good;
- (2) a healthy democratic government depends on values that come from religion (the Judeo-Christian tradition, that is);
- (3) human rights are based on the moral worth that a loving God has granted to each human soul; and
- (4) authority in social affairs is empowered because of underlying transcendent moral law (Brookings Institution).

It seems evident that society will continue to be confronted with an assortment of problems that revolve about the value system of our North American culture. Now that the Cold War with the former U.S.S.R. is over, we are faced with a "hot" "culture war" on this continent (not to mention an "ongoing war against terrorists"). To be sure, this appears to be somewhat more of a problem in the United States, but Canada will inevitably be drawn more fully into the ongoing controversy as the North American 'concept' matures. Those arguing for a much greater percentage of "Canadiana" in the media and all aspects of Canadian life, the "Canadian-content contingent," could prevail marginally, however, but the constant media blitz from the U.S. behemoth to the south will probably not be denied.

And so the struggle between the two opposing influences will continue in various ways at many points. For example, although denying a person's right to choose abortion is still being argued by a minority, the question of gays in the military has been only temporarily resolved in the United States. However, it does seem reasonable that, if a person is willing to die for his or her country in military service, how this person fulfills sexual desires in the privacy of a bedroom should hardly be a major issue today. Also, we are still finding difficulty in granting full rights as citizens to same-sex alliances in both countries. Nevertheless, the questions of immorality and its relationship to the legal system are still with us and won't go away easily. Even the question of smoking marijuana brings a smorgasbord of responses extending from those on the far left to those at the other extreme.

What this all adds up to is that the people espousing Kekes' Disintegration Thesis are strongly convinced that society's basic problem is moral.

### Rebutting the Disintegration Thesis

What rebuttal may be offered to the idea that our culture is sliding down a slippery slope to moral bankruptcy? Kekes, for example, argues that the whole problem is simply this: Moral *change* has been confused with moral *disintegration*. He agrees that there are many seemingly disturbing moral issues today, but he then wonders about the true significance of these facts since a "new morality" is struggling to be born. Basically what is seemingly being abandoned is the idea that there is *one and only one* set of virtues for a human life--**One Summum Bonum**\* (one highest good), to place the dilemma in terms of Latin.

The opposite viewpoint to The Disintegration Thesis is that a gradual change in our morality has been occurring, and that such change will continue on into the future. However, in this change from a single morality to a pluralistic one in North America, there are still many good traits or virtues present in our daily lives.

We still have the basic concepts of freedom, knowledge, happiness, justice, love, order, privacy, wisdom, etc. with which to guide and develop our personal lives and social living. However, we should understand that in this ever-increasing pluralistic culture none of these concepts is necessarily reducible to the other--and *especially not* to the idea that there is one transcendental moral law.

This means that each person should work in his or her life for some reasonable or acceptable combination of such values as love, freedom, justice, etc. This sounds great and may be all well and good for those individuals ready to accept the changes toward a pluralistic morality that are occurring. But to the defenders of The Disintegration Thesis, the argument for acceptance of this developing situation simply adds fuel to their fire.

To the single- or one-morality group, the points of whose argument are enumerated above, any individually selected amalgam of values and virtues represents just one more symptom of the moral bankruptcy that is taking place right before their eyes. So, if the advocates of a new, more pluralistic morality hope to win their argument, they must show that there is indeed sufficient continuity between the old and the new, between monistic and the more pluralistic morality.

How can we move an analysis of this issue one step further along? One way to do this is to look for regularity and continuity in morality from one historical period to another. What we have been doing is to become too concerned about the present *seeming* irregularity and discontinuity as North American culture changes from monism to pluralism in ethics and morality.

However, the only way that The Disintegration Thesis offered by Kekes can be

disproved is to show that human nature still exhibits a deeper, powerful, more important continuity in moral affairs than appears through a initial analysis of the apparent confusion that confronts us today.

In approaching this presumed continuity, I believe we need to review the purpose of morality first. We can argue that morality's aim is to increase good and to decrease evil in human affairs. As we strive to do this, we understand that some goods and some evils are the result of natural forces in the world. However, many other goods and evils are the result of human action or inaction. For example, some individual or group are responsible for the **Evil** inherent in the Oklahoma City tragedy or the more recent World Trade Center destruction. Conversely, think of all the **Good** that has resulted from this as literally thousands of people have made almost superhuman efforts to restore the lives of the people caught in these truly tragic situations to a state of normalcy.

In any effort to improve the state of morality, we recognize further that there are many similarities among the various world's cultures on the subject of goods and evils. Nevertheless, we can't escape the fact that there are also many individual, social, cultural, and historical differences on the subject of morality.

However, despite all of these differences between and among cultures, it is *human nature* itself that necessarily establishes the continuity and regularity between our earlier monistic morality and the pluralistic morality toward which many of the world's peoples are moving inevitably and inescapably!

And so, it can be maintained, it is this very unchangeable *continuity* that places boundaries on, and thereby limits, the scope of moral change and the very kinds of moral conflicts that we are confronting today.

How may we define this continuity? Kekes defines it simply as that group of "universally human, culturally invariant, and historically constant characteristics" that every creature living in a social environment in the world possesses. Here I am referring to (a) physiological capacities and needs and (b) psychological capacities and similarities. The evidence for this comes from both the natural sciences and the social sciences--that is, from physiology on the one hand, and from psychology & sociology on the other.

These needs, capacities, and similarities include (a) facts about the body and the self, (b) facts about close relationships, and (c) facts about social living. Note in this connection, also, the strong similarity with Maslow's hierarchy of fundamental propositions about human nature. Recall that he theorized that we move from up the scale from *survival* (the instinct to satisfy physiological, safety, and personal needs and interests) to *commurgence* (from belonging to conformity to affection) to *differentiation* (a growing concern with status, power, respect) to *self development* (fulfilling personal drives toward learning, creativity, and love).

You may ask, "How does all of this relate to the morality issue?" The answer is evidently this: the fact that we all have this *universal* and *unchanging* human nature is vitally

important morally *because it gives us insight into what actions or inactions in life count as beneficial or harmful to our human nature*. These universally good and evil things are, respectively, (a) the satisfaction of needs and interests by exercising our capacities and (b) the accompanying frustration and injury that will result if these universal needs and interests are not met.

What this all adds up to, therefore, is a need for a *re-assessment* of the goods necessary for the continuity of human nature for which we all strive. These universal human goods that should be maintained and preserved in our increasingly pluralistic morality are, according to Kekes,

- (a) *Self-direction* (the desire for individual freedom),
- (b) *Intimacy* (the need for close relationships with others), and
- (c) *Decency* (fairness and the other rights valued in democratic societies).

Human life is better according to this approach, therefore, if it possesses these goods in abundance and worse if evils abound to decrease the presence of these avowed goods.

This all adds up to refute a position on the one side of the argument, the "original sin" side, that human morality is steadily disintegrating. The central task of morality according to this newer position is not to worry about the peripheral aspects of the increasingly pluralistic morality. It is to foster conditions that bring about conditions that raise the levels of the core aspects of human nature--that is, *self-direction, intimacy, and decency*.

If you understand this, then, and agree to it--the latter is the rub for those who argue conversely for The Disintegration Thesis. Such agreement could take you part of the way--**not all of it!**--toward the resolution of the puzzling ethics and morality question plaguing our culture at the present.

However, I must make clear--with the approach taken here in this book--I (personally) do not presume for a minute to move you strongly in one direction or the other. You will have to make this basic decision for yourself as you seek to resolve the case situations presented below.

## CASES IN PERSONAL ETHICS

In this section two characteristic cases in personal ethics will be offered for your consideration. Each case will be described briefly, but sufficiently for our purposes here.

**Note:** For a case method discussion, especially if human relations are involved too, a write-up with more details would be needed. (See Phase Four, Chapter 9.)

Then each case will be analyzed by implementing the steps followed in Phases One, Two, and Three (see the brief "Introduction to Part Three" above and the longer explanations in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 for possible review).

Following this, a series of 10 case situations, briefly stated, will be presented as exercises for you to carry out as you find the time to do so. At the very least, you should follow the three-step plan recommended for Phase One by determining separately on a single sheet of paper whether your proposed decision about a particular case situation (i.e., the three steps) seems reasonable to you after you have spelled it out on paper.

Finally, I hope that you will also follow through with the steps recommended for Phases Two and Three. To this end you will find a sample, incomplete "law-court-format" sheet included for this purpose. (The simplest way to follow through with this proposal would be for you to make 10 copies of this [incomplete] page format. As you do this, you may wish to enlarge the page [to 125% or more] on the copier, if that is possible.)

**Note:** The same plan will be followed in Chapters 11 and 12 for Professional Ethics and Environmental Ethics, respectively.

### Sample Case 1: Beth (Abortion)

Beth, who has been accepted for admission next year at the state university, evidently made a serious mistake. She (they) didn't mean to "go all the way" with Tim after a party following the final football game. But it happened; they had a few drinks together, on the spur of the moment made love passionately without protection, and now she has tested positively for pregnancy. She hadn't thought too much about it when she missed her period, because she was a very active person and this happened occasionally. To make matters worse, however, Beth has now missed her second period, and the situation is rapidly turning into a real tragedy. Beth and Tim are simply not ready for married life. Beth's parents are heartbroken, and Tim's parents are equally upset. Beth wants an abortion as soon as possible even though such an action is not sanctioned by her religion. But she knows it is legal, and her parents tend to agree reluctantly. But Tim's parents are divided on the subject, and Tim himself is anxious "to do the right thing." He was thinking of attending community college in the fall; so, his plans obviously do not include fatherhood at this time. Beth must now decide what to do.

*Written Analysis.* This is a highly complex issue at present--and perhaps will always be so for some time to come. The question of an abortion basically revolves around a decision as to whether a fetus is a person at conception. The Supreme Court's decision in the United States (*Roe vs. Wade*) brought about a significant change in attitude, but a significant minority of the populace is still most strongly anti-abortion at any point in a pregnancy. The basic question is whether an abortion is a case of murder of a human, or whether the fetus achieves status as a human only in the latter phase of a pregnancy when life is detected in the womb? Or beyond this, should the fetus be considered human *after* birth? Suppose, also, for example, that the unborn fetus is defective and would if born become a burden to the parents and to society? Does that make a difference? It must be asked further in any analysis whether the state and/or the church should (or can) have anything to say about such an intimate matter as the health care of a citizen's body. It is obvious that Beth's analysis and subsequent decision will depend upon a number of personal and social factors.

Table 6

**DIAGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS (ABORTION)**  
**(With the Three-Step Approach Superimposed**  
**on the Jurisprudential Argument Layout )**



Beth, a high school senior with plans to attend university in the fall, has become pregnant. She and Tim hadn't planned it that way, and now they and their families have conflicting opinions about what to do, if anything, as to Beth's having an abortion. She wants it desperately so that she can get on with her life.

Plans should be made for an early abortion so that Beth can continue with college plans, and Tim can get on with his life as well. There is no reason why their relationship can't continue if that is their mutual wish.

**(SINCE W)**  
**WARRANT**

Applying the criterion of universality, a mature person should have the right perhaps after advice to make such a basic decision about her body and her future in all circumstances that might arise.

**TEST NO. 1 (KANT)**  
**(universalizability)**

**(ON ACCOUNT OF B)**  
**BACKING**

The concept of individual freedom is basic and extremely important

**UNLESS R)**  
**REBUTTAL OR**  
**EXCEPTION**

1. Beth, the person concerned decided that her religious faith was so strong that the dictates of the Church in the matter should prevail.

2. The person involved can be convinced (e.g., by Tim, the father) that carrying the fetus to term is the right thing to do, everything considered.

3. Beth, on second thought, decides to carry the fetus



as humans search for "the good life" in a world that has in the past so often been beset by tyranny and slavery. Recognition of this individual right in society generally would result in the greatest (net) good or happiness for those involved.

**TEST No.2 (MILL)**  
*net* consequences)

to term and then puts the child up for adoption thereby not going against her faith and that of her parents).

**TEST No. 3**  
(ARISTOTLE))  
(intentions)

**Key: Jurisprudential Argument Terms:**

- D =** Data (A statement of a situation that prevails including evidence, elements, sources, samples of facts)
- Q =** Modal Qualifier (adverbs employed to qualify conclusions based on strength of warrants (e.g., necessarily, probably)
- C =** Conclusion (claim or conclusion that we wish to establish)
- W =** Warrant (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question, "How do you get there?")
- B =** Backing (categorical statements of fact that lend further support to the bridge-like warrants)
- R =** Conditions of Exception (arguments of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)

## Sample Case 2.

Bert graduated from community college five years ago and is now a successful insurance salesman. He still lives in the city where he was raised and is active in a number of social and civic organization. He plays both tennis and golf quite well. He has also dated a number of young women, but has never become too serious with any one person. Recently to Bert's surprise, George, a male friend who is a computer programmer became quite friendly and invited Bert over for tennis and dinner on two separate occasions. Bert discovered that he liked George very much and surprised himself by readily acquiesced when he was invited to share a sexual encounter. The following week George called and asked whether Bert might be interested in saving money by moving in with him and sharing expenses in his very nice condo apartment. This new relationship has developed quite suddenly and, as it happens, Bert has also having a semi-serious relationship going with Martha who works in the same office with him. Only last week Bert's mother had invited the couple over for dinner and had made quite a fuss about what a nice person Martha was in a conversation with Bert on the telephone later. Bert is now having fairly strong feelings of guilt about his relationships with both George and Martha. How shall he decide how to handle what has become a highly delicate issue?

*Written Analysis.* What Bert does "in the privacy of his own bedroom" is, of course, only Bert's business (although some states still have archaic laws on the books in this regard). However, whether it is fair to have a "relationship" with both friends at the same time must be decided. The "nature vs. nurture" argument arises on the question of homosexuality, but--although evidence is tending in one direction--science has not yet proved definitely that certain genes in a person's make-up are the determining factor in this regard. If Bert were to move in with George, this would definitely be a move in the direction of homosexuality. And it is true that many people still believe strongly that being a homosexual or a lesbian is morally wrong. Also, how would Bert's parents and siblings react to any such move? Further, if the relationship with George became general knowledge, his business interests could well be hurt by the reactions of narrow-minded colleagues or clients. Bert is puzzled, because he would like to keep both relationships intact (i.e., with both George and Martha). Obviously, following this course of action would be most difficult. What should he do?

Table 7

**DIAGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS (HOMOSEXUALITY)**  
**(With the Three-Step Approach Superimposed**  
**on the Jurisprudential Argument Layout)**



Bert, a successful insurance salesman living in the community where he grew up, starts a homosexual relationship with George at the same time he has been dating Martha. Now George has asked Bert to move in with him and share condo expenses. Bert is feeling very guilty and uncertain about the future, even though he really is enjoying both relationships.

Bert should do some soul-searching and realize that his personal life and professional career may be at stake unless some careful decisions are made demonstrating fairness to both .  
 Martha and George  
 He should seek from a relative or friend if available, and probably from a qualified professional, also.

(SINCE W)  
 WARRANT

UNLESS R)  
 REBUTTAL OR  
 EXCEPTION

It is not fair to have a sexual relationship with two different people at the same time in North American society. Also, it may be an indication of some immaturity on Bert's part and may require some psychological counseling in the near future.

1. Bert explains the prevailing situation to both Martha and George, and each is willing to permit him a *very* short period of time to decide one way or the other. However, this may be a dubious course of action.

TEST No.1 (KANT)  
 (consistency)

ON ACCOUNT OF B)  
 BACKING

2. Bert, after thinking his predicament over on his own, decides to continue his friendship

Prevailing social custom is such that homosexuality is not typically accepted, and bi-sexuality is regarded even more negatively. Unless Bert maintains strict secrecy for the time being, the prevailing situation could cause great difficulties in both his social life and professional career.

**TEST No.2 (MILL)**  
(*net consequences*)

with George without the sexual aspect for the present as he seeks to sort out his relationship with Martha.

**TEST No. 3 (ARISTOTLE)**  
(intentions)

**Key: Jurisprudential Argument Terms:**

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- W = Warrant** (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question, "How do you get there?")
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- R = Conditions of Exception** (arguments of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)

## EXERCISES

**Note:** Below you will find 10 case situations described briefly. In each instance, ethical decision-making seems required on the part of one or more persons involved. *Use one "format page" to analyze each case situation, This sample page is provided below after Case 10 for you to make copies of it.* Keep the following points/questions in mind as you consider each case situation:

Determine "who had a duty or responsibility to do what" in each of the case situations below. Decide whether you believe that there someone had a moral obligation to "do this" or "not to do that" in the situation concerned. As you make this assessment, keep in mind the following questions about the actions (or inactions) of one or more of the major individuals concerned:

1. Is the action basically unfair to a person or group?
2. Does the action or decision (or inaction) impose on another's freedom
3. Does the action hurt another person's welfare?
4. Does the action impose on an individual's privacy
5. Does the action deny an opportunity to another person?
6. Is the action, in addition to being one of the above, also **illegal** (thus adding another dimension to the analysis)?

**Note:** In this instance (i.e., that which we in this chapter are calling *personal ethics*), including what has been said immediately above, we should be thinking about the establishment of any or all standards of virtue (e.g., honesty, fairness) in any personal decision-making. These would be opposed to the presence of any or all standards of vice (e.g., exhibition of prejudice, action of theft, doing of harm).

With an ethical obligation, it is best to use the word "**should**" (i.e., "As her superior, Joe *should* not taken advantage of Marie when she was in such a vulnerable position").

When the obligation has been accepted as a societal norm--and has subsequently been instituted *legally* (i.e., "Joe committed a criminal offense when he assaulted Marie sexually after the office had closed for the day")--the "*should* not" can obviously be further strengthened by "*must* not".

Assume the role of one of the major participants in the case situation, and then make recommendations as to what should be done (ethically)--and what *must* also be done (legally) if what happened violated both a societal norm and established law.

Case 1. Gil and Mary are happily married with three children. They are making ends meet with some difficulty. Mary works part-time and is the homemaker. Gil has a regular job in a bakery and is a cabdriver on one of the weekend days. In this way they can just about make ends meet. Mary's father is deceased, but her mother lives in a nearby community, is reasonably well off, and needs no financial assistance. They visit together about once a month and talk on the telephone quite often. Gil's parents on the other hand are becoming a real problem. His father gets laid off periodically, and his mother has never worked outside of the home. Their health isn't very good either; so, they are having considerable difficulty making ends meet. Gil doesn't see how he and Mary can be of any help financially, and he wonders just what to do and just how much responsibility he should have anyway.

Case 2. Faith has turned out to be a daughter who has become a trial for her parents. She is doing very well in all respects as a junior in high school. Her grades are above average; she has lots of friends, one boyfriend in particular; and she plays forward on the school soccer team. The problem is that, as she entered her adolescent years, she has somehow become a minister's daughter who is an atheist. She claims that there is so much evil in the world that there couldn't possibly be an all-powerful God looking after the best interests of either individuals or humankind all together. This stance of his daughter has become quite an embarrassment for the Reverend James N. Douglas. Faith skips the various services and meetings at the church whenever she can, or often slips out when she can conveniently do so. When she deigns to attend youth discussion groups, she is quite vocal about her lack of religious faith. She is disturbed because her parents are so upset and disappointed with her. Nevertheless she doesn't know how else to handle the matter.

Case 3. Times are changing. In earlier times children grew up, got jobs, and moved away from home or went away to college. During the college years they came home during the holidays, but moved out permanently when university was completed and a position was obtained. Nowadays young people seem to be having trouble "leaving the nest." The right type of employment is difficult to find. Often a position located is "beneath" the talent and abilities of the young person and pays accordingly. And so, in many instances, after completing their education the son or daughter moves back home. This is just what has seemed to happen to the Trumbull family. Roger and Eunice love their children dearly, but they really did think that their way of life would change significantly when Tracy and Roger, Jr. completed their periods of higher education. Roger, Jr., majored in English literature and planned to be a writer, while Tracy took a two-year medical assistant course at the community college. But now neither one has moved away from home, and they are having difficulty finding employment in areas for which they are qualified. Roger and Eunice don't know how to handle the matter of "reclaiming" what they thought was going to be their life without "losing" their children in the process.

Case 4. After a relatively short engagement, Tim and Loraine were married four years ago. They both work to make ends meet and have two children, three years and one year of age. Both Tim and Loraine are active young people who are anxious to get ahead and make a go of it in life. However, various pressures are mounting in their lives. Tim works hard and is

tired when he comes home every day. Mary works hard too, but also has the added burden of childcare and most of the housework. Loraine's mother helps out with the children in the morning, and they engage a woman living nearby for the afternoon hours until Loraine returns. Their social life is limited because there simply isn't much time for leisure available, not to mention that they are just getting by financially. Loraine has recently begun to notice a characteristic of Tim's that wasn't present earlier. His disposition has become taciturn and surly on occasion, especially after Loraine has made requests for somewhat more assistance around the house. He has also begun to drop in to the local bar for a few beers "with the boys" several times a week. As a result of this, presumably, he has begun to slap Loraine (not too heavily) on various parts of her anatomy including her face when he loses his cool. Loraine is very upset about this turn of events, but she doesn't want to start the practice of hitting him back. Also, she is concerned that their three-year old child has seen her being hit. How should she cope with this unpleasant situation?

Case 5. Terry, a high school senior, has always lived in one city before she left for college. Her parents, Morris and Dorothy, are what might be called "pillars" of the community. Morris is a leading attorney in one of the city's leading law firms. Dorothy is active in the ongoing work of their reform synagogue. Terry is the oldest of three children and is very bright. She has led her class scholastically throughout high school and was very active in school groups organized for social activism and reform. One of Terry's girl friends heard about a young woman in another community who marched topless down the street in the center of town and caused considerable uproar. She had been arrested, and the case is pending in the courts. At the recent meeting of Terry's high school group ("The Future Is Now"), it was decided that they should all do the same thing on a hot day at the beach in early July after school has closed. The boys in the group thought it was a great idea, of course, and decided that they too want to take part and be "topless" as well. When Terry announced to her parents at dinner what the club's plan was, "All Hell" broke out. Terry's younger brother and sister were both laughing, but also looked a bit scared because their parents were so angry. Her father said he would be embarrassed professionally, and her mother said she would be embarrassed socially at the synagogue. Terry said she would be embarrassed. also, in front of her good friends and schoolmates if she chickened out. Further, Terry argued, "What's right is right! If men can do it, why can't women?" How can she handle this problem, a potentially embarrassing one either way she decides.

Case 6. Anthony and Angelina are a middle-aged couple who have been married for 20 years. They have four children, the oldest being 19 years old. He was named Garibaldi after his grandfather, but he has been using Garry as a shortened version of what he calls an "old-fashioned" name. His father, "Tony," is also jokingly called "Rocky" by friends after the former, well-known professional boxer. He has been with the local police force for 17 years and has risen to the rank of detective. The Colavito family have also been active in the work of the Church. Although Angelina works afternoons at a local bakery, she has also found time to somehow raise her children and support their involvements at both school and the Church. Garry, the older of two sons, has followed in the footsteps of his father. He is a star halfback on the high school football team and a varsity guard in basketball as well. Some of his friends have been experimenting with marijuana recently, and have tried to get Garry involved at

recent "rave" sessions. Garry's whole family have occasionally discussed the matter of marijuana and other drugs. They all appreciate the danger so-called "hard" drugs present, but Tony (Garry's father) has expressed the opinion that the casual use of marijuana should not be considered a crime. However, he understands, of course, what his responsibilities are to uphold the present law. Garry would like to "experiment" a bit with his friends, but is nervous that the police could well "do a bust" on one of these high school parties at any time. What choices does Garry have ethically?

Case 7. Bill comes from a good family, whatever that means these days. During his high school years, he dated a number of girls. Although he never got too serious about anyone, Arlene is really interested in him. Whenever they do date, they typically end up having sexual intercourse (almost invariably "protected"). When Bill went away to college, Arlene trained to be a hairdresser. She also began to date Tom quite steadily. Tom soon became devoted to her and has actually asked her to marry him twice. Arlene likes him, but keeps putting him off with one or more excuses. However, whenever Bill comes home for vacations, etc., Arlene becomes "immediately available" to take up where they left off. Bill knows that he really has no intention of ever marrying Arlene, and he also knows that she is very serious about him. However, he continues to "string her along" because he enjoys the ready opportunity for sex. In various ways Arlene has questioned Bill about his intentions for the future, but he simply will not be pinned down. He knows also about Tom's feelings for Arlene, and that she reciprocates them to a degree. Bill feels a little guilty about it all, but he rationalizes that his own indecision is both Arlene's and Tom's problem, not his. What should Bill (or Arlene, or Tom) do?

Case 8. Joanna, a single mother with a 10-year old son, has not had an easy time of it. Since shortly after her son was born, she has been on her own. Being a career person, she and Tibor (her ex-husband) had necessarily waited until she achieved relative permanency in her position to start a family. Over a period of 16 years, Joanna had been the main supporter of the family. Tibor obtained a college degree during the first years of marriage while working part-time. Since then, he has worked at a multitude of positions for a variety of reasons (including his inability to work for anyone else). Shortly after their son had arrived, Tibor decided that he wanted a divorce. The eventual legal arrangement was such that Dennis, the son, would spend the equivalent of one day a week with his father, with Joanna receiving "major" custody of the child. Since the divorce 10 years ago, Tibor has been married three additional times (with an overall total of at least six or seven similar relationships). After 10 years, because of her many responsibilities, Joanna has not been able to establish another relationship. However, recently she has been dating a fine person whom she really likes. Now she is wondering about the advisability of permitting Don, her new friend, to sleep over on occasion. Although Joanna's son has seen his father having a series of short and slightly longer relationships, Joanna is uneasy about Don sleeping over. She doesn't want her son to think that such a relationship before marriage is completely proper. Yet she reasons that she is getting older, and that it won't be long before her only child is off to college. How should she handle this situation?

Case 9. Gregory and Joan are a happily married couple with no children. They made this decision quite a while ago, because they felt that raising children nowadays was simply



too precarious a problem. Also, they wanted their freedom to come and go as they wished. They both had good jobs, but they looked upon their work as just that--jobs. They wanted nothing to do with overtime, volunteer work in the community, or involvement with any political party. They both smoked almost incessantly and drank much more than they should. As a matter of fact, they have on occasion also experimented sexually with one or two extra partners (or even individually with an acquaintance from their respective work environment). They are careful and discreet in this regard, but worry about it a bit nevertheless. Nevertheless it has put some excitement in their lives. Everything considered, they understand that they are living life a bit selfishly, but they reason that they don't want to be "here today and gone tomorrow" without having some fun out of life. Also, if something should happen healthwise, they figure that various public and private health insurance plus social security will see them through. Do they have an ethical problem?

Case 10. Jack was the son who stayed home, who didn't get married, and who ended up looking after Marie, his mother. All of the other brothers and sisters went their separate ways. There were three other brothers and one sister, she being the only one who kept in touch regularly with their mother. When his father died early in his forties, there was a fairly large insurance policy. Jack saw to it that the money was invested wisely. Also, he had purchased the old family home from his mother and invested those funds for her. Jack was what everyone called a "solid citizen." He had a good job and worked hard at it. He was always a bit uncertain as to his sexuality and finally decided to forego such relationships with other men and women. His brothers and sisters were seemingly grateful to him for assuming the major burden of looking after "Mom," and as the years went by they really were taking advantage of Jack. However, they all had their own lives and families with accompanying responsibilities. When it finally came to the point where Mom was having difficulty taking care of her own affairs, Jack convinced his mother to give him power of attorney over her affairs "just in case." As he went over his mother's affairs recently, Jack realized that his mother's will completed after his Dad's demise was still in force. This meant that after Marie's death each child would receive an equal share of what was left. Realizing that the other brothers and sisters would probably not agree to allot him (Jack) a larger share of what money might be left--even though he had been "the one who stayed home and cared for Mom," Jack wondered if he should gradually do something about this "unofficially." After all, he did have his mother's power of attorney and could easily "pad" both her and his expenses. Could this be one way to handle this situation?

Table 8

**SAMPLE FORM TO GUIDE ANALYSIS  
(PHASES ONE, TWO, AND THREE)**

(Name of Case: \_\_\_\_\_)



(SINCE W)  
WARRANT

**TEST No.1 (KANT)**  
(*consistency*)

UNLESS R)  
REBUTTAL OR  
EXCEPTION

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

**TEST No. 3**  
(ARISTOTLE)  
(*intentions*)

(ON ACCOUNT OF B)  
BACKING

**TEST No.2 (MILL)**  
(*net consequences*)

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- R =** Conditions of Exception (arguments of rebuttal exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)

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## CHAPTER 11

### APPLYING ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING TO PROFESSIONAL PROBLEMS

#### INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 11, the emphasis will be primarily on *professional* ethics (Category II). By that I mean that the ethical problems considered here will relate primarily to an individual's relations with others at his or her place of employment. This second (personal &) professional category will, therefore, include case situations of an ethical nature in which the person is confronted with the need for ethical decision-making in the course of his or her employment as a practicing professional or tradesperson (or as a manager).

Initially, we all need to keep in mind that there are values and norms that are basic to life in democratic societies, and that they, accordingly, also relate to the subject matter of ethics. (The term *norm* here refers to one of a series of standards of virtue that are expected to prevail in this type of society or culture as explained below.) Persons in a responsible world culture can also be expected to be honest, fair, truthful, etc. These are ordinary norms that inevitably also have a relationship to what I call professional norms.

Additionally, over time, certain rights and privileges have been accorded to citizens in democratically oriented countries. In North America, for example, the following norms relating to rights and privileges currently prevail:

- a. Governance by law
- b. Individual freedom (as much as may be permitted in the social setting)
- c. Protection from injury
- d. Equality of opportunity
- e. Privacy
- f. Individual welfare (Bayles, 1981, pp. 5-7).

Second, based on a review of the literature, the following five categories or dimensions are recommended for a code of ethics for a profession (e.g., a teacher **OR ANY OCCUPATION** that aspires to professional status):

- a. The professional's conduct as a teacher

(The intent here is that the teacher should in the performance of his/her duties, (a) hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public, (b) perform services only in his/her areas of competence, (c) issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner, (d) act in professional matters for

each employer or student/client as faithful agent or trustee, and (e) avoid improper solicitation of professional employment.)

**b. The professional's ethical obligations to students/clients**

(The intent here is that the professional should be completely trustworthy and that he/she has the following obligations or responsibilities in his/her relationship with students/clients: To exhibit *candor, competence, diligence, discretion, honesty, and loyalty*)

**c. The professional's ethical responsibility to employers/employing organizations**

(The intent here is that the professional should understand and respect his/her responsibility to both the student/client and third parties (e.g., superior and organization represented) by exhibiting *fairness, truthfulness, and non-maleficence [i.e., doing no harm]*)

**d. The professional's ethical responsibility to colleagues/peers and the profession**

(The intent here is that the professional has certain obligations to the profession in regard to doing research; working for reform; providing social leadership; improving professional knowledge and skills; and preserving and enhancing the role of the profession so that society's respect will be maintained.

Under this category, also, the professional should never forget that he/she has an obligation help with the self-regulation of the profession (a) by encouraging desirable young people to enter the profession and (b) by complying with, and seeing to it that others comply as well, with the established responsibilities and obligations of the profession as explained in the profession's code of ethics)

**e. The professional's ethical responsibility to**

society

(The intent here is that the professional has an ethical responsibility to society and therefore will make his/her full services available to all who need help regardless of age, sex, physical limitation, ethnic origin, religion, or sexual orientation. Additionally, the professional person will make every effort to see that he/she personally, as well as his/her colleagues, will live up to the canons and principles of the profession's code of ethics)

Third, proceeding from Bayles's (1981, Chapters 3-7) fivefold categorization of the basic make-up of *any* code of ethics proposed, the recommended progression to be followed in the eventual determination of specific rules and regulations moves to a secondary categorization within the heading of professional *obligations* or *responsibilities*. Included here as they might relate to any one of a number of professions are (a) *standards* (virtues or vices), (b) *principles* (where some latitude is possible), and (c) *rules* that must be adhered to strictly (see Table 12 below).

**Table 9**

**Examples of Provisions for an Ethical Code for a Professional Person**

Categories	Standards	Principles	Rules
a. Bases upon which professional services are made available	A prof. should be <i>fair</i> and <i>just</i> in providing his/her services	A prof. should ensure that all students receive adequate instruction	A client needing help should receive it as soon as possible
<b>Example:</b> A <i>professional manager</i> shows bias toward a client and manages him/her in a way that might cause the individual--knowingly or unknowingly--to act in wrongful or unethical manner.			
b. Ethical nature of prof.-client relationship	A prof. should be <i>honest</i> in his/her treatment of a client	A prof. should never treat a client as a means to an end illegal or unethical action	A client must never be forced to take an

because of  
fear of loss of  
status

**Example:** An *athletic director* urges an athlete to act in a dishonest or possibly harmful way by stating that the athlete's scholarship will be lost if he doesn't cooperate.

c. Conflict resolution when conflict arises between prof.'s obligations to clients and third parties	A prof. has an obligation to be <i>truthful</i> in dealing with third parties that contravene the earlier verbal agreement made by him on behalf of his company	In checking a business contract a staff member notices that a few inaccuracies advantage of in a dishonest manner	A staff member must never knowingly permit a client to be taken
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**Example:** Somehow even though a *business salesperson* and a client had verbally agreed on certain specifics of an impending contract, when it was time for both parties to formally sign the agreement several key inaccuracies of such a nature are present that would cheat the client had somehow crept into the document .

d. Professional obligations to society,(i.e. duty to serve the public good) and to one's profession	A prof. should be <i>loyal</i> to societal values and those of the profession	A prof. has a duty and responsibility to preserve and enhance the role of the profession in which he/she is a licensed practitioner	A prof. has a duty to upgrade and strengthen his/her knowledge by attending one or more conferences or symposia annually
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**Example:** A professional (*in any field*) gives the profession a bad name by obviously falling behind on the knowledge in his/her area of expertise to the point that his clients begin to notice it and start looking elsewhere for assistance.

e. Ensuring compliance with the established obligations of the profession's ethical code	A prof. should practice his/her profession with <i>honesty</i> and <i>integrity</i>	A prof. should encourage his/her associates to be honest within the letter and spirit of the established principles and rules of the profession's code of ethics	A prof. who permits his/her colleague to lie or cheat shall be reported and should be excluded from the profession if found guilty
--	---	--	--

**Example:** A professional (*in any field*) who is guilty of unethical practice shall be reported to the ethics committee of the professional society (and subsequently to his/her employers, if such is applicable).

**Note:** It should be understood that there always are choices to be made when an individual acts personally or professionally in situations that are less than clear-cut. Thus, if one category is that of *obligations* (i.e. you must do so-and-so), a second category of available norms may be designated as *permissions* (i.e. you have freedom of choice because any action may be debatable). In this latter case, professionals are permitted to do (a) what is not prohibited by law; (b) what is not considered unethical in the society, generally speaking; and (c) what is not considered to be unethical by the professional society to which one belongs.

Fourth, and finally then, the listing of eight standards (virtues) should be implemented *above* in Categories Two and Three (i.e., candor, competence, diligence, discretion, honesty, and loyalty under Category Two; and fairness, non-maleficence, and truthfulness under Category Three). A brief, hortatory, approved ethical creed is typically placed after a preamble to a code of ethics. It remains for a somewhat more detailed code itself to include (a) a listing of the major principles or canons under which the professional person act, and (b) to show how professional associations may begin the process of developing a listing of the specific rules of practice that must be adhered to in daily professional life. (See Table 3 above, also, for a diagrammatic explanation as to how rules of practice can be derived in the immediate future.)

### What Is a Profession Today?

A profession typically includes those people who are functioning in a professional and/or disciplinary way within the broad field concerned. Merely stating that a group of people working within a field of endeavor at the public, semi-public or private levels



represents a profession is a beginning, of course, but there is obviously much more to be accomplished than that. It can be argued, however, that there is no generally acceptable definition for a profession today--i.e., it is impossible to characterize professions by a set of necessary and sufficient features possessed by all professions--and *only* by professions (Bayles, 1981, p. 7). Nevertheless, the following is a brief attempt to define what constitutes a profession in the last quarter of the 20th century:

(a) A profession can be defined as an occupation which requires specific knowledge of some aspect of learning before a person is accepted as a *professional* person.

(b) There are *sub-categories* of professions as follows: administering, teaching, supervising, consulting, research, etc. Teaching would presumably represent some combination of teaching, administering, supervising, and consulting duties and responsibilities. However, some within the profession or closely related fields should undoubtedly have a responsibility for scholarly and research endeavor.

(c) The following may be considered as three *necessary* features of an occupation that can also be designated as a profession: (i) a need for extensive training; (ii) a significant intellectual component that must be mastered; and (iii) a recognition by society that the trained person can provide an important basic service.

(d) Additionally, there are some other features that are common to most professions as follows: (i) licensing by state/province or professional body, (ii) establishment of professional societies, (iii) considerable autonomy in work performance, and (iv) establishment of a creed or code of ethics (Bayles, 1981, p. 7).

**Note:** One aspect of a comprehensive code of ethics is that the controlling body should establish an code of ethics discipline committee to which infractions of the ethical code may be reported for deliberation and possible disciplinary action.

## CASES IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

In this section two characteristic cases in professional ethics will be offered for your consideration. Each case will be described briefly, but sufficiently for our purposes here. (For a recommended approach to case method discussion of professional ethics, including a situation where human relations are involved too, a more-detailed presentation would be needed. (See Phase Four, Chapter 9, pp. 98-114 for such a discussion.)

Then each case will be analyzed by implementing the steps followed in Phases One, Two, and Three (see the brief "Introduction to Part Three," pp. 115-128, as well as the longer explanations in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 for possible review).

Following this, a series of 10 case situations, briefly stated, will be presented as exercises for you to carry out as you find the time to do so. *At the very least*, as recommended

previously in Chapter 10, you should follow the three-step plan recommended for Phase One by determining separately on a single sheet of paper whether your proposed decision about a particular case situation (i.e., the three steps) seems reasonable to you after you have spelled it out.

Finally, I hope that you will also follow through with the steps recommended for Phases Two and Three as well. To this end you will find a sample, incomplete "law-court-format" sheet included below for this purpose. The simplest way to follow through with this proposal would be for you to make 10 copies of this (incomplete) page format. As you do this, you may wish to enlarge the page to 125% on the copier you use (if that is possible).

**Note:** The same plan will be followed in Chapters 12 for Environmental Ethics (as it was previously for Personal Ethics in Chapter 10).

## Two Cases

**Sample Case 1.** Brad, a college graduate in business administration, obtained a position with responsibility for assisting with the advertising and marketing of his firm's products. His superior, Wesley, appeared to be a real "go-getter." One of the people in the marketing department described him as a person who "wanted to start at the top and work up." Nevertheless, Wes seemed to want to be very helpful to Brad in a number of different ways. Brad was anxious to do well with his new job, of course, and he appreciated the fact that someone was willing to "show him the ropes." As time passed, however, Brad began to perceive that he and Wes were really operating on different wave lengths (so to speak). He told Barbara, his wife, that Wes was really much more realistic and pragmatic than he was. Wes was always trying to cut corners and to get ahead of the other guy (the firm's competitors) or even the consumer for that matter). "I guess I'm just too idealistic," Brad said to Barbara one evening during dinner, "but in writing advertising copy I try to tell the truth about our products. They are good, of that I'm certain, but Wes is always on me to write what I feel is dishonest, 'borderline' fraudulent copy." On Barbara's urging, Brad invited Wes out for a beer after work and explained his concerns to him. Wes replied that he knew what Brad was talking about, and he also said that he felt that way once too. "But," he concluded, "I soon learned that the only to get there is to be as 'borderline' as everyone else in this business. It's 'dog-eat-dog' out there, and you simply have to cheat a little here and there and occasionally make wild claims that may not be true--or you'll be left behind in the dust." How should Brad cope with this situation?

**Analysis.** On the surface the problem faced by Brad in Case 1 seems pretty much "black and white"; either you practice honesty or not. However, as many of us learn along the way, this question can be a highly complex one in numerous life situations encountered. Human relations at the personal level *and* at the professional level are rarely simple. It is an unfortunate fact that a significant minority of the populace do seem to be ready to cheat or be dishonest in small ways--and at times in more serious ways as well. Then these people of questionable morality tend to rationalize their actions by saying, "Oh, everybody does it; so why shouldn't I?" To permit even minor dishonesty as a "standard" of virtue either in

personal or professional life would be fundamentally wrong . Also, if we apply Kant's principle of universality to this matter, it is obvious that *everyone* doesn't cheat and be dishonest. Secondly, just think of what the net consequences of "everyone doing it" (Mill's principle) would be. It would obviously not be a very nice world in which to live. Lastly, are there situations (Aristotle's thought) where you might be dishonest and yet be moral? Probably very few, although every day we do run into the so-called "white lie" where you may be dishonest in a sense that you lie to someone because you don't want to hurt his or her feelings. And it is true, of course, that a great many people are dishonest in business with their marketing practices when they practice what I call the "We're the greatest!" syndrome even if they know they aren't--if the truth be told. To return to the case at hand, it appears that Brad is going to have to engage in a large measure of soul-searching if he is going to continue and be successful in his present position.

**Table 10**  
**DIAGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS (HONESTY)**  
 (With the Three-Step Approach Superimposed  
 on the Jurisprudential Argument Layout)



Brad, a business administration major, discovers in his first position in advertising & marketing that his superior is urging him to cut corners and "camouflage" the facts in various ways if he hopes to achieve real success in the advertising game.

(SINCE W)  
 WARRANT

Since the competition in a strongly capitalistic economy even in a democratic state is such that "survival of the fittest" demands that business people follow an aggressive, "borderline" business ethic as they seek

Brad will eventually need to decide if he can go along with the morality of the approach that Wes, his superior, says is necessary to succeed in today's "cut-throat" business environment.

UNLESS R)  
 REBUTTAL OR  
 EXCEPTION

1. Brad can convince himself that it is somehow possible to go along with Wes and still remain true to his principle of honesty and ultimately achieve sufficient success in his career.

to advertise and market their products, businesspeople are being forced to abandon strict application of a code of ethics.

TEST NO. 1 (KANT)  
(*universalizability*)

(ON ACCOUNT OF B)  
BACKING

An approach based on communitistic theory to the business enterprise, one in which there was a large measure of government ownership and control, has evidently led to waste, corruption, and inefficiency typically; thus, the underlying theory has seemingly not been valid or successful in the long run.

TEST No.2 (MILL)  
(*net consequences*)

2. Brad decides that his youthful idealism about being completely honest in his business dealings was naively idealistic in the realistic business world that he is encountering.

TEST No. 3  
(ARISTOTLE)  
(*intentions*)



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- C** = Conclusion (claim or conclusion that we wish to establish)
- W** = Warrant (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question, "How do you get there?")
- B** = Backing (categorical statements of fact that lend further support to the bridge-like warrants)
- R** = Conditions of Exception (arguments of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)


Sample Case 2. Sam's grandparents and parents have operated a successful garment business in northeastern United States for several generations. This was accomplished by planning, sacrifice, and hard work. They always tried to pay their workers fairly but not exorbitantly. The company's community involvement was such that it was regarded typically

as a good "corporate citizen." As time went by, however, the competition increased steadily, and it was difficult indeed to keep the business afloat. The family made every effort to modernize the undertaking, but the profit margin was steadily shrinking despite their best efforts. Local, state, and federal taxes were rising sharply. So the company was forced to go public, but in the final analysis the Bronstein family were only able to retain 40% of the stock shares. Sam's father, who had founded the business originally, was getting close to retirement. He definitely wanted Sam to succeed him before long. In the meantime, the difficulty of making ends meet had forced the workers to complain more seriously than ever before about raises, not to mention the social benefits and the pension plan of the company. Most recently there was a rumor that some of the workers had been lobbying for a vote among the group to establish a union that included a large number of other garment workers in the country. Sam, who had business management education, had seen this move coming for some time, but his father felt somewhat betrayed by "his people" to whom he felt he had always been fair. As the business year was coming to a close, Sam had a long talk with his father. He suggested that, if the group did plan to hold a certification vote, they should start a rumor that it might be time to move the whole enterprise south, perhaps even to Mexico. He thought that perhaps this would cause the vote for a union to fail. If the vote did carry, however, he argued that he would be in favor of following through with the move south anyhow despite the hardship that it would impose on many people and their families. Viewing this ethically, what should Mr. Bronstein and Sam do to keep the business functioning with a reasonable profit? How do you assess Sam approach to the problem?

Analysis. Situations like this have been quite typical in recent years and will undoubtedly continue. Family dynasties with son succeeding father and so on have run into difficulty when conditions forced opening a growing business up to stockholders. The development of unions put a check on rampant capitalism earlier in the century, but the forces of unionism have moved up and down with a spiraling economy. With a capitalistic system, stockholders want a reasonable, if not good, return on their investment. If a business is not showing a good annual return, and it seems like high wages are the culprit, there will be great pressure to move to a locale where salaries and the cost of living are lower. Should Sam do all in his power to defeat the threat of unionism in the family business? Should he, his father, and the extended family forget any responsibility toward hundreds of workers and their families and encourage other stockholders to vote for a change of venue for the factory? Is this the type of action we should seek to "universalize" (Kant) in a democratic society? Is it possible to assess the *net* consequences (Mill) of a decision one way or the other? How can we weigh the intentions (Aristotle) of the main players in this dilemma?

Table 11

**DIAGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS (LOYALTY)**  
 (With the Three-Step Approach Superimposed  
 on the Jurisprudential Argument Layout)



Sam's family have developed a successful garment business, but for many reasons the profitability margin is down and some stockholders feel it might be necessary to move to a different region of the country. Such a move would put hundreds of people out of work and affect the community significantly. To head off a favorable vote on the formation of a union, Sam, the "heir apparent," wants to start a rumor that formation of a union would force such a move. Either way, looking to the future, he would favor such a move anyhow.

Granting the need for any company to earn a return for its stockholders, the current president, Sam's father, should hold wide discussions with all concerned, including leading community officials & the workers, to assess the situation. Starting a rumor should not take place, but the workers should honestly be made aware of all of the facts. Any decision made should be as fair as possible—to both those who brought the company along in the past and to the local community.

(SINCE W)  
WARRANT

(UNLESS R)  
REBUTTAL OR  
EXCEPTION

Decisions by companies (of long-standing in a city to move away from the workers who helped develop them and the communities that helped support them are unfair and do not reflect what postmodern society should be like in the future.

1. The workers do unionize and make most unfair demands on the company that simply cannot be met and still stay in business.

2. Reasonable severance packages and early retirement schemes are

TEST NO. 1 (KANT)  
(consistency)

(ON ACCOUNT OF B)  
BACKING

As the world moves into the 21st century, politicians and those who put them in office will need increasingly to enact legislation that initially encourages and then ultimately, if necessary, forces companies to be "good citizens" on a worldwide basis so that workers are treated fairly throughout their entire working careers.

TEST No.2 (MILL)  
(*net consequences*)

made available, as well opportunity for those qualified and having interest to move along with the company.

TEST No. 3 (ARISTOTLE)  
(*intentions*)



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- C = Conclusion** (claim or conclusion that we wish to establish)
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- R = Conditions of Exception** (arguments of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)

**EXERCISES**

**Note:** Below are 10 case situations described briefly. In each instance, ethical decision-making seems required on the part of one or more persons involved. After you analyze each case situation, use one "format page" for that purpose. This sample page is provided below after Case 10. Keep the following in mind as you consider each case situation:

Determine "who had a duty or responsibility to do what" in each of the case situations below. Decide whether you believe that there someone had a moral obligation to "do this" or "not to do that" in the situation concerned. As you make this assessment, keep in mind the following questions about the actions (or inactions) of one or more of the major individuals concerned:

1. Is the action basically unfair to a person or group?
2. Does the action or decision (or inaction) impose on another's freedom?
3. Does the action hurt another person's welfare?
4. Does the action impose on an individual's privacy
5. Does the action deny an opportunity to another person?
6. Is the action, in addition to being one of the above, also **illegal** and against the law (thus adding another dimension to the analysis)?

**Note:** In this instance (i.e., the matter of *professional* ethics), we should also keep in mind the obligations a professional has (a) to make provide services equally and to make them equally available; (b) to exhibit honesty, candor, competence, diligence, loyalty, and discretion in client relationships; (c) to be truthful, non-maleficent, and fair to third parties (i.e., ordinary not professional norms); (d) to promote values inherent in a liberal society, as well as fulfill obligations to do research, work for reform, and maintain respect for the profession; and (e) to work so that compliance with the profession's ethical norms results (Bayles, 1981, Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7).

With an ethical obligation, it is probably best to use the word "should" (i.e. or e.g., "As her superior, Joe *should* not taken advantage of Marie when she was in such a vulnerable position").

When the obligation has been accepted as a societal norm--and has resultantly been instituted *legally* (i.e., "Joe committed a criminal offense when he assaulted Marie sexually after the office had closed for the day")--the "*should* not" can be further strengthened by "*must* not".

Assume the role of one of the major participants in the case situation, and then make recommendations as to what should be done (ethically)--and what *must* also be done (legally) if what happened violated a societal norm and established law.

Case 1. Ozzie found a job with a furniture company right out of high school. He had always been interested in woodworking and carpentry as a youngster, and his father had encouraged him along this line. So when the position with the company opened up, he applied and was hired. Because of his all-round abilities and personality, he fitted into the business in a variety of ways such as salesperson, furniture mover, minor-repair person, and what have you? After he had been with the firm for about eight years, the position of assistant manager



opened up, and Ozzie was offered the post at a considerable increase in salary. This worked out very well because he was just about to get married, and the extra money came in handy in so many ways as he and Beth got established in a new home. As it happened, the company was not extremely well organized; so, the company's inventory was poorly kept. When some floor samples didn't sell, even after being offered at sales at reduced prices, they were eventually moved to one of the company's three warehouses. Other items got scratched or dented and were stored also for possible repairs. One day, when the manager decided to discard a bed that had somehow been broken, Ozzie asked for it and received permission to haul it off after work and repair it himself for his newly purchased home. Realizing also that there was many other items around that he and Beth could use, items which could be repaired or renewed--but which in the past had typically been discarded or donated to a charity agency--Ozzie gradually singled out one damaged piece of furniture after another that he himself could use. He usually checked with the manager, and because he and the manager had become friends, he often repaired or refinished an item that the manager himself would take for his own home. After a while, when Ozzie began to realize how much money he had saved, as had the manager also to a lesser degree, he wondered how he could be handling this situation better. Would the owner be upset if he found out about this practice?

Case 2. Betty works for an insurance agency locally that is a branch office of a large company. Not wanting to specialize further after graduating with an arts and science degree, and planning to be married and continuing to work at least part time, she located the position with the agency on the basis of her degree and her competence with a computer. She has been employed there for five years and enjoys her work both from the standpoint of what she does and the people with whom she relates daily. Over and above her base salary, the company provides typical benefits such as a pension plan, limited health benefits, two weeks of vacation annually, and nine "sick days" annually. As it usually happens, some people seem never to be sick and pride themselves on their "durability." Others are sick more than one might expect and actually need more than the nine allotted days annually. Their salaries are docked per diem for extra time taken away from work. A third group is sick occasionally, but usually have unused sick days at the end of each year. As it happens, Betty is very healthy, and at year's end she has typically had at least a week of unused days. Having lunch with three of her associates the other day, she suggested that maybe they all ought to "get sick" more often. One of her associates thought that was a good idea, but she mentioned also that the agency would be less efficient if they did so even if "they coordinated their efforts" so as not to make life miserable for the "healthy person" working when someone else had suddenly "become ill." What should Betty do in this and similar situations?

Case 3. Stanley is a bright 30-year old who has a degree in computer science. Because he was known as a "whiz kid," he had no trouble finding employment with a leading computer company. His salary and benefits are excellent, and he was soon promoted "prematurely" because of his diligence and creative efforts. This area of technology, as is generally well known, is highly competitive. Within Stan's firm there are "teams" that work on specific innovative projects. His promotion had meant that he would be heading up one of several teams that were working on a project designed specifically to increase both the computing speed and the storage capacity of one of the company's leading products beyond

its present limits. The project was moving along well, and Stan's small group had worked together well feeling a sense of real accomplishment. Their objectives seemed realizable and were just about met. However, Stanley was working at home alone one evening, and he had a brilliant idea that if realized would help his group vastly exceed the goals that had been set for the present project. He reasoned that his plan, if realizable, would be worth millions to some company, and he couldn't help but wonder if he shouldn't just keep quiet and let the present project come to a "successful conclusion." He also remembered an accidental meeting with the CEO of a leading competitor at a recent computer convention who had said in departing, "It was nice to meet you, Stan. We are always looking for top-flight people. So give me a call sometime if you have any innovative ideas that you would like to discuss." Would Stan be acting ethically if he followed through to profit from "his own" idea?

Case 4. Peggy was a well-trained nurse working at the local hospital. She had always wanted to be involved with the health profession in some capacity. The idea of becoming a physician had crossed her mind while in high school, but she didn't know where she would get the money needed for medical training. Eventually she got admitted to a two-year training program for nurses and, after completing those two years so very well, she jumped at the opportunity for a scholarship leading to a bachelor's degree in nursing. Now, after working eight years successfully as a nurse, Peggy began to assess her commitment to her profession. Some aspects of her work were exciting and highly interesting, whereas others were a bore and a drag. And she found, also, that the same characteristics could be assigned to the sick people in her care. When she thought about her work carefully, she realized that she could well be neglecting her professional service in various ways to clients (patients) who were unattractive, boring, difficult to reason with, and often stupid. Quite often when hall lights lit up indicating assistance was needed, she made a quick assessment as to which patients were requesting service. Then she made a judgment as to whether she could "look the other way" until an associate answered the call. As she ate lunch recently with an orderly from another floor, she somewhat embarrassedly sought to rationalize her actions by saying, "You know, Tom, they really don't pay us enough to wait on so many of these people just lying around to die." However, I am doing my very best to give full attention to those people who have a future after their release from our care. Is Peggy being unethical in the way she is carrying out her duties?

Case 5. Henry is a high school teacher/coach who has been doing quite well in this capacity for 12 years since he received his teacher certification. In addition to teaching physical & health education classes, he coaches three sports: football, basketball, and baseball. He is married with two children and, to make ends meet, his wife has been working half time as a librarian. All of this adds up to the fact that he and his family are extremely busy, often tired, and have great difficulty finding time for most leisure pursuits in which they are interested. Additionally, Henry realizes that he is falling behind in keeping up professionally. To make matters more difficult, Frank, another teacher/coach in the same school, is a "whirlwind" in the sense that he seems to be able to do it all and still have time for professional involvement. Frank attends seminars and symposia to keep in touch with advancements in his areas of interest and involvement. The physical & health education profession always seems to be battling for its "rightful" place in the curriculum, and Frank

feels he is doing his bit to help out. He also goes to the state conventions and national conventions of his professional association almost every year. To make matters worse for Henry, Frank is always waving information sheets and articles at him saying, "Have you seen this piece by Morgan on stress?" or something of that sort. Henry figures that Frank is gunning for the department head's post when "old Pete hangs it up" in a few years. However, Frank believes that he is handling all that he can cope with reasonably well. "I do my job well," he stated the other day, "someone else is going to have to maintain the 'PR' with the other teachers, the principal, the school officials, and the public." Can we truly argue that Henry is being unethical in the way he is handling all of his responsibilities and duties to both his family and his teaching position?

Case 6. Marie is a top-flight, young assistant manager in a computer firm. Her work is of such quality that she should be able to look forward to a bright future with the company. After she got married, she and Ted, her husband, had great plans for the future. He was a driver for a parcel delivery firm, but had plans to move up the ladder in the firm. They also wanted the best of everything for themselves and the family they intended to start soon. Additionally, they both hoped to be able to help their parents who were close to retirement and had sacrificed to help them financially with their education. However, as seems to be the case with so many younger people nowadays, even two incomes don't seem to be enough to cover the expense of all those things a young couple have in mind. So both of them looked around for part-time work to supplement their already supposedly sufficient incomes. Neither discussed this idea with his or her superior on the job. They both were able to find something part time, but they soon called the financial return from this extra work "blood money." Their lives were overcrowded with too many responsibilities, and they didn't know when they would be able to start a family. Additionally, they both sensed that their overall efforts in their primary positions were suffering. When Marie was needed for an extra (unpaid) assignment, she had to beg off citing a family duty with her parents. And Ted simply couldn't accept overtime work because of her second job and simply said that he "didn't feel well." In both cases each superior showed concern when Marie and Ted, respectively, offered such lame excuses and couldn't carry out the request for assistance. Are Marie and Ted being unethical in their approach to "making a go of it" financially?

Case 7. Bill is an assistant professor in a department of physical education and sport studies in a large university that offers an intercollegiate athletics program in a major athletic conference. He, along with Roger and Jim, are responsible for the educational counseling of all undergraduate majors in the program. Many of these young men are scholarship athletes who are "marginal students." Toward the end of the academic year, the assistant director of athletics invited Bill to coffee. They talked about a variety of subjects, one of which had to do with athletes running afoul of university regulations because of their indifference to such matters. As the discussion developed, the assistant director told Bill that the athletic director would like the assistance of a counselor in this regard (e.g., to look after the "blue-chippers" in regard to such things as dropping courses *after* the prescribed deadline). He also offered Bill \$5000 a year as an "unlisted" honorarium if he would take on this assignment for the division of intercollegiate athletics. Bill could really use this extra money, especially since it would be in essence for doing the sort of service he was already

providing--but typically within the established regulations. However, he told his colleague, the assistant athletic director, that he just "wouldn't feel right" about taking unreported money in this way. The following week Bill by chance learned that Roger, his office associate, seemed to have taken on the responsibility. From an ethical standpoint, should Bill report Roger to the department head?

Case 8. Tex, who hates his real name of Thornton, was one of three partners in a television store with a repair department on site as well. Business was good, although the competition from the large national firms kept Tex and his partners worried all the time. However, they figured that their best stock in trade was their developing reputation for both well-priced sales; careful attention to warrants; and careful, qualified, reasonably economical repair service. And yet, as seemed to be happening on so many fronts, times were changing. Their profit margin has been dropping significantly the past few years to such an extent that the store was not "supporting" the three partners to the extent that they had envisioned. Also, the prices of newer television sets in many cases were currently significantly less than they had been 10 years ago. This "holding of the line *plus*" against inflation by the manufacturers is evidently accomplished because (a) the quality of the various parts used for initial construction varies and basically is not as good as formerly, (b) the sets themselves are assembled now where labor is very much cheaper than where Tex's company is located, and (c) the price of replacement components has lowered as well, especially if cheaper parts were used for repair jobs. Despite the above, the three partners still had to advertise their product more than ever and extol the virtues of their product inordinately. The only solution that Tex could recommend to his associates was to meet the competition head-on price-wise and to provide the best, friendly service possible in the hope that more television sets would be sold. In addition, the only difficult option to invoke seemed to be to hire younger technician help and let the older, more experienced technicians go. At the same time, they could switch to lower-grade repair parts and thereby bring in more income that way. Are there any ethical concerns to be resolved with what Tex is recommending to his partners?

Case 9. Susan is a competent, well-trained person who works in a forward-looking company where significant efforts have been made to break down the presumably old-style hierarchical, line-staff relationship among employees. Project groups are often formed to tackle work orders that require a variety of knowledge, competencies, and skills by those involved. Often one person is elected by the group appointed to complete the project using a secret-ballot mechanism. At other times, where one person is the obvious choice to be in charge, the manager may appoint him or her to the temporary post. Evaluation of group and individual performance is carried out regularly, and the manager discusses the results privately with each person concerned. Employees are even asked to rate themselves. There is even an opportunity for employees to rate the performance of the manager and assistant manager, and the results are presumably discussed with these two by the company owners. The salary paid is the same for all workers when a person is first hired. Thereafter, there are both cost-of-living increments and merit raises based on the evaluations of others and those of the manager. Everything considered, those who have been with the company longer are presumably making better salaries. Susan has done quite well salary-wise, but she has some concerns because the employees do not know what each other is making. She understands


that males are automatically making better salaries than females in the company even though the work involved may be identical. Also, she sometimes has the feeling that certain other males may be typically downgrading her in the evaluations thereby causing her to lose out on the size of the merit increases. After talking this over at lunch one day with an associate, Sally, they agree that in the future that--most secretly--(a) they will typically rate each other high no matter whether they performed at their best; (b) they will typically rate women co-workers somewhat higher than males; and (c) they will rate the manager and asst. manager highly on the assumption that somehow the evaluations are not as confidential as they are purported to be. "After all," Susan tells Sally, "all's fair in love and war, and people always look after themselves first." Are Sally and Susan handling their concerns ethically?

Case 10. Bruce is an assistant professor at a large state university. He is on tenure track which means that he has a maximum of seven years in which to convince the promotion and tenure committee of his department that he should be granted a permanent position there (i.e., tenure). The achievement of such status presumably provides Bruce with a "life appointment," because tenure when earned can only be broken because of (a) proven incompetence, (b) proven immorality, or (c) proven dishonesty. (If a university can prove "financial exigency," tenure can be invoked with a "pay-out" to the professor concerned.) A professor's work assignment is typically a 40-40-20 proposition (i.e., 40% of his time should be devoted to teaching, 40% to scholarship and publication, and 20% to service in the university, the profession, and/or the community. However, at the "better" universities, it is generally recognized that solid publication, research grants, and "citation-index" recognition will get a person tenure and a subsequent "clear track" to the rank of full professor and the accompanying perquisites. Of course, practically no one will admit that fine teaching at both the undergraduate and graduate levels doesn't really count for all that much "when the chips are down." It can help somewhat, of course, but "marginally acceptable" teaching will do the trick if the research component of one's dossier is strong. The same can be said for the service component of one's overall promotion and tenure folder that is evaluated--i.e., it helps a bit, but barely nominal effort along that line will fill the bill. Returning to the case of Bruce, a bright assistant professor in his second year of a tenure-track appointment, he assessed the situation carefully and decided very quickly what approach he was going to take. As he told his wife after dinner one evening, "There's no question but that research grants and publication are "the name of the game" here. So that 40-40-20 division of workload time for me is going to be 70-20-10. Seventy percent of my time and effort is going to be devoted to scholarship, applying for grants, and publication. I will teach as well as I can, just enough to 'keep the students sullen but not mutinous,' and I'll duck every time-consuming committee assignment that I can. Also, my only concern with professional associations and scholarly societies will be to find opportunities to present the results of my research as often as I can." Is Bruce's proposed "realistic" approach an ethical one?

Table 12

SAMPLE FORM FOR USE WITH ANALYSES  
(PHASES ONE, TWO, AND THREE)

(Name of Case: \_\_\_\_\_)



**Key: Jurisprudential Argument Terms:**

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## CHAPTER 12

### APPLYING ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

The third and final category of ethical problems (Category III, environmental) contains a selection of case situations in which the professional person as a concerned person and a "enlightened world citizen" may wish to, or need to, make a decision of an ethical nature about his or her relationship to the environment. In Category III, also, it should be kept in mind that we can conceivably delineate between what might be called the *social* environment and, of course, the *physical* or *natural* environment.

Thus, once again I am agreeing, as I explained above, that all ethical problems are ultimately personal problems (i.e., those problems encountered by a *person* typically in ethical relationships (1) *between himself or herself and other persons* at home or in social settings, or (2) *with fellow professionals or colleagues (or customers)*, or (3) *with other persons* within what might be called the social or physical environment. Accordingly, I chose to make this tripartite subdivision of all possible ethical problems for purposes of ease of understanding and convenience in the "experiential" section of this book (Part III).

#### THE CLASH BETWEEN ECOLOGY AND ECONOMICS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICANS--& OTHERS

The influence of ecology began to be felt during the 1970s when some scholars in North American society (whose work is reported here) began to predict the upcoming clash between ecology and traditional economic theory. This influence and the potential conflict became truly recognizable and significant during the 1980s. It is not unusual that very little attention has been paid to this threatening development by those in the general population before the 1990's decade. As a matter of fact, the large majority of people still conduct their lives in the 21st century in a manner that clearly indicates they still do not appreciate the gravity of the situation. Maybe people will finally come to their senses when they are finally confronted by the purported Cree Indian prophecy: "When the last tree is cut down, the last fish eaten, and the last stream poisoned, you will realize that you can't eat money." Mark Twain said it even more succinctly: "Humans are the only animals that blush, and need to."

Although this problem has been with us over the centuries, the lack of understanding and appreciation of it by leaders, along with the size of the world's population and their societal development, never brought the basic issue home to people forcibly. Now the problem is here to stay; so, after having the matter called to my attention in the summer of 1970, I soon decided that it, too, should be considered a persistent problem to my field in the same way as the other five forces of values, politics, nationalism, economics, and religion. No longer, as it has almost always been possible in the past, can we simply move elsewhere to locate another abundant supply of game to hunt, water to drink, or mineral resources to exploit when natural resources are depleted.

## Ecology As a Field of Study

Hawley (1986) defined ecology as the field of study that treats the relationships and interactions of human beings and other living organisms with each other and with the natural, or physical environment in which they reside (p. 1). Until the 1970s very few scientists were known as ecologists; they were identified as biologists or zoologists, or perhaps as conservationists. Now many of these scientists have been asked to consider our plight in relation to the environment in a much broader perspective than that in which an experimental scientist typically functions. The outlook for these people must be macroscopic as well as microscopic--and scientists often find it difficult to make this transition in their lives with some unusual in-service experience or outside prodding.

In this insightful "theoretical" essay, Hawley explains how he developed his thought about *human* ecology within the broader subject. Recognizing that "adaptation is a system phenomenon," he inquires about the individual's position within developing ecological theory. In summary, he postulates (pp. 4-6) that:

- (1) "every human being requires access to environment";
- (2) "interdependence with other human beings is imperative";
- (3) the individual "is a finite creature in a finite world";
- (4) the human "possesses an inherent tendency to preserve and expand life to the maximum attainable under prevailing conditions"; and, finally,
- (5) "the intrinsic limitation on the human being's behavioral variability is indeterminate."

What has happened is that, for a variety of reasons, we can no longer proceed on the assumption that our responsibility is to "multiply and replenish the earth" in the sense that these words were originally intended. In the past we have been exhorted to both increase the population and develop an economy to cope with the various demands. Now there are more than six billion people on Earth, and approximately six or seven babies are being born somewhere in the world every second! It has become starkly obvious to many reflective people that strong attitudes favoring population control must be developed, because we continue to see some version of the Malthusian law operative--and its operation may become more massive as time passes. Sadly, this idea still seems valid today, with the only possible checks being war, disease, natural catastrophes, famine, and birth control.

## Choices Will Have to Be Made



Moving more directly into the realm of economics, it has been pointed out that the United States--as opposed to Canada, for example, although what each does usually impinges on the other--has some extremely difficult choices to make in the next few decades. In fact, a number of these choices may be made because of the severe crises the nation will encounter. Those who look ahead optimistically, explained Murray back in 1972, seem willing to allow a continuous-growth economic system, whereas those who will probably be classified as pessimists argue for a no-growth system (p. 38). It is imperative for us all to understand that the forecasting models developed by economists and ecologists quite typically differ sharply; the consequences of their recommendations, respectively, are completely different. Certainly all are aware of contradictory economic theories that appear in the daily press, but it is also obvious that very few people, relatively speaking, are aware of the collision course seemingly being taken if the ecologic models have any validity at all.

About the same time, in an article titled "The Ecologist at Bay," Grahame Smith (1971) explained: "The decline in quality of this planet and the precarious aspect of continued existence of life on Earth are largely the results of this comfortable shell of consumer technology with which each American is surrounded" (p. 69). Thus, ecologists find themselves in a situation in which they comprehend fully the dangerous position in which *some* people of Earth are right now, and in which most of the earth's population may well find themselves in a few short years. However, for ecologists to cry out in alarm to the general populace in the favored countries more vigorously, and to have them truly understand the reality of the precarious approach being followed, is to risk being ridiculed and branded pessimists and doomsayers. Nevertheless, the problem is definitely here, and it cannot be escaped by closing our eyes. As Pogo, the cartoon possum, has stated--and it is a remark we must accept ruefully--"We have met the enemy, and he is us!"

In an effort to consider the problem more carefully, and in the process to place it in some perspective for members of the many professions, I will (1) offer a few definitions, (2) present a brief historical background, (3) analyze the extent of it in our society, (4) put the environmental crisis in some philosophical perspective, and (5) offer a concluding statement.

### Definition of Terms

As a result of the subsequent development of ecology, and what has by some been called "environmental science," many new words and phrases have been added to our vocabulary. Huxley (1963) had defined ecology as "the science of the mutual relations of organism with their environment and with one another" (p. 6). Or, to be somewhat more precise, Murray (1972) stated that "ecologists study competition between individuals and between populations for resources, the growth of populations, and the movement of materials (e.g., water and minerals) in ecological systems (ecosystems)" (p. 36).

Actually, it may not be possible or pertinent to define even the most common terms usually employed in this area of study here, but it should be understood that we have polluted the Earth--and are doing so now and may continue to do so in the future--in both the biosphere (the zone of life) and in the remainder of the atmosphere. This includes the area from 35,000

feet up to perhaps 600 miles above the Earth. The biosphere, as described by Kunz (1971) is "that envelope made up of the Earth's waters, land crust, and atmosphere where all organisms, including man, live" (p. 67). Also states Kunz an ecosystem is "an integrated unit or 'system' in nature, sufficient unto itself to be studied as a separate entity--e.g., a rotting log in the forest, a coral atoll, a continent, or the earth with all its biota" (p. 67).

Fortunately, however, many of these common terms are recognizable, and their continued use in the various communications media is making them part of everyday vocabulary. A few of these terms are: allowable release level, biodegradable, biota, carcinogen, coliform bacteria, compost, decibel, demography, effluent, energy cycle, green revolution, greenhouse effect, herbicide, atmospheric inversion, non-renewable resource, recycling, smog, sonic boom, symbiosis, thermal pollution.

### **Brief Historical Background**

There are now well over six billion people on Earth. At the beginning of the Christian era, that figure was only 250 million. By the time North America was settled by Europeans, the figure had been doubled to about 500 million, in a period of only 1,600 years. By 1830 the figure had increased twofold again to 1 billion in somewhat less than 200 years. In the next 100 years, the amount doubled again to 2 billion, and now, in about only 70 years, the total number of men, women, and children on Earth has surpassed 6 billion!

And so, as Huxley (1963, p. 2) had warned many years ago, "By the year 2,000. unless something appalling bad or miraculously good should happen in the interval, six thousand millions of us will be sitting down to breakfast every morning." He was absolutely correct! To make matters worse, it is in the underdeveloped countries that the rate of increase is so much higher than the average. It will presumably not be possible for such nations to move ahead to full industrialization because of the inevitable drain on their resources caused by such rapid growth.

In another realm--that of poor husbandry insofar as land and animal use are concerned--our careless and ignorant abuse of the planet probably goes as far back as 9000 years ago or more when we first began to farm the land. There are today innumerable archeological sites that were once thriving civilizations. For a variety of reasons, including poor use of land, most of these locations are now dusty and desolate ruins. An example of such an area is North Africa, which was once exploited extensively by the ancient Romans. Here, valuable topsoil was eroded by poor farming techniques, incorrect grazing of livestock, and flagrant abuse of timberland. One can also go back to ancient Greece to find another example of once fertile land with an abundant supply of water and forested hills. Now much of the area is blighted, with rocky hills and barren lowlands denuded of topsoil. Wildlife is almost extinct as well.

Much the same story can be related about what came to be known as Turkey. Early port cities, such as Ephesus and Tarsus, offer no evidence today of their history as trading ports. The Fertile Crescent of biblical times has long since gone, and the "land between the rivers" (the Tigris and the Euphrates) shows almost no evidence of its former luxuriant vegetation.

Thus, turn where one will--to areas desolated by 15th-century sheep raisers in Spain, to the pre-Columbia North American civilization on Monte Alban in Mexico--one is apt to find examples of poor management and land and forest degradation. Obviously, some peoples have managed their resources wisely--The Netherlands, Japan, and modern Israel, for example--but they are rare exceptions in an otherwise bleak picture. The discussion that follows will describe concisely why the present century will need to be characterized by a concern never shown before.

### The Problem in Modern Society

What then is the extent of the environmental crisis in modern society? Very simply, then, in regard to the ecological situation, we humans have achieved a certain mastery over the physical world in which we have found ourselves because of our scientific achievements and accompanying technology. We are at the top of the food chain because of our mastery of much of Earth's flora and fauna. Because of the exponential, geometric explosion of the human population, Mergen (1970) explained that increasingly greater pressures "will be placed on our lands to provide shelter, food, recreation, and waste disposal areas. This will cause a greater pollution of the atmosphere, the rivers, the lakes, the land, and the oceans" (p. 36).

All of this was explained graphically over 35 years ago by the National Geographic Society (1970) in a chart titled "How Man Pollutes His World." Here the earth is "divided" into air, land, and sea. It is vital to understand that this satellite we inhabit is self-sustaining; is possessed of only a finite quantity of oxygen, water, and land; and has no means of reconstituting itself with further natural resources once the present supply is exhausted. This means that we should (must!) give immediate attention (a) to the effect of supersonic aircraft on the atmosphere at various levels; (b) to what increasing urbanization will mean insofar as the strain on the physical environment is concerned; (c) to how significant the stripping of vegetation is to the Earth's soil supply and to its ability to produce oxygen; (d) to how dangerous the effects of mercury waste, harmful pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and trash and sewage disposal are to the natural environment; and (e) to what the oil spills and dumping at sea will mean to the Earth's great bodies of water and their ability to sustain fish, bird, and bottom life. We need to ask ourselves *daily* vital questions about the extent to which nature's self-renewing cycles are being disturbed. To repeat a point made earlier, what sort of world will our children and grandchildren inherit?

In North America alone, many rivers, lakes, and streams are being used as sewers; the air in some cities is so polluted that one might as well be smoking a pack of cigarettes daily; New York City alone is estimated to have as many rats as it has people (more than 9 million); overall about 4 billions tons of garbage are produced each year; more than four-fifths of the original forests have been converted for other purposes, as have about 300 million acres of crop and range land; and at least 3,000 acres a day are covered with concrete and other substances. And, of course, many other nations in the world are following the same path on their "trip to civilization!"

Further, if all this sounds a bit too melodramatic, keep in mind that there is a global

network of international agricultural research centers that is facing ever-increasing demands from all parts of the Earth for assistance in increasing food production because countries' populations are outstripping their capacity to put sufficient nutritional food on the table for all of their citizens. And still further, a generation ago (1975) "air pollution plagued several large and populous areas along the Eastern seaboard today, causing serious potential hazards for people with respiratory or other health problems and at least some discomfort for countless others" (*The New York Times*, p. 37).

This "diatribe" could be continued, but the point must have been made several pages ago! Certainly the gravity of prevailing patterns of living has been recognized by many, but such recognition must become knowledge about which increasingly *positive* attitudes are formed by a great many more people who are in a position to act even more aggressively in the immediate future (e.g., the U.S. president and Congress, the Canadian prime minister and Parliament). Interestingly enough, many laws have been passed, but enforcement is difficult, and the fines for law-breaking in this regard are evidently not sufficiently high. Other seemingly more pressing demands tend to take precedence over environmental concerns (e.g., the destruction of lakes and ponds by various industries through air pollution that falls as rain depending on prevailing wind patterns). It has now been 34 years (!) since one ecologist decried the "fragmented approach that we tend to take in seeking solutions" (Smith, 1971, p. 69), and explained that appointed presidential councils are perennially accused of dodging the evident crises. Fortunately, ministerial groups are placing some emphasis on what has been called a 'theology of survival'.

## Meaning and Significance

How does one approach a question such as the influence of ecology or the environmental crisis philosophically? Presumably no one philosophical position or stance would actually include any tenets designed to bring about an end to life on Earth as it has been known. Of course, some particularistic approaches might be overly optimistic about our future on Earth, and others might contain dicta which, if carried out assiduously, might hasten the time when the Earth's resources could no longer sustain its population. Other approaches might be so despairing and pessimistic about the future that the inevitability of our consciously (or even unconsciously) destroying ourselves is a distinct possibility.

This subject brings us close to the subject of ethics, a branch of philosophy which includes societal values and norms describing what is good and bad and what actions are right or wrong. When these first "ecological predictions" began to appear, Holmes Rolston (1975) asked what to many might seem like a contradictory question--"Is there an ecological ethic?" He inquired whether an environmental ethic--the values that we hold about our environment--is based simply on a specific ethical approach (e.g., with a philosophical position) or whether there is actually a built-in naturalistic ethic in the universe. Commencing from the position that the dividing line between science and ethics is definite if one but accepts the philosophical categories of *descriptive* law and *prescriptive* law as being separate and distinct. Descriptive law, presented in the indicative mood, is employed in science and history.

Prescriptive law, on the other hand, is used in ethics, and the imperative mode is involved implicitly or explicitly. Thus, in moral philosophy the quickest way to be accused of committing a naturalistic fallacy is to blithely assume an "ought" from an "is"--at least in the eyes of an analytic philosopher with a scientific orientation. Transposed to the discussion of ecological ethics, environmental *science* should tell us what we think we know through observing, hypothesizing, experimenting, and generalizing about the environment. Using the term "environmental", on the other hand, means simply that we have applied one or another approach to moral philosophy to aid our understanding of and relationship to the environment.

Those who argue for a built-in ecological morality have differences in opinion that divide them into two groups: (a) those who equate homeostasis with morality, and (b) those who appear to go even further by arguing that there is "a moral ought inherent in recognition of the holistic character of the ecosystem" that results in an ecological ethic (Rolston, 1975, p. 94). In assessing the first group, Rolston sought a "moral translation" from the paramount law in ecological theory--that of homeostasis (a closed planetary ecosystem, recycling transformation, energy balance). Paul Sears (1969) viewed the matter in relation to the quality of life--to the effect that:

probably men (sic) will always differ as to what constitutes the good life. The need not differ as to what is necessary for the long survival of men on earth. . . . As living beings we must come to terms with the environment about us, learning to get along with the liberal budget at our disposal . . . we must seem to attain what I have called a steady state. (p. 401)

Here the argument appears to be as follows: If you wish to preserve human life--and you ought to want to do so--the ecological law (that the life-supporting ecosystem must recycle or all will perish) indicates that technically you ought not to disturb the ecosystem's capability to recycle itself. According to moral law (which equates with natural law), you ought to assist such recycling wherever possible. With this approach, values are not strictly inherent in the makeup of the world; they are ascribed to it by us attempting to employ careful husbandry with what we have assumed to be *our* possession (the Earth). Rolston argued that we can call the balance of nature (and the ends that we seek, which are presumably compatible with an ecosystemic balance) "ultimate values if we wish, but the ultimacy is instrumental, not intrinsic (1975, p. 98).

The other major claim referred to above allows one to use the term ecological ethic without quotation marks, because the assumption is that "morality is a derivative of the holistic character of the ecosystem" (p. 98). Rolston appreciated that this is a radical idea that will not receive ready acceptance. It endows nature and its integral ecosystem with value. This is obviously a proposal for the broadening of the concept of value--nature in and of itself would have value whether anyone was here to appreciate it and function on that basis. The leap is made from "is" to "ought" because "the values seem to be there as the facts are fully

in" (p. 101).

Because of past philosophical and religious speculation, not to mention what is called philosophy of science, it is extremely difficult to find a logical place for a primary ecological ethic in which the long-standing classical ought "has been transformed, stretched, co-extensively with an ecosystemic ought" (p. 104). Are human beings ready to agree that "egoism should be transformed into ecoism" (p. 104)? If the answer is "yes," then the self would be identified with Nature as one of its components, as part of the ecosystem. It would not be human beings *and* nature; it would be human beings in nature with such a transformation of outlook. In this way we would have a much stronger obligation to preserve nature's balance, because we are truly a part of the world--and the world is a part of our bodies.

With such an outlook, we would create what might be called the "ecological person," and such a person might be able to postulate an authentic naturalistic ethic:

Man (sic), an insider, is not spared environmental pressures, yet in the full ecosystemic context, his integrity is supported by and rises from transaction with his world and therefore requires a corresponding dignity in his world partner. Of late, the world has ceased to threaten, save as we violate it. How starkly this gainsays the alienation that characterizes modern literature, seeing nature as basically rudderless, antipathetical, in need of monitoring and repair. More typically modern man, for all his technological prowess, has found himself distanced from nature, increasingly competent and decreasingly confident, at once distinguished and aggrandized, yet afloat on and adrift in an indifferent, if not a hostile, universe. His world is at best a huge filling station, at worst a prison or "nothingness." Not so for ecological man; confronting his world with deference to a community of value in which he shares, he is at home again. (Rolston, 1975, pp. 107-108)

### Implications for Human Education

Above we have explained the difficulty of moving from an ecological "is" to an ecological "ought" in the realm of science and ethics. Nevertheless, the concept of the ecological man and woman has a definite appeal. Regardless of your position on this interesting question, there are quite obviously many scientific findings classified as environmental science that should be made available to people of all ages whether they are enrolled in educational institutions or are inhabitants of the everyday world. Simply making all the facts available will, of course, not be any guarantee that strong and positive attitudes will develop on the subject. It is a well-established fact, however, that the passing of legislation in difficult and sensitive areas must continue to take place through responsible political leadership, and that attitude changes often follow behind--albeit at what may seem to be a snail's pace. The field of education must play a vital role in the development of what might be termed an "ecological awareness." This is much broader than what was called the conservation movement within forestry and closely related fields that were bent on the

preservation of this or that feature of nature. Now ecology (or environmental science) places all these individual entities in a total context in which the interrelationship of all parts must be thoroughly understood.

Sound educational planning should take place at all levels, from early childhood education through the free tuition courses now being offered to many older citizens by certain universities. As Mergen stated as this movement was gathering early strength, "The knowledge that has been accumulated is vast, and ecological principles should be made part of the educational menus for economists, city planners, architects, engineers, the medical profession, the legal profession, religious groups, and all people concerned with the public and private management of natural resources, as well as politicians and governmental employees" (1970, p. 37). Obviously, those concerned professionally with sport and physical education, health and safety education, and recreation and parks administration from the standpoint of professional preparation have an equally important stake in this total educational process.

Presumably the usual struggle took place among those who want to introduce a new subject into the curriculum, those who will demand that environmental science be taught incidentally as part of existing subjects within the educational program, and those who will see no need for the study of environmental relationships to be in the basic curriculum. Further, some will want the subject matter taught as facts and knowledge in a subject-centered curriculum based on a logical progression from the simple to the complex, whereas others will stress that interest on the part of the learner should dictate if and how the subject should be introduced, because this is the way people learn best. Regardless, the urgency of the ecological crisis warrants an approach that veers neither to the right nor left of center. The point is simply that a potentially devastating problem is upon us, and that we should move ahead rapidly to see that some of the basics of environmental science are made available to all. These issues have been with us for so many centuries, of course, that they will not be solved tomorrow. What is critical right now is that we start to move as strongly as possible to foster understanding and the development of attitudes leading to corrective action.

It is difficult to state that certain information and attitudes should be taught to the population of pluralistic societies--and then to look forward confidently to the effective execution of such a pronouncement throughout North America. This is simply not the way things happen in countries like the United States and Canada, for example, where educational autonomy prevails in the individual states and provinces. All that can be hoped is that knowledge about the several positions regarding economic growth will be made available in a fair manner to the people as a controversial issue. What should be made known is that certain ecologic and economic theories and recommendations are diametrically opposed and which one should be followed and how far is something that the people in a democratic type of government must soon decide.

*A No-Growth Policy?* We don't hear much about it even today, but B. G. Murray an ecologist, made it quite clear in the early 1970s that citizens of the United States are definitely being placed in a position where a decision will have to be made between a continuous-

growth economy policy or a no-growth one (1972, 38). Somehow it has happened that the very large majority of citizens are not even aware that some scholars were recommending such a thing as a no-growth policy. Is this continent not one where capitalism and democracy prevails, where a steadily increasing gross national product is a strong indicator of economic prosperity? Is it a case where the eternal optimists seem to be saying, "Full speed ahead, if we ever hope to remain 'Number 1' and reduce poverty," and the pessimists respond with an incantation that "population and economic growth must strive for a steady state by the next century (if that is not already too late)." Whoever heard of such nonsense as a steady-state situation when both countries are encouraging immigration from around the globe? This is the almost impossible task educators face as they attempt to explain and carry forward the various forecasting models developed by researchers in both the natural and social sciences.

In a comparison of conflicting ecological and economic models, Murray examined the concepts of growth, movement of materials, and competition. In regard to growth, he explained that all types of biological growth follow a characteristic pattern that in time reaches a steady state or equilibrium in which as many organisms are dying as are being born into the system. (Think of this in relation to the massive problem being faced by China where a quite-effective birth-control policy has been operational for some time.) In United States business, however, the high standard of material living has been reached by continuously increasing GNP to meet the needs and demands of a continuously increasing population. Question: How long can this growth curve be maintained--and at what cost, including that to the rest of the world? It is explained further that continuous growth curves are not unknown in biological and physical systems (p. 38). However, the result is usually disaster--death of the host organism as when uncontrolled cell growth takes place in cancer, or even when the chain reaction of fissioning uranium-235 nuclei results in the inefficient use of energy in nuclear explosions (p. 39). The axiom of the ecologist here is that a system will eventually collapse unless it stops growing at some point and *recycles*.

The second concept discussed is the movement of materials, and here reference is being made to the biogeochemical cycles operative within nature--"the movement within ecosystems of minerals, water, oxygen, carbon dioxide, and other nutrients essential for life" (p. 39). One example of this process, of course, is that which carbon dioxide follows in its cyclic path between Earth's atmosphere and the many organisms that inhabit this planet. Interestingly enough, the recycling that takes place is not completely efficient, with the result that the process known as "succession" results in a somewhat different makeup based on the ecosystem's chemical composition. The serious difficulty created by human beings is that both food requirements and the demands of technological advancement are simply not recycled in such a way as to sustain even a steady-state situation indefinitely. In other words, the movement of materials is almost completely in one direction--for the temporary service of an expanding population that is increasing in number exponentially.

Third, and last, the other fundamental rule of ecology is discussed. Sooner or later competition excludes some of the competing species. Practically this means that, if two organisms are competing for an exhaustible resource (and which one isn't in a closed system?), one of the competitors will be dispensed with by its rival "either by being forced out



of the ecosystem or by being forced to use some other resource" (p. 64). Thus, there exists a basic contradiction between the economic theory that competition is supposed to maintain diversity and stability of systems, and the contrasting theory based on the ecological model described above.

By now it should be readily apparent that this issue of conflicting models and resultant (presumably correct) operative theories should have an overriding priority for inclusion somewhere, somehow, and immediately in our culture and its educational systems. We simply have to know what all this means for such cherished concepts as increasing growth, competition, capitalism, and advancing technological revolution. The merging of tenable principles of environmental science with altered societal values and norms into acceptable and high desirable social policy and accompanying educational theory and practice is an urgent challenge for all people in North America. It especially should challenge politicians and educators.

### CASES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

In this section two characteristic cases in environmental ethics will be offered for your consideration initially. One has to do with the social environment, so to speak, while the other relates to the physical or natural environment. Each case will be described briefly, but sufficiently for our purposes here. (For a case method discussion, especially if human relations are involved too, a write-up with more details might be more desirable. (See Phase Four, Chapter 9.)

Then each of the two sample cases will be analyzed by implementing the steps followed in Phases One, Two, and Three (see the brief "Introduction to Part Three" (see p. 000) and the longer explanations in Chapters 7 and 8 for possible review.

Following this, a series of 10 case situations, briefly stated, will be presented as exercises for you to carry out as you continue to work your way through Part III of this volume. At the very least, you should follow the three-step plan recommended for Phase One by determining separately on a single sheet of paper whether your proposed decision about how to proceed with a particular case situation (i.e., the basic three steps) seems reasonable to you after you have spelled it out on paper.

Finally, I hope that you will also follow through with the eight exercises with the steps recommended for Phases Two and Three. To this end you will find a sample, incomplete "law-court-format" sheet included for this purpose just before the end of the chapter. The simplest way to follow through with this aspect of the proposal would be for you to make 10 copies of this (incomplete) page format. As you do this, you may wish to enlarge the page to 125% on the copier if that is possible.

**Note:** The same plan followed here in Chapter 12 was recommended in Chapters 10 and 11 for Personal Ethics and Professional Ethics, respectively.

## Sample Case 5: Civic Responsibility

Geraldo is the sort of person that everyone likes to "have on their side." He is the proverbial tall, dark, and good-looking fellow, the type who typically makes a good hero in the movies. Actually he works as a dispatcher in a local trucking firm, having started there after he finished community college with an associate in arts degree. Along the way he was active in several sports, and more recently he has been active in a local theater company. Geraldo is a most personable fellow that everyone seems to like. He is reasonably self-centered, but also shows great interest in other people, their concerns, and the overall community itself. Because the coastal city where he lives has become so heavily industrialized, recently a number of concerns have been raised about the environment. Geraldo sympathizes with these concerns and has actually made contributions to the efforts of two different groups working to improve the situation. However, as seems to be the case quite often nowadays, the mayor and the city council appear reluctant to rein in those forces that are working to develop enterprises that will undoubtedly make the environmental situation worse. Why this is happening is a good question. Interestingly, it is fair to say that those behind the aggressive expansion taking place are strong contributors to the campaign funds of the various members of the city council when they run for re-election. All in all, a number of leading citizens are anxious to put at least one voice on the council who will argue for moderation of the onrushing expansion "in all directions." There really seems to be a dearth of good, "environmentally conscious" candidates who might run. A group that is conscious of this fact meets to discuss a possible candidate to back in the upcoming election. They decide that Geraldo would be just the person to run for one of the two open spots in the council. When asked, the idea appeals to Geraldo initially. But when he thinks about the time that would take in an already crowded existence, he can't bring himself to take the step. He reasons that there are many people much better qualified than he is who should stand for election. Geraldo needs to make a decision that he can live with too.

*Written Analysis.* This first sample case in Chapter 12 of Part III relates to what is called *social* environmental ethics here. (The second sample case involves consideration of *natural* or *physical* environmental ethics.) Of course, in this instance there is no law that says that Geraldo must run for office. He has a right to say "no" to the idea. However, using the three-step approach that we have recommended here--if **all** of the Geraldos of the world decide that they are just too busy to run for this or that elective office for one or more reasons--the future of democratic societies will soon become precarious. So we certainly don't want to see this type of rejection *universalized* (Test No. 1), so to speak. Second, the *net consequences* (Test No. 2) of qualified people typically avoiding their responsibility to serve the community in one or more ways will obviously be that this city will become a less desirable place in which to live. In fact this is exactly what is happening at the various levels but to different degrees all over the country. The best people are not necessarily running for election to the many offices that become open on a regular schedule. The final (third) step that we have recommended to help with an analysis of an ethical situation has to do with Geraldo's *intention s* (Test No. 3). Is he really too busy at this time to get involved? Does he feel that he doesn't have a duty or responsibility to get involved somehow in helping to make his community a better place? Does he know of some personality or knowledge deficiency that he has which would "disqualify" him from serving well as a member of the city council. Does he not care what happens to the environment of the city?

Table 13

**ANALYSIS NO. 5 (CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY)**  
 (For use with Steps One, Two, and Three)



Geraldo, an intelligent, conscientious, personable young man, has shown concern for the future of his community and its environment. Those concerned with the overly aggressive expansion have asked Geraldo to stand for election to the city council. He has such a busy life already that he doesn't want to take the time, but he feels a bit guilty.

If he is truly concerned about what is happening to his community and intends to remain there in the future, and there are no extenuating circumstances to prevent him from doing so, Geraldo should probably accept the offer and stand for office.

**(SINCE W)**  
**WARRANT**

**(UNLESS R)**  
**REBUTTAL OR**  
**EXCEPTION**

Applying the criterion of universality, it is obvious that if all of the "qualified Geraldos" of the world decide that they are "too busy to run," democracy, as a political movement will in time be supplanted by some other, form of government.

1. There is some good reason that would prevent him from having adequate time to campaign for office and serve if selected
2. Geraldo decides that there is some other way that he can serve his community more effectively.
3. He knows of a deficiency in his personality or knowledge that would at times prevent him from being an effective contender and ongoing public servant

**TEST NO. 1 (KANT)**  
*(consistency)*

**(ON ACCOUNT OF B)**  
**BACKING**

Democracy, as a form of government is relatively new on the political scene as compared to monarchy and

oligarchy. People all over the world want to have the freedoms that it seems to offer, not to mention its current alliance with capitalism. However, people are not typically accepting the concurrent duties and responsibilities to be involved and offer public service.

**TEST NO. 3 (ARISTOTLE)**  
*(intentions)*

**TEST NO. 2 (MILL)**  
*(net consequences)*

**Key:** Jurisprudential Argument Terms:

- D =** Data (A statement of a situation that prevails including evidence, elements, sources, samples of facts)
- Q =** Modal Qualifier (adverbs employed to qualify conclusions based on strength of warrants (e.g., necessarily, probably))
- C =** Conclusion (claim or conclusion that we wish to establish)
- W =** Warrant (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question, "How do you get there?")
- B =** Backing (categorical statements of fact that lend further support to the bridge-like warrants)
- R =** Conditions of Exception (arguments of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)

Sample Case 6.

Gordon is a successful businessman who has built a fine life for himself and his family. As he was getting established in his line of work, he met Kate who was the shipping agent for the same company. After a fairly long courtship, they married and now have three children. The oldest is a nine-year old daughter, Gail, who is an outgoing tomboy in all respects. Two boys are seven and five years, respectively. Gordon was a successful athlete in two sports during his schooldays and was also always active in both hunting and fishing dating back to his high school days. Now in his late 30s, he jogs quite regularly to stay fit. As he explains, "I really don't like jogging, but it helps keep me ready for what I really love, hunting and fishing. Kate got involved in these activities at first, but mainly to please Gordon. She and her present circle of women friends have a variety of interests, but typically play tennis in the summer and are curlers in the winter. For several reasons she also has misgivings about Gordon's involvement of their children in his favorite activities. The idea of fishing doesn't bother her very much, except that the two boys don't really know how to swim yet. But she really doesn't think they should get involved with killing birds and animals, nor does she like the idea of having guns around the house (often in drawers or unlocked cabinets). Gordon laughs about her squeamishness while arguing that a knowledge of guns and their proper usage is basic for everyone. A recent hunting trip for bear really got Kate upset. However. Gordon decided

that Gail should go along, and he would see to it that she would be absolutely safe. As it happened, the hunters finally cornered a bear that proceeded to climb a tree. So Bob brought Gail in for the kill and allowed her to take the shot that actually killed the bear. Bob's friends agree with his plan to take the bear's head and have it mounted on a plaque to hang in her room. What then happened surprised everyone; it was not the fact that the picture taken of Gail standing proudly next to the dead bear was run in the local newspaper, but that CNN picked up the story of a nine-year old girl shooting a bear. They featured it internationally for a day at the end of their 30-minute news segments. Kate was embarrassed and doesn't know what to do--and now she doesn't know what to say to her friends.

*Written Analysis.* The second sample case included here in Chapter 12 of Part III can be categorized as one in which the ethical problem relates to what I have called *natural* or *physical* environmental ethics. Generally speaking, situations similar to this one abound all over the world. Various species of fauna are being eliminated from existence on a daily basis. Do humans somehow have a right to kill these creatures in the first place just for the thrill and excitement of the hunt? Admittedly we are at the top of the food chain. Secondly, do we have a right to kill animals and birds when they are not needed for food? Hunting harkens back to the days when people killed for food, of course, but for most people in North America that phase of history is long past. So here we are in a situation where Gordon obviously wants to teach his daughter how to shoot and how to hunt--and then to have the animals mounted as trophies. Of course, so long as he (and the child?) has a license to hunt, and it is in the designated season to hunt this particular species of animal, what he is doing is legal. But he and his family should ultimately decide whether they agree that (a) these activities (i.e., hunting with guns) for "sport" should be *universalizable* (Test No. 1) and (b) that the *net consequences* (Test No. 2) of having their children involved with guns and hunting are positive and desirable either. Finally, (c) applying the test of *intentions* (Test No. 3), only Gordon (and Kate too!) are in a position to decide what the long range aims and specific objectives of such activity are in regard to their children's education and the traits which they hope to develop through the experiences they are providing for them.

(Please go to next page)

Table 14

**ANALYSIS NO. 2 (ANIMAL WELFARE/ A CHILD AS HUNTER)**  
**(With (a) the Three-Step Approach Superimposed**  
**on (b) the Jurisprudential Argument Layout)**



Gordon and Kate have three children, the oldest (Gail) is nine years old and two sons are younger. Gordon is really into hunting and fishing as hobbies along with an ample supply of guns and fishing equipment . Kate is not pleased with the idea of with the idea of the children being involved with hunting and having guns around the house. Recently Gordon took Gail along on a hunting trip and allowed her to shoot a treed bear. The mounted head is to be hung in her room.

**(SINCE W)**  
**WARRANT**

It seems cruel enough to slaughter animals, fowl, and fish daily to provide food for a population that is increasing out of control on a closed-system planet, but to do so wantonly in the name of sport is unfair (and often illegal). Also, maintaining a "gun mentality" in the home and community is questionable in a world striving for global peace.

**TEST No.1 (KANT)**

Kate should confront Gordon in regard to her feelings about the ethics of killing wild animals (and so-called game fish) for so-called sport. She should also discuss gun safety around the house and whether their children should be developing a "gun mentality" as well.

**(UNLESS R)**  
**REBUTTAL OR**  
**EXCEPTION**

1. Gordon and Kate agree on the idea that the creatures of the earth are here for humans' use since the human has been made supreme by "the Creator" to all sentient creatures on earth.
2. Gordon convinces Kate that knowledge

*consistency)*

**(ON ACCOUNT OF B)  
BACKING**

The clash of ecology & economics is continuing unchecked on a planet with finite resources. Species of animals, fowl, and fish are being eliminated forever. In addition to possibly being not ethical, it is also very impractical. The inculcation of a "gun mentality" in a world where peace and the brotherhood of humankind is desired seems to be highly undesirable.



of guns for protection is essential since the veneer of civilization may crack at any given moment.

3. Gordon & Kate agree on the need or their children to know how to hunt and fish as possible self-preservation skills when or if the occasion arises.

**TEST No.2 (MILL)**  
*net consequences)*

**Key: Jurisprudential Argument Terms:**

- D =** Data (A statement of a situation that prevails including evidence, elements, sources, samples of facts)
- Q =** Modal Qualifier (adverbs employed to qualify conclusions based on strength of warrants (e.g., necessarily, probably)
- C =** Conclusion (claim or conclusion that we wish to establish)
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- B =** Backing (categorical statements of fact that lend further support to the bridge-like warrants)
- R =** Conditions of Exception (arguments of rebuttal or exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)



## EXERCISES

Below you will find 10 case situations described briefly. In each instance, ethical decision-making seems required on the part of one or more persons involved. After you analyze each case situation, use one "format page" to present your analysis (by writing or typing it in the appropriate areas). This sample page is provided below after Case 10. Keep the following points/questions in mind as you consider each case situation:

Determine "who had a duty or responsibility to do what" in each of the case situations below. Decide whether you believe that there someone had a moral/ethical obligation to "do this" or "not to do that" in the situation concerned. As you make this assessment, it would help to consider the following questions about the actions (or inactions) of one or more of the major individuals concerned:

1. Is the action basically unfair to a person or group?
2. Does the action or decision (or inaction) impose on another's freedom?
3. Does the action hurt another person's welfare?
4. Does the action impose on an individual's privacy?
5. Does the action deny an opportunity to another person?
6. Is the action, in addition to being one of the above, also **against the law** (thus adding another dimension to the analysis)?

**Note:** In this instance (i.e., the matter of "social" or "natural" environmental ethics), the situation is a bit more complex. Initially, of course, we should keep in mind the desirable *personal* character traits to display, as well as the negative ones to avoid ( see Chapter 10). Secondly, there are the several categories of *professional* concerns such as the availability of professional services to all equally (Chapter 11). Finally, here in Chapter 12, we are bringing to the fore such particular aspects of a person's growth and development as care and concern for, as well as respect and preservation of (1) the many institutions of democratic society that has been developed (e.g., democratic elections) and (2) the physical or natural environment here and elsewhere in the world (e.g., its recycling and preservation). Expressing it somewhat differently, the *natural* environmental ethics of an (arguable) ecological morality that may be present in the universe "states" that humans ought not to degrade the environment because there is a moral ought operating that "demands" that the earth's ecosystem be preserved to the greatest extent possible (Rolston, 1975, p. 94; see also above).

With an ethical obligation, it is probably best to use the word "should" (i.e., "As her superior, Joe *should* not taken advantage of Marie when she was in such a vulnerable position").

When the obligation has been accepted as a societal norm--and has resultantly been instituted *legally* (i.e., "Joe committed a criminal offense when he assaulted Marie sexually after the office had closed for the day")--the "*should* not" ethical judgment can be further strengthened by the "*must* not" legal judgment.

Assume the role of one of the major participants in the case situation, and then make recommendations as to what should be done (ethically)--and what *must* also be done (legally) if what happened violated a societal norm *and an established law*.

Case 1. Sonya is a very bright young person whose parents emigrated to North America from eastern Europe to escape from religious persecution. After a difficult few years, her parents made a satisfactory adjustment to their new life. With language difficulties almost completely overcome, they were able to carry on here in the positions for which they had originally trained back in their homeland. Sonya in the meantime did extremely well with her studies in high school and had no difficulty obtaining a scholarship and matriculating in a fine eastern Ivy League institution. Realizing the difficulties her parents had encountered, as well as the sacrifices they had made, Sonya was determined to become a scientist and to truly make something of her life. Along the way she had developed a great interest in ecology and the conservation of the earth's resources. Additionally, she now finds that she is disturbed about the way that humans have treated and are *still today* treating both the flora and the fauna of the world. The ongoing destruction of innumerable species including the great whales bothers her greatly. The random destruction of hundreds of thousand of seal pups every year causes her true mental anguish. And now, since she has been getting increasingly involved with science courses and the accompanying research in the several fields, she realizes how animals and other little creatures were being used for all types of experimentation. She wonders how she can continue, everything considered. Now, she has even begun to have deep concerns about the morality of the slaughter of helpless, sentient animals for human consumption daily. She wonders if she should just give up the idea of becoming a research scientist and go into some other interesting field instead.

Case 2. Cecile and Normand are students registered in a liberal arts and science degree program at the university. Both are taking a course in ethics this semester in which they have been assigned to debate the topic: Resolved that society should adopt an "ecological ethic" while there is still time." Cecile is very "idealistic" in a non-philosophic sense, while the opposite may be said of Normand who has a strong business and commercial orientation. It could be argued that he, conversely, is "realistic" in a non-philosophic sense. When the day arrived for the debate, Cecile took the position that there she firmly believed that somehow there is a built-in naturalistic ethics in the universe. She stated that morality should be equated with an effort to preserve a homeostatic condition in the earth's ecosystem. We should, therefore, seek to attain and maintain such a steady state for the benefit of future generations. Thus, the maintenance of a life-supporting ecosystem is a *good* thing (i.e., a

*naturalistic* ethic) for humankind to follow. In this case the values we hold about our environment are based on more than a specific ethical approach (e.g., philosophic pragmatism). She concluded that her argument can be validated if we simply broaden our present concept of value. Conversely, Normand as her opponent in the debate, argued that it all sounded "very nice," but that such an argument simply perpetuated what many philosophers now called the "naturalistic fallacy"--e.g., what G. E. Moore reasoned shortly after the turn of the 20th century when he argued that the term "good" defies definition or analysis (i.e., no matter what is proposed as being good, the question always remains open to debate). So for many, Normand reasoned, Moore's argument killed the idea forever more that ethical terms can be defined in non-ethical, natural terms. So, if this is indeed correct, logically there can be no built-in naturalistic ethic to concern humankind as any or all of the resources are gradually used up for whatever purposes. Interestingly, this argument made Normand happy, because he wanted to get rich and not worry about somehow "despoiling" the earth along the way. On the other hand, his argument made Cecile sad, because she wanted her (planned) children, along with future generations, to enjoy earth's many bounties on into the indefinite future. The debate over, the instructor asked the class to take a vote as to who won the debate. Normand won the debate, but said later that he could see both sides of the question. How should a person decide the "right" answer to this dilemma?

Case 3. Angus was the second son in a family of five children raised on a large farm in a state that was known for its shoreline, its farmland, and its mountains and recreational forests. His family had traditionally raised potatoes in that portion of the state characterized by "people, pines, and potatoes." He had thought that he would also like to make his living off the land as a farmer too, but the price paid annually for his father's crop varied greatly. Sometimes his dad would say, "It hardly paid me to plant them this year." As Angus was growing up, he soon realized that "civilization" was gradually but steadily hurting the quality of life in his state (and in the whole region for that matter). The growth of the major cities and their suburban areas, as well as a steady increase in industrialization, were polluting the rivers and streams. The towns and villages were growing disproportionately too. "Ribbon development" extending almost the length of the entire state between the superhighway and the ocean was seasonally creating a state of traffic gridlock. Overzealous logging was steadily reducing the quantity of standing timber and creating a good deal of erosion in several large areas within the state. Acid rain from certain industries was affecting the quality of the state's many lakes, as were the many powerboats and jet skis that seemed to be increasing in number almost exponentially to the disgust of recreational fishermen. When the hunting season opened in the fall, people were saying that you needed to wear a red vest in your own backyard. Finally, snowmobiles in the winter were damaging forest areas. All in all, conditions didn't bode well for Angus's plan for the future. The only way he could see that his present "way of life" could last was if the federal, state, and municipal governments were to enact stringent legislation protecting the environment. Angus could not see this happening in time because, as he reasoned, "When ecology clashes with economics, economics wins every time!" On what basis should Angus decide what to do with his future?

Case 4. Sally is a conscientious, well-prepared physical educator/coach who has been teaching at the high school level for nine years. Daily she is confronted with the fact that, for a

variety of reasons, modern, urban, technologically advanced life in North America has created a population with a very low level of physical fitness. What makes matters so extremely unfortunate is that the large majority of the population has been lulled into a false sense of complacency by a "seared physical conscience." (Herbert Spencer said this more than a century ago!) People today are falsely complacent and simply unable to "monitor" their bodies properly and accurately. What we have created, therefore, is a ridiculous situation in which most people on this continent are overfed and poorly exercised. (One third of the population is borderline obese and worse!) Conversely, at least a fifth of the children growing up in North America are undernourished, and a multitude of people on other continents are typically underfed and often strenuously overworked. Most people need to be "rugged animals" fit to withstand the excessive wear and tear that life's informal and formal activities may demand--and they are not! All of this is being brought home daily to Sally as she strives to carry out her professional duties and responsibilities. Many students come from families that do not recognize the need for exercise and fitness. These children and youth are also not getting adequate nutrition either from a lack of knowledge or financial wherewithal on the part of their parents. People at all stages of life show evidence of a variety of *remediable* physical defects about which very little, or nothing, is done. Nevertheless, the public is unwilling to require to provide the funding needed for a sound, required physical and health education program throughout the school years for all children. On the other hand, somehow adequate funding for competitive athletics for the "gifted few" always seems to be available in the final analysis. On what basis can Sally explain the prevailing situation to her superiors?

Case 5. Tomas and Maria are both working to support their family of five and make ends meet. They feel as if it's a losing battle and that they are slipping behind. Their church asks for regular contributions. The taxes must be paid. The pile of monthly bills seems to get larger each month, and their credit-card debt is almost out of control. They are struggling to keep an old car in workable condition and to pay their monthly mortgage payments on a relatively inexpensive house. However, every day when they get home they find the mailbox full of requests for donations to one worthy cause or another. They would like to help to the best of their ability which is slight indeed. Requests for research on cancer, muscular dystrophy, birth defects, you name it, seems endless and all appear equally worthwhile. Additionally, children and adults in so many other countries on earth are desperate for assistance for nutrition and disease control. On top of all this, there are all sorts of organizations striving to protect and recycle the earth's ecosystem. Still further, small and large, declared and undeclared wars abound on the planet, and they are so wasteful of people and resources. Tomas and Maria are discouraged. They want their children to appreciate the world's need for assistance. They feel that they have an ethical responsibility to help out, but don't know how a family does this when no extra money is available? On what basis can they make a decision as to which agency to support (if any)?

Case 6. Günther loves life, or at least what he considers to be "good living." Through both a family inheritance and a successful business career as an entrepreneur, he has no financial worries. He has been married twice and has also had a number of relationships. In the final analysis, Günther sees life as being rather pointless. If we are "here today and gone tomorrow," and a person has no financial concerns, why shouldn't he do what he wants to do

when he wants to do it--especially if this approach brings pleasure! He sees no need to have children, believing that the world already has "too many mouths to feed"? The idea of involvement in politics or other types of community service bores him. Günther drinks quite heavily, but "not to excess" he stated recently. He smokes cigarettes regularly as well; his argument against quitting is that the practice brings him enjoyment, and "so what?" if he dies a year or so sooner than he would have otherwise. Günther's one good friend, Franz, chides him occasionally for his philosophy of life, but Günther's typical response is, "I want to be the master of my own fate; what's wrong with that?"

Case 7. Akio is a rising young executive in a business firm. He is married with a young family and can look forward to a fine future. His parents moved to North America from the Far East after World War II. They had been close to, but not directly involved in, the nuclear bomb explosions of that time. However, several relatives and friends had been killed, and Akio's parents had indirectly inculcated a horror of "things nuclear" to their young son born several years after their arrival in North America. Thus, when Akio, as a man with a young family, discovered that a plan had been developed to build a nuclear facility fairly close to the housing development where he owned a nice home, he became very upset. He began his protestation by writing a strong letter to legislators denouncing the idea of the plan itself, and especially its designated location. Then he helped to organize a group that was determined to block this development by all available means. One tactic planned was to stage protests and to actually (physically) impede construction even if this was deemed illegal by the authorities. Akio's wife, Nori, agreed with his involvement with the protest group, but she felt that carrying out such demonstrations would be harmful to Akio at his work and to him and the family in their community relationships. Akio believed strongly, however, that he had an ethical obligation to follow his beliefs even if unfortunately his group's plans presented possible business, community, and legal difficulties for those involved.

Case 8. Shapik likes life in North America. He especially likes the rights and freedom that a democracy offers its citizens. However, it bothers him that many people seem to be "taking advantage" of the system in various ways. He is particularly concerned about the leniency evident in dealing with criminal behavior. "They arrest them and, the next thing you know they're back on the streets again preying on innocent people," he said recently to a friend. "And if they're underage, they don't even have their names given in newspaper accounts of their misdeeds." Shapik is especially upset by the purveying and abuse of drugs. He believes that people who sell drugs are committing heinous crimes. Further, the willful, "easy" taking of another's life is a crime that really deserves the harshest punishment in his opinion. "It wouldn't bother me in the least to see some of these fiends shredded" is another favorite theme of Shapik. He deplors it when a judge sentences a murderer to "life" imprisonment, and then that individual can conceivably get a parole after 10 years. "I have no problem with the idea of capital punishment for first- or second-degree murder," Shapik believes, "if it's proven that you have taken a life premeditatively and/or willfully, then I think society should say 'Goodbye' forever to that individual."

Case 9. Armando is very interested in economic theory and plans to put his knowledge into practice in his career. He recognizes that the concept of a "global village" is really

becoming a reality, especially when it comes to international trade and commerce. Multilateral corporations now abound, and every day there are news items about new mergers of companies. All of this economic development appeals to Armando, and being interested in sport and exercise, he would like to get into some business that produces sport and exercise footwear. He understands that it's practically impossible to keep track of where the products we buy daily came from originally. Also, some parts of an item are often shipped from one country to another for assembly, and so on. Further, Armando understands that the strength of the U.S. dollar has made it difficult for U.S. companies to compete with goods produced offshore. Despite ongoing concern about trade balances between nations, many company operations have been shut down and shipped south or overseas to save costs. "This has been the only way," they say, "that we are still able to compete." The production of footwear for sport and exercise has been a multi-billion dollar affair. Whether these companies who produce "running shoes" recognize it fully or not, one serious difficulty arises for them. Their products are often being produced cheaply overseas in companies that pay starvation wages to children forced to assemble them. These children should really be in school getting an education that will prepare them for a better life in the future. As he researches the possibilities of getting involved with one of these footwear companies, Armando understands better the problems these companies are facing to remain competitive, Yet he wonders to what extent he should permit the "offshore labor" issue to cloud his judgment.

Case 10. Tom Longstaff is the chief of a native Indian tribe in the Northwest whose origins can be traced several hundred years. Many of the members of the tribe make their living by using hunting and fishing to supplement meager incomes they can make from a variety of relatively low-paying jobs. Fishing stocks have been depleted significantly in recent years and, most recently, the Federal Government has decided that the tribe members will not be able to carry out their annual whale hunt because the particular species they would hunt has become endangered. After a meeting of the band's council, it was decided that this decision would be appealed and the hunt would proceed nevertheless. The tribe will present the argument that it has a long-standing right to kill a specified number of whales each year despite the fact that this particular species of whale is facing extinction. A copy of the original agreement is still available, and there is also oral history to substantiate the arrangement. As Chief Longstaff says, "We aren't the ones who have been causing these whales to become extinct. The government should do a better job of policing those who have killed these whales in excess. We should either be permitted to carry out our annual hunt, or the government should offer us sufficient recompense instead. (See Table 15 below.)

Table 15

**SAMPLE FORM FOR USE WITH ANALYSES  
(PHASES ONE, TWO, AND THREE)**

(Name of Case: \_\_\_\_\_)



**SINCE W**  
WARRANT

**UNLESS R)**  
REBUTTAL OR  
EXCEPTION

- 1.
- 2.
3. etc.

**TEST No.1 (KANT)**  
(*consistency*)

**TEST NO. 3 (ARISTOTLE)**  
(*intentions*)

(ON ACCOUNT OF **B**)  
BACKING

**TEST No.2 (MILL)**  
(*net consequences*)

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- W = Warrant** (practical standards or canons of argument designed to provide an answer to the question, "How do you get there?")
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- R = Conditions of Exception** (arguments of rebuttal exception that tend to refute or "soften" the strength of the conclusion)

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## CHAPTER 13

### SCIENTIFIC ETHICS: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE?

Human beings have made at least recognizable progress in their ongoing relationship to the surrounding environment. However, as we enter the 21st century, it is increasingly apparent that--despite the significant lowering of tensions between the former (so-called) superpowers--there is still great insecurity in people's attempt to live together constructively and peacefully on our closed planet. I personally believe that "scientific" ethics may offer the best hope in the long range for the future of humankind throughout the world. So please allow me to say again why I believe this to be true.

This topic is vital because in 1965 Burt wrote that "The greatest danger to his future lies in the distorting emotions and destructive passions that he has not yet overcome" (p. 311). Looking ahead hopefully, he stated that humans did have a capacity for self-understanding, and this therefore offered the possibility of entering the "inclusive universe" as humans strove for freedom and self-fulfillment. As I stated above, general adoption of scientific ethics may provide the answer for humans entering the "inclusive universe."

In the mid-1970s in North America, a developing awareness of the need for the application of an ethical approach to personal and professional living became apparent from various sources. The New York Times reported on Feb. 26, 1978 that "nowadays students in many disciplines are enrolling in new ethics courses in a variety of undergraduate departments and professional schools. . . . part of the impetus for new programs stems from the social consciousness of the 1960s." This social consciousness heightened in the 1980s' decade, so that in 1986 Fox and DeMarco stated,

For little more than a decade, philosophic ethics has been faced with a relatively new challenge: to provide theoretical frameworks within which practical moral problems can be solved. This challenge has been posed from many quarters, from outside as well as within philosophy (Preface).

Keeping the above in mind, permit me to briefly review some earlier thoughts in this book briefly. The term "ethics" is employed typically in three different ways, each of which has a relation to the other, and all of which will be used here. First, it is used to classify a general pattern or "way of life" (e.g., Muslim or Christian ethics). Second, it refers to a listing of rules of conduct, or what is called a moral code (e.g., the "fair play" ethics of an athlete in a particular culture). Last, it has come to be used when describing inquiry about ways of life and rules of conduct (e.g., that subdivision of philosophy known as metaethics).

#### BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of ethics has been characterized by "irregular progress toward complete

clarification of each type of ethical judgment" (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, III, p. 82). It is obvious that changing political, economic, and other social forces of the various historical periods required the introduction of new ways of conduct--just as today people evidently believe that there is a need for the inclusion of experiences in applied ethics during this transitional period.

In considering this topic, we are confronted with the basic question: "What are humans?" How do we view human nature? Different views about human nature are what have increased the complexity of the topic at hand. A number of these views are accordingly reflected in the extant approaches to the making of ethical decisions. Stevenson (1987) has propounded seven views of human nature for us to consider:

- (1) Plato: The Rule of the Wise;
- (2) Christianity: God's Salvation;
- (3) Marx: Communist Revolution;
- (4) Freud: Psychoanalysis;
- (5) Sartre: Atheistic Existentialism;
- (6) Skinner: The Conditioning of Behavior; and
- (7) Lorenz: Innate Aggression.

Obviously, the extent to which one subscribes to one of these views of human nature, or even another extant view, will have an effect on people's ethical decision-making.

Because of changing emphases in "doing" philosophy, until very recently the field of ethics in life generally has been left to theologians, dramatists, novelists, poets, medical doctors, politicians, jurists, scientists, comedians, sport figures, and educational administrators in no special order of importance. These usually well-intentioned people offer a variety of opinions ranging from suggestions to dogma about what is good and bad, right and wrong, about all aspects of life actually.

It does indeed make sense for us to be working toward the elimination of irrational beliefs. At the same time each of us, as a presumably free individual in an evolving society, should attempt to discover the soundest possible approach to ethical decision-making. Recognizing that the task of normative inquiry can be most difficult, I felt a need to justify my own personal theory of ethics that could be applied to both personal and professional living. To me it was readily apparent that an intelligent person should be able to state correctly, elucidate sufficiently, and defend adequately his/her moral or ethical claims and arguments about participation in personal, professional, and "environmental" living.

#### A PERSON'S IMPLICIT "SENSE OF LIFE"

For better or worse, each of us within individual growth and development patterns have been conditioned by what Rand (1960) called a "psychological recorder"--i.e., the integrating mechanism of a person's subconscious. This so-called "sense of life" is, she said, "a pre-conceptual equivalent of metaphysics, an emotional, subconscious integrated appraisal of

man and existence. It sets the nature of a person's emotional response and the essence of that person's character" (p. 31). Once again, for better or worse, this child or young person is making choices, forming value judgments, experiencing emotions, and in many, many ways is acquiring an implicit view of life.

So far so good--I hope. My further hope, as a professional interested in education and philosophy, is that all young people will move on from this point to develop their rational powers. In such instances, reason can then act as the "programmer" of the individual's "emotional computer" with a possible outcome that the "program" will result in the eventual development of a reasonably logical and rational life philosophy. We certainly want to avoid at all costs an adolescent who is "integrating blindly, incongruously, and at random" (1960, p. 33). Thus conceived, the goal of education is an individual whose mind and emotions are in harmony, thereby enabling the person to develop his or her potential and achieve maximum effectiveness in life. To the greatest possible extent, we eventually want a mature person whose mind leads and whose emotions follow any such dictates in social living including regular involvement in sport and physical activity.

#### THE SELECTION OF ONE FROM AMONG SEVERAL ROUTES TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

For years I have been arguing, for example, that highly competitive sport in the United States was becoming too strong a social influence. This might not be a problem if the positive personal and societal influences emanating from participation as players, coaches, owners, spectators, and administrators were obviously clearly superior to the negative ones. Whatever your opinion on this controversial subject, no one can argue but that young people need help to make intelligent decisions in these areas affecting their lives so strongly. I have analyzed the major ethical approaches extant elsewhere in this book (see Chap. 4). You will recall that have identified them as (1) authoritarianism (legalism), (2) relativism (or antinomianism), (3) situationism (with some similarity to #1), (4) scientific ethics (pragmatism applied to ethics), (5) "good reasons" approach (the "moral point of view"), and (6) emotivism (analytic philosophy's response to ethical problems that arise).

#### EMPLOYING A PRAGMATIC SCIENTIFIC-METHOD APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

My assignment here is to explain that I have personally opted for a pragmatic, scientific-ethics approach to ethical decision-making., and then to provide an example that outline how it can work in practice. My initial premise is that we have been living in a crisis of human values during the second half of the twentieth century especially. We have traditionally turned to religion and philosophy for moral and ethical guidance, but today confidence in these fields has been diminishing for many. Conversely, many others have found that the invasion of science and technology into our lives has bestowed benefits upon us, but they question at times the "hazardous side effects" of such progress. (Witness the controversy about the possible cloning of human body parts to help those stricken with various debilitating diseases and associated problems.)

We have been told further that the twentieth century was a transitional one in which the old order is most definitely being replaced by the new as the world moves into the 21st century. But what is not generally appreciated is that the rate of change in society is gradually accelerating--and that this acceleration may well continue to increase. All of this has led me to align myself ever more strongly with the pragmatic position holding that we in the Western world must eliminate the persisting dualism that has traditionally separated investigation about the physical world from the study of human behavior in relation to moral values and virtues. I have been comforted by the fact that I am far from alone in holding this position. Rorty (1982) explained how the pragmatist holding this stance,

sees no need to worry about whether Plato or Kant was right in thinking that something "nonspatio-temporal" made moral judgments true, nor about whether the absence of such a thing means that such judgments are "merely expressions of emotion" or "merely conventional" or "merely subjective" (p. xvi).

It is my position, therefore, that society's present predicament demands more than the application of traditional philosophic or current analytic approaches to solve problems in ethical decision-making. I believe that society's typical drift and failure to employ scientific method in the realm of so-called moral goods, as well as in the realm of so-called natural goods, has kept our world in a position where changes in values have come about accidentally or arbitrarily (or with some combination of the two). Social theory has warned us in this respect for decades about the powerful controlling influences of societal values and norms.

Accordingly, what is needed is consensus on the idea that there is no inevitable, unassailable difference in kind between what we have called "human nature" and what we have identified as the "physical world." If such consensus can be achieved, we will then be able to bring the forces of science to bear increasingly and more effectively on all human behavior. Actually, John Dewey saw this need when he comprehended that the consequences of "inherited institutions and customs" should be examined with an eye to "intelligent consideration of the ways in which they are to be intentionally modified on behalf of generation of different consequences" (what a way with words he didn't have!) (1929, pp. 272-273). Dewey then went one step further with the assertion that we need a faith that (a) science can indeed bring about complete agreement on factual belief about human behavior; (b) such agreement in factual belief will soon result in agreement in attitudes held by people; and (c) resultantly, continuous adaptation of values to society's changing needs will eventually effect the directed reconstruction of all social institutions (1948, p. xxiii).

(Note: If the truth be known, I think this is exactly what has been happening in most of our ethical dilemmas in an agonizingly slow, amorphous way. However, the trouble with permitting such drift is that it often results in a dubious outcome. Eventually, keeping in mind the developments in regard to nuclear armaments and general environmental degradation, this could well mean that we earthlings

will destroy ourselves in the process!)

Interestingly, if society were to place its faith in scientific method as described immediately above, it would in no way negate the work of the analytic philosopher who subscribes to the language analysis technique within an emotivist approach. In fact, such analytic endeavor is scientific and can assist science in a vital way by dispensing with possible fallacious premises and nonsense terms resulting in more insightful, correctly stated hypotheses. However, in terms of human behavior, it is at this point that a wholly scientific approach to ethics parts company with emotivism. The problematic factual statements are not automatically referred to the social scientist by the pragmatist, as is the case with the emotivist. Indeed, the distinction between the factual statements and the value statement is not made--it is explicitly rejected!

The classic scientific method itself is brought to bear in problem-solving. Reflective thinking begets the ideas that function as tentative solutions for concrete problems of all kinds. In the process the person as a problem-solving organism is confronted with a rapidly changing culture and must be prepared therefore to make adjustments. Habitual and/or impulsive response will often not be effective--and assuredly not as effective as reflective thinking that employs both the experience of the past and the introduction of creative ideas.

As explained by Albert and others, the criterion of truth is directly related to the outcome of the reflective process. Those ideas which are successful in resolving problematic situations are true, whereas those which do not lead to satisfactory adjustments are false. Truth is relative rather than absolute, changing rather than eternal. In science, ideas function as tentative solutions for concrete problems--i.e., as hypotheses, which must be tested by experiment (1975, p. 282).

What has just been described is, of course, basically a pragmatic idea of knowledge and truth, one that was made available to us by modern scientific development (after Darwin's evolutionary theory). Truth is to be tested (a) by its correspondence with reality and (b) by its practical results. This treatment of knowledge lies between the extremes of reason and sense perception and--in keeping with analytic philosophy's verifiability theory of meaning--revolves about those conditions under which a statement does have meaning, and just what specific meaning in the light of such conditions. Thus, if a proposition truly does have meaning, it must make some difference in people's lives. Viewed in this manner, we can appreciate what James called the "cash value" of an idea--the import that certain knowledge, having served people as an "instrument for verification," has for the fulfillment of human purpose.

The human mind, viewed within the context of pragmatism, is a social phenomenon that "expands" when meaning interactions occur between organisms because of their identification with each other. In this way the individual's mind serves to form knowledge (or truth) because of the experiences with which it is involved. Such a mind must be adaptable because it encounters novelty in the process of living. The human's relationship with the world is a precarious one within this context. Mind "is an abstraction derived from the concreta of intelligent behavior" (Kaplan, 1961, p. 26). Through a gradual evolution, the

human mind has become that part of the whole of a person that enables the man or woman to cope with the surrounding world. Through experience, therefore, the many problems we encounter have been, are, and will be solved; it's an ever-changing world.

Putting this in present context, we encounter various ethical problems in our lives today. Some are problems of a highly personal nature, while others have more of an interpersonal orientation. Other ethical problems that arise are more professional in nature because they relate to our chosen professions. We may not even recognize that some of these problems or issues are indeed ethical in nature. Typically, we seem to be resolving any such issue or problem encountered on the basis of (a) authoritarianism, (b) relativism, or (c) perhaps on the basis of what might be called "common sense, cultural utilitarianism." How much better would (could?) it be, however, if we would avail ourselves of the opportunity to expand the mind's potential through the employment of scientific, experimental method to help devise the best solutions for problems of human behavior that arise regularly?

#### APPLICATION OF A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO THE PROFESSIONAL/SEMI-PROFESSIONAL/AMATEUR CONTROVERSY IN COMPETITIVE SPORT

The following is a brief outline of the steps involved in the application of a pragmatic approach to one persistent problem in competitive sport--the Professional-Semiprofessional-Amateur Controversy. (Space does not permit a detailed review of a more complete analysis carried out by the author; see Zeigler, 1978, pp. 35-42.) The steps to be followed are fully characteristic of an experimental problem-solving situation.

1. The smoothness of life's movement or flow is interrupted by an obstacle. This obstacle creates a problem, and the resultant tension must be resolved to allow further movement (progress?) to take place.

(Note: In this case the underlying problem is that the concepts of "work" and "play" have traditionally been strongly dichotomized in North America, and their typical usage is imprecise and muddled. Nowhere is the confusion more evident than when we are discussing to what extent this nomenclature [i.e., work and play] may be applied when referring to the various levels of sport participation. This accentuates what may be called the "Professional-Semiprofessional-Amateur Controversy," a problem that has been with humankind since ancient times.)

2. Humankind marshals all available, pertinent facts to help with the solution of the problem. Data gathered tends to fall in one or more patterns; subsequent analysis offers the possibility of various alternatives for action--one of which

should be chosen as a working hypothesis.

**(Note:** The terms indicated above were **first** (1) defined carefully initially and then placed in what was called a traditional play-work definitional diagram as applied to sport and athletics. Differentiation was made among synthetic, analytic, and pseudo-statements. Then **second** (2) the status, along with brief historical data, of sport/athletics in North America was reviewed [with primary attention to the university level]. Finally, **third** (3) the possible relationship among the prevailing, pivotal social forces [e.g., economics, nationalism] and the status of sport was discussed. The differences in the interpretation of various concepts in the three leading types of political states [i.e., democratic, communistic, monarchic] were explained. It was explained further why and how the terms "work" and "play" have become so sharply dichotomized. **Also**, the evident necessity for re-evaluation of some of our basic assumptions about the outmoded amateur code in sport was discussed. It was pointed out as well that the professional in sport today is largely being professional in only a limited sense of the word [i.e., concern for money]. Typically, there is no lifetime commitment to serve society through various contributions to one sport in particular, and to all sports in general. The argument was made further that the amateur should be regarded as the beginner--not as the modern Olympic performer who during the 20th century somehow refrained from taking cash on the spot for his performance [but who received substantive support later].)

Next, as a result of the investigation described above, one working hypothesis among the various courses of action open on the basis of the type of political state operating in North America was selected for experimentation. A taxonomy was devised and is recommended below for consideration and implementation. In this model the concepts of "work" and "play" as aspects of a person's "active occupation" are altered so as not to present any insurmountable difficulties in evolving democracies. This taxonomy is titled "Aspects of a Person's Active Occupation," with play, art, and work [as defined by Dewey] included as the three appropriate aspects. These terms were interrelated from the standpoint of a concept of the "unified organism." (See Table 16 below.)

**Table 16**

**Aspects of a Person's "Active Occupation"**

(1. Play ----- 2. Art ----- 3. Work)

	<b>LEVEL I</b>	<b>LEVEL II</b>	<b>LEVEL III</b>
<b>Goals Continuum</b>	<b>Short Range</b>	<b>Middle Range</b>	<b>Long Range</b>
<b>Categories of Interest</b>	<b>THE UNIFIED ORGANISM</b>	<b>1. Physical education-recreation interests</b> <b>2. Social education-recreation interests</b> <b>3. Learning education-recreation interests</b> <b>4. Aesthetic education-recreation interests</b> <b>5. Communicative educ.-recreation interests</b>	
<b>Amateur-Professional Continuum</b>	<b>Amateur</b>	<b>Semiprofessional</b>	<b>Professional</b>
<b>Freedom-Constraint Continuum</b>	<b>Freedom</b>	<b>Limited Freedom</b>	<b>Constraint (No Freedom)</b>

3. Obviously, a working hypothesis must be tested to see if the present problem/issue may be solved through the application of the particular hypothesis selected for experimentation. If, after a trial for a reasonable period of time, this hypothesis doesn't seem to be solving the problem, another alternative hypothesis should be tried. An hypothesis that proves to be acceptable provides new information, and thereby becomes true in the sense that it offers a frame of reference for the organizing of facts. Subsequently, this results in a central meaning that may then be called knowledge.

4. Determination of knowledge based on agreement in factual belief that is communicated to citizens in evolving democracies should soon result in



agreement in attitude. Admittedly, social progress in any given area of endeavor is never a "straight-line affair," but continuous adaptation of values to the culture's changing needs will in time effect the directed reconstruction of all social institutions.

It is at this point that pragmatic (experimentalistic) theory of knowledge merges with the value theory of scientific ethics. This can be so inasmuch as such knowledge acquired frees humans to initiate subsequent action furthering the process of movement and change on into the indefinite future (as adapted from Zeigler, 2003, pp. 256-264).

I believe there is logic in a bona fide progression--if the person wishes to progress and is sufficiently capable--through the ranks of the amateur athlete to that of the semiprofessional, and finally to that of the highly trained, proficient athletic performer--a professional (in all the best senses of this term, we hope). Based on the model described above (Table 16), if a boy plays baseball after school, his goals are short range and therefore conceived as "play." If he continues with his interest in high school and university, and were to receive an athletic scholarship to attend university, play might soon take on many of the aspects of work. Further, when this young man (or a woman in one of a number of sports) goes away to university on a baseball scholarship, he may then be considered semiprofessional (a semipro). This would be so (a) because of the time being spent, (b) because of the middle range goals attendant to his athletic activity, (c) because of the level of performance he has achieved, and (d) because he is being paid for performing the baseball skills he has mastered. If the young man is then chosen in a draft by the major leagues, he will be forced to make a decision at Level II (Figure 1), the Goals Continuum, and also at the Level III continuum about moving from the Semiprofessional stage to the Professional stage. If the athlete succeeds at this point, he has moved to status as a Professional so long as he continues to maintain a high level of performance.

## CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Although it has undoubtedly been said many times before, these do appear to be truly unusual times. A world transformation is occurring, and such change is coming about rapidly because the tempo of civilization appears to be increasing exponentially. We are told that behavioral science, along with natural science, is leading humans to believe that many of their problems are as much structural as they are ideological. In other words, disregarding whether a political or social solution is to "the right" or "the left," we need to move forward to improve the world situation for our descendants. It is this type of reasoning that has rekindled my interest in the abolition of the long-standing distinction between what have been called moral goods and natural goods.

We are exhorted further to prepare for a continuing technological thrust. This means that we will necessarily have to recognize changing values with their accompanying language concomitants. In a way we are searching for an ethic in a new culture that has not yet arrived!

All of these changes are having their inevitable effect on competitive sport (as one example of a changing social institution). As the reader reflects on the example provided here to discuss the viability of a pragmatic, scientific-ethics approach that might assist with the problem in professional, semiprofessional, and amateur sport we are facing, think about how ridiculous the selection process in connection with the assembly of the men's Olympic basketball team of the United States became when amateurism "went out the window." And so I say, "Avery Brundage, stop spinning in your grave; there is nothing you can do about the fact that the United States team is being made up of basketball players who have all become millionaires in their own right because of their athletic talent."

But is this development so wrong or evil? Not necessarily, but I believe it is wrong at this moment because we have drifted into it with inadequate rationalization. The U.S.A. lost the gold medal in 1988, and then was determined to win it back in Barcelona in 1992. The team did win and the "flood gates" has been open to confirmed professionals ever since. The United States Olympic Committee has certified the selection process for squad members, and the International Olympic Committee permits all national committees to make such decisions about eligibility. However, we could have prevented this farce. Indeed, we might have been able to rationalize this situation adequately and properly with sufficient advance planning and solicitation of world approval for this transition to out-and-out professionalism in Olympic sport.

In conclusion, my general conclusion is that the pragmatic, scientific-ethics approach, embodying also careful application of language analysis at all appropriate points, offers the best and ultimately the most humane approach to the many problematic issues our culture is now facing. We cannot escape the evidence that new, continually changing values are transforming our culture. Whether we are facing ethical decisions in our home life, our professional endeavor, or in our competitive sport and other recreational pursuits, this approach offers humankind not a philosophy of life, but an explicit approach to applied philosophical understanding--a philosophy for the living of life today and tomorrow.

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## CHAPTER 14

### "TAKING IT FROM HERE"

Despite the frequent tricks played on us by Mother Nature, humankind has won a recognizable semblance of victory over what is often a harsh physical environment. Yet, any reasonably intelligent person in society today realizes that people have not yet been able to remove much of the *social* insecurity present in our lives as we seek to live together peacefully and constructively.

In an effort to help you and me, many philosophers and theologians have searched down through the ages for a normative ethical system that espouses a moral base upon which people could and should base their conduct. However, today as we get started in the new millennium, there is still no non-controversial foundation on which the entire structure of ethics can be built. Perhaps there never will be.

In considering humankind's basic problems, the philosopher, E. A. Burtt, believed that the greatest danger to our future "lies in the disturbing emotions and destructive passions that he [man, primarily] has not yet overcome; the greatest promise lies in his capacity for a sensitive understanding of himself and his human fellows."

So, if our "distorting emotions and destructive passions" do indeed represent the greatest danger to the future, the application of a sound ethical approach to personal and professional living can be of vital assistance to people who are truly seeking a "sensitive understanding" of themselves and their associates.

However, as life becomes ever more complex in the 21st century, there are at least six major ethical routes to decision-making extant in what we call the Western world. Everything considered, it can be argued that the available "ethical smorgasbord" confronting humankind is in sad shape. Nevertheless, daily problems related to ethics and human values abound, problems that should somehow be resolved through sound ethical decision-making.

Further, the present way in which a young person initially learns how to make rational ethical decisions in North American society is also inadequate. (See Preamble.) A child and young person typically acquires such competency--or lack of it--implicitly through everyday experiences, including what direct guidance his/her elders may offer.

This laissez-faire approach is simply insufficient as the young person develops reasoning powers. We are faced, therefore, with a situation where we should be helping young people to learn *explicitly* how to develop their own conscious convictions in which the mind leads and the emotions follow to the greatest possible extent.

In the past, moral philosophers offered general guidance as to what to do, what to seek, and how to treat others--injunctions that we should understand even today. As a rule, however, philosophers have not tried to preach to their adherents in the same way that theologians have

felt constrained to do. These earlier moral philosophers did, however, offer practical advice that included a great variety of pronouncements on what was good and bad, or right and wrong. For example, the terms right and wrong apply only to *acts*, but the terms good and bad refer to (a) the *effects* of acts; (b) the *motives* which caused the act; (c) the *intention* of the person carrying out the act; and (d) the person who is the *agent* of a particular act.

Thus, we might say correctly that "although Smith is a *good* person, he acted *wrongly*--yet with *good* motives and intentions--when he punched Jones and broke his jaw. The consequences were *bad*, even though Jones had made some threatening gestures at Smith's smaller brother."

In retrospect we now appreciate that values, morals, and ethical standards underwent an identity crisis in the 1960s, and the pendulum has been swinging back and forth quite violently ever since. Also, 20th-century academic philosophers in North America largely turned their attention to so-called analytic philosophy with its detailed attention to language and related conceptual analysis.

As a result, insight into the human values and morality struggle has devolved to a small group of philosophers, and a much larger group of theologians, politicians, playwrights, comedians, and others. And yet no one can deny the great importance of ethics and human values. Nor can the belief be refuted that the question of personal and professional ethics is indeed on many people's front burner and has really been in a continuing state of flux in the last half of the past century. The subject is actually so important that it truly demands careful monitoring at all times.

## A FINAL "PLAYBACK"

So what is one to do in what appears to be a "rudderless" world? For one reasonable answer that can be used by most people in a civilized society as a basis for elementary decision-making, a person could well consider this "*trivium*" or "*three-step*" approach recommended by ethicist Dick Fox of Cleveland State University to his undergraduate students. (The word *trivium* has been coined from the Latin meaning three roads converging into one--one ethical solution in this case.)

Proceeding, then, on the assumption that a reasonably intelligent person should be able to work out rationally what right and wrong ethical behavior is, I am recommending this basic trivium (i.e. three-step) approach for your use as experience is being gained. This progression from the thought of (earlier philosophers) Kant and Mill to that of Aristotle (an ancient philosopher) is a "vigorous step in the right direction!" As you have seen, it consists of the application of three "tests" (phrased as **questions**) to be applied when one wishes to analyze an ethical problem or dilemma prior to making a decision as to which course to follow. These tests are called: (a) the test of consistency, or universalizability; (b) the test of consequences; and (c) the test of intentions.

Immanuel Kant's test of universalizability (or consistency), Step No. 1, is based on the idea that one should "act only on that maxim which one can will to be a universal law." So, despite some inherent weaknesses, I am nevertheless recommending that your first question to yourself when considering a specific response or action in regard to an ethical problem confronting you should be: **"Is it possible or desirable to universalize this action to all people on earth?"**

John Stuart Mill's test of consequences, Step No. 2, has been taken from the heritage of philosophic utilitarianism. Its base is the maxim "Act so as to bring the greatest good possible." So, invoking the test of consequences involves asking **what the total effect of a planned action would be**. Further, the decision-maker should be concerned *with the promotion of the maximum amount of net, not gross, happiness*. At the same time, such thoughts as whether the planned action is fair, just, beneficent, and permits autonomy on the part of any other people concerned. At first glance applying this second test seems quite simple compared to the first test of universalizability (or consistency). But affairs are never as simple as they seem at first glance.

Aristotle's test of intentions, Step No. 3, is the third and final step to be applied in the trivium recommended by Professor Fox. For this advice we turn to the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, who asked in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, **"What were the conditions under which the act was performed?"** Virtue, as defined by Aristotle, "is concerned with emotion and action, and emotions and actions that are *voluntary* are objects for praise or blame, while those that are *involuntary* are objects for pardon and sometimes for pity." So, depending on whether we are adjudging whether a person's actions were voluntary or involuntary, we may decide whether a person's questionable action is actually pardonable because it was carried

out under compulsion or from ignorance, or whatever.

A very practical example employing these three tests to determine whether a person's action are good or bad, beneficial or evil, might be a situation where a person has committed a crime (e.g., murder). First, considering Test No. 1, we certainly would not wish to see such an act universalized and carried out against *all* people on earth. Second, using Test No. 2, this particular act (murder) obviously had most serious consequences and did not contribute to the greatest (net) good or happiness of anyone (in fact, the *opposite* was the case). Thus, employing Test No. 3, if we wish to judge this seemingly heinous crime as good, bad, or neutral, we need to know under what conditions the act was carried out. A law court definitely takes the results of Test No. 3 into consideration when rendering a judgment.

So there it is **one more time**, admittedly "played back" in a most elementary fashion in the limited space available here at the end of this book. However, what is being recommended here is offered as a good starting point in basic decision-making. I urge you to try it out the next time you face an individual or social problem where you are confronted in your own life with the need for sound ethical decision-making.

## HOW WE MIGHT IMPROVE THE PLANET

Although we may all wish that peace, happiness, harmony, and well-being could prevail globally, such has not yet happened. Thus, one is inclined to hope that all of the clashing religious opinions and beliefs based on hoary tradition would silently go away. Then maybe prevailing world conditions would somehow improve. But this is wishful thinking unless improved institutions are created to take their place and make the entire world a better place in which to live.

By titling this section of the final chapter "How We Might Improve the Planet," I hope to convey the thought that it will only be through **POSITIVE MELIORISM**, philosophically speaking, that we humans will be able to do something to improve the prevailing disturbing, highly perplexing, and frustrating plight of the world as it moves to the now (so tritely named) **GLOBAL VILLAGE**.

Implementing what is known as philosophical meliorism means simply that men and women working together in a spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood must work positively, not negatively, to make this "global ball game" live up to the letter and spirit of the rules that are established by the United Nations and affiliated organizations. (As a former coach, I just had to throw in that 'sportspeak' terminology.)

In the absence of a sign from on high, we simply must--**BY OURSELVES**--dredge up the apocalypse (or unveiling) of the ethical core present in all world religions pointing to "a fuller understanding of the oneness of humankind." This we had better do very, very soon; in fact we need to do this by devising institutions that improve on these present outdated relics of ethical systems passed down to us from ancient religions.

I say this because I am inclined to believe that the achievement for "good" of many of these theistic and/or spiritualistic approaches may soon be exceeded by their negative "bads" as their promulgators parry and thrust repeatedly at their presumed archenemies and protagonists. (Speak to Mr. Rushdie and the many other religious and political outcasts around the world on this topic.)

So what I have offered here is not "yet another contemporary version of the now endlessly repeated moral counsels of despair," As I see it, positive meliorism (or working collectively to improve life) on the part of people of goodwill all over the world is the only way of salvation offered to us fallible humans. I believe deeply that this is so in the absence of reasonable evidence that there is indeed a "Messianic vision" at the core of the 13 more or less established world religions.

How did I arrive at this position as my personal response to the persistent or perennial problems faced by humankind (i.e., war, famine, death, and pestilence)? As a young person, I soon realized the inherent limitations of a religious faith to which I was almost automatically bound by reason of birth. Instead of having some conception of theism of dubious historical origin foisted upon him or her in youth, my contention is that each person should work this philosophic/religious problem out for himself or herself through careful reflection while growing to maturity. I believe that an individual's solution about such matters would of necessity then have a deeper, more meaningful influence on his or her subsequent development as a socially oriented person and as a professional or tradesperson in an increasing complex and changing social environment.

Having been raised in a largely Judeo-Christian culture carried along by onrushing science and technology, I could not help but challenge what I perceived to be the inherent weaknesses of blind faith presented by fallible humans masking (literally) in the robes of some organized religion or other as it (they!) sought to gain credibility and influence. So I soon came to accept a broader definition of religion, one conceived as "the pursuit of that which an educated and presumably enlightened person regards as most worthy and important in life." What I found to be most worthy was the advancement of knowledge for the betterment of humankind along with related teaching and professional service. This to me truly represented a personal challenge, and I reasoned that what I came up with should be fully worthy of a person's complete devotion.

Moreover, our culture has now become increasingly multi-ethnic and is resultantly characterized by the faiths and religious positions of all of these migrating peoples. This situation has indeed created a highly confusing ethical "miasma," a situation where the thoughts of politicians and the jibes of comedians seemed to be taking over on the subject of human values.

In the process, the wisdom I thought I had learned from philosophers in my earlier days is not being received with anywhere nearly the same authority as previously. Philosophers, largely because of their 20th-century adoption of a truncated approach to their task--i.e., the analytic movement--very rarely spoke to the larger questions of life and living any more.



Additionally, I do respect the personal religious stances taken by many, but one soon comprehends that no one of the approximately 13 historical faiths has a corner on the market of religious truth.

Fortunately, however, there is a large amount of room for agreement among people of good will regardless of which faith or creed to which they subscribe. This would also be true for those who have never been involved, or are no longer involved, with some organized form of belief.

For example, I felt that we could agree that the cosmos as we know it is evolving or developing in time. It was obvious to me, also, that the mystery of this universe has already become a highly effective source of awe and reverence for many humans. Additionally, I could see as a developing young person that our growing knowledge of this vast cosmos was becoming increasingly valuable in helping us to guide our lives in an improved manner. Further, although some would debate this point, there is evidence of a type of progress through both inorganic and biological evolution.

Naively I had supposed that the world situation would improve markedly in my lifetime. Well, it has, and it hasn't. Fortunately, humankind is now beginning to realize that it has certain powers and responsibilities for the continuation of this evolution. We are gradually understanding further that the practical application of universal brotherhood, undivided by nation, race, or creed, is vital if we wish to continue to survive. Whether we can progress as we hope to do in human affairs is a further question.

The world is beginning to understand further that a form of democratic process in human relations provides the best opportunity for a person to develop to the maximum of his or her potentialities. Additionally, we are also steadily increasing worldwide awareness that the development of any one person shall not be at the expense of the group or society at large.

As defined above, I believe that philosophic/religious growth should be basic to all human life. It is an attitude of mind and "spirit" which should permeate all aspects of human endeavor. It is challenging to us that life as we know it in this universe appears to be characterized by creativity. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the purpose of religion is to assist with the integration of all of a person's behavior with this presumed creativity within the universe. If religion is defined broadly, we may state that a critical and developing reason is a powerful aid in the search for a logically valid religious position.

I find that I want each individual to be free to seek philosophic/religious "truth" unhampered by *official* creed or outdated religious dogmas. Therefore, I strongly believe that young people in public schools and higher education should have an opportunity to study all of the world's great religions *comparatively*. In this way they will remain receptive to religious truth wherever it may be found.

I argue further that most if not all aspects of life are (potentially) accessible to scientific study, and this fact may be of enormous significance in the centuries that lie ahead. As the

body of scientific knowledge grows, this will help to develop attitudes (psychologically speaking) that could lead to enlightened social action. Ultimately, to me this is a much truer criterion of the religious quality of a person's life than any religious ideas which are dutifully, but often perfunctorily, professed as part of a Saturday or Sunday ritual.

As I see it, also, it is axiomatic that the church and the state should remain separate. Nevertheless, I do understand that it is most important for members of any religious group--acting as *individuals*--to take responsibility for positive social action. All enlightened citizens should be involved in the political process at some level.

This leads me finally to the conclusion that the hoary religious "truths" of the past are truly devoid of meaning for people facing the world of the 21st century. Humanities scholars may believe that the "utopian speculation of the human imagination which constitutes the core of the liberal arts" is indeed a "moral counsel of despair" unless we all have "an encounter with a reality larger than the one we ourselves invent" If they can have "encounter" such as this, I am glad for them, and I respect their position. However, I am finding that the Pennsylvania "Dutch" motto is creeping up on me fast. I am growing "too soon oldt und too late schmart."

#### A RIDDLE FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD: HOW TO LEAD A GOOD LIFE AND SURVIVE

More than a quarter of a century ago the author sought to look into the future and make some recommendations and suggestions to help people cope with a serious problem that recreation professionals and many others felt would soon exist in the "coming age of leisure" (Zeigler, 1967). As is the case so often, prophecies and projections are interesting, but they rarely come to pass as predicted.

The basic premise of the 1967 argument based on the prognostication of Michael (1962) was that certain basic assumptions about ongoing social living would continue to prevail (e.g., the weapons systems industries would continue to support a major share of the economy). However, the prediction that the average person in North America would be working fewer hours per week, and would therefore be available to "enjoy life through creative recreational participation," has not come to pass. (Here it may be stated wryly that today, 35 years later, many unemployed and homeless people do seem to have more time on their hands.)

Nevertheless, it is true that municipal and private-agency recreation has received continuing financial support from the increasingly burdened taxpayer. However, the concept of the traditional family structure has been strongly challenged by a variety of social forces (e.g., economics, divorce rate); many single people are finding that they must work longer hours; and families need more than one breadwinner just to make ends meet. Also, the idea of a surplus economy vanished, temporarily it is hoped, in the presence of ever-present annual deficits.

Additionally, many of the same problems of megalopolis living described in 1967 still prevail (e.g., significant crime rates, transportation jams, overcrowded schools). Interestingly, however, and despite all of our current problems, we can take pride in the fact that North America ranks among the best places on earth to live. Nevertheless, we can't escape the fact that the work week is not getting shorter and shorter, and that Michaels' prediction about four different types of leisure class still seems a distant dream for the large majority of people.

Further, as North Americans functioning in a world that is undoubtedly becoming a "Global Village," need to think more seriously than ever before about the character and traits for which we should ever more diligently educate our people. We can only lead the proverbial good life if children and young people develop the right attitudes (psychologically speaking) toward education, work, use of leisure, participation in government, and the various types of consumption. Make no mistake about it: Education for the creative and constructive use of leisure, as a part of general education, should have a unique role to play today *and* tomorrow.

We knew in 1967 that the world was changing; we just didn't know how much it would change by the end of the century--and how rapidly such change would occur! This means that our task today as enlightened citizens is still to help people of all ages to learn that the objectives for which all of our professions and trades stand can help them "live the good life," the best possible one available. People will need to search individually for this elusive goal. They will also need to strive collectively--*working together as EQUAL partners*--to maintain North America's place as a truly fine place to live, to work, and to strive for "the good life." There can be no other way as we search for the unity and "the good life" that we hope that all people on earth may find some day.

## GLOSSARY

(**Note:** This glossary contains those philosophic terms and definitions that have been adapted and repeated here from descriptions and definitions that appear in the several bibliographies that appeared in earlier volumes by the author. A number of these terms have been adapted as well from other philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias. This is not an all-inclusive glossary, because certain terms employed purely in *formal* logic have been purposely omitted.)

**A:** An abbreviation for a positive universal proposition.

*Absolute:* The term used to denote that which is final and complete within itself; it is frequently used as another term for God.

*absolutism:* The doctrine that fundamental reality is fixed and unchanging; it refers also to the existence of power that is unconditional.

*abstract:* A term that has no application to a particular, concrete object.

*absurd:* A term often used in relation to an outlook on life in philosophic existentialism (i.e., life if basically lacking in coherence and reasonableness).

*accident, fallacy of:* A fallacy where a generalization is applied to a case to which it does not relate.

*ad baculum fallacy:* An argument in which force is threatened to get its conclusion accepted.

*ad hominem fallacy (argument against the person fallacy):* A fallacy created when an argument is directed to (or appeals to) the person's prejudices or convictions rather than the issue at hand.

*ad ignoratum fallacy:* An argument asserting that a proposition is true simply because it has *not* been shown to be false.

*ad misericordiam fallacy:* An argument that appeals to one's pity to get a conclusion accepted.

*ad populum fallacy:* An argument that appeals to the commonly accepted beliefs of the crowd.

*ad vericundiam fallacy:* An argument in which an authority is appealed to on subjects in which the person is *not* an authority.

*aesthetics:* The subdivision of that branch of philosophy known as axiology (theory of value), which treats the essential character of the beautiful.

*affirming the consequent fallacy:* An argument proceeding from the truth of a hypothetical statement and the truth of the consequent to the truth of the antecedent. (If p then q, also q; therefore p; see *denying the antecedent fallacy* below.)

**agape:** God's love (or Christian love) is an absolute norm; so what is fitting in any problematic situation is based on the application of agapeic love.

**agnosticism:** The belief that knowledge of the ultimate origin of the universe is impossible.

**altruism:** The belief that a person is best fulfilled on earth by devoting himself or herself to the best interests of others.

**ambiguity (amphiboly), fallacy of:** A fallacy where the meaning of a word used more than once in an argument is changed more or less from the first meaning expressed.

**analysis:** In philosophy, a procedure whereby an effort is made to come to some conclusions and to solve problems by reflective thought involving resolution to fundamental issues or parts.

**analysis, philosophical:** In philosophy, a development that began early in the 20th century to "join the battle" with the ethical objectivists and the ethical subjectivists by questioning the very nature of the activity in which he/she was engaged. This has also been called *the analytic movement* or *analytic philosophy*.)

**animism:** The belief that all living things have souls; in some instances plants and stones, etc., are said to contain souls existing in a separate state.

**antecedent:** A proposition **A** is the antecedent in a conditional proposition having the form: *If A then B*.

**anthropomorphism:** The conception of God as a Being possessing human qualities.

**antinomianism:** An approach to ethics the underlying proposition of which is that good and bad, and rightness and wrongness, are relative and vary according to the situation or culture involved.

**a posteriori:** A type of reasoning that arrives at principles by generalizing from facts; hence, this describes knowledge that is derived through a person's sense experience.

**appeal to emotions fallacy:** An argument in which people are convinced of its rightness because they truly want to believe that the argument is true.

**a priori reasoning:** A type of reasoning that asserts certain self-evident principles initially and then makes subsequent deductions independent of experience.

**a priori statement:** A statement of truth or fact the justification of which is independent of empirical observation or scientific experimentation.

**argument:** One or more statements made by a person to provide a rationale for the acceptance of another statement. In a sound argument acceptable premises are properly related to the conclusion. An *indirect argument* is one where a proposition (**P**) is proved by demonstrating that if its opposite (not-**P**) is not true, the

proposition (**P**) is true. An *inconsistent argument* is one where no interpretation of the set of premises would result in them being considered true.

*argument from authority fallacy*: An argument where the person arguing expects the listener to accept a premise simply because the person quoted is in favor of the conclusion being drawn.

*assumption*: An unexamined proposition accepted as true prior to consideration of the proposition at hand.

*asceticism*: A practice of self-denial by means of which an individual hopes to discipline himself or herself in order to reach higher spiritual levels.

*atheism*: Disbelief in a God or supreme power underlying the cosmos.

*atomism*: An early theory that nature is composed of minute, indivisible, and indestructible particles. *Logical atomists* sought to rearrange our ambiguous language so that more logically arranged sentences would become very clear.

*authoritarianism*: The theory that advocates obedience to indisputable authority, such as the Church or the State, which certifies basic knowledge and/or principles to people. In ethics it is an approach presupposing that absolute good and rightness are either present in the world, or have been determined by custom, law, or code.

(See *legalism*, also.)

*authority*: A person proposed as being qualified to speak on a subject or topic.

*autonomy in applied ethics*. If a person is autonomous, speaking ethically, he or she has the capacity to make decisions that indicate the capacity to be self-determining in all respects concerning actions in life.

*axiological ethics*: That aspects of ethics that treats values specifically.

*axiology*: The branch of philosophy that treats the general theory, nature, and kinds of value.

*axiom*: In logic, an axiom is a statement of a self-evident truth that has universal recognition. In formal logic, an initial line assumed in a deductive system.

*basic belief*: A belief held with no supporting reasons; contrast with *derived belief* below.

*begging the question, fallacy of*: An argument that assumes as part of the premises the conclusion that is supposed to be proved. Also known as *circular reasoning*.

*beauty*: A term used to describe one or more characteristics in a person or thing that gives pleasure and appeal to the esthetic sense of the beholder.

*behaviorism*: The doctrine that generalizations about human behavior

should be based completely on observation of external behavior.

***benevolence***: A quality possessed by a person who desires to work for the common good. People who are benevolent may be said to be kind and generous. Such an emotional connotation differentiates the term somewhat from that of the term justice where reason should prevail in a consideration of the welfare of others.

***bioethics***: The study of the morality of scientific advancements in the biological sciences.

***business ethics***: One aspect of applied ethics that considers the morality of the theory and practice of business affairs at all levels.

***care, ethics of***: A movement within applied ethics in which those concerned reflect about past neglect and lack of present concern with the lack of sympathy for the sorry plight of others in the world.

***categorical imperative***: A term used by Kant to describe the nature of moral law as he interpreted it; people should act in such ways as their reason indicates in order to arrive at universal laws of conduct.

***categorical statement***: A statement affirming that a certain relation does, or does not, hold between two classes, collections, or sets.

***categorical syllogism***: An argument involving deduction in which a sequence of three, *and only three*, categorical statements appear sequentially; each term must appear in exactly two statements.

***categories mistake fallacy***: A fallacy in which an issue is confused by using a term from one category as if it belonged in another category.

***category***: The arrangement and classification into a system of the objects of knowledge and thought; hence, a category becomes a fundamental concept or principle.

***causation***: Those positive and/or negative conditions that produce an effect or event.

***chain argument***: A serial argument employing conditional propositions as premises, the *consequent* of each premise necessarily agrees with the *antecedent* of the next premise. Also known as *hypothetical syllogism*.

***circular reasoning***: See *begging the question, fallacy of* above.

***class***: A set of things designated by the same name or title and/or having a common property.

***code letters***: The symbols, **A, E, I, and O**, employed to indicate the four types of subject-predicate propositions.

***complex question fallacy***: A fallacy that occurs when a question is asked in such a way that it assumes an answer to a further question--and that assumption does not hold.

***composition, fallacy of***: A fallacy in which what is true of a part is

therefore asserted to be true of the whole.

*concept*: A mental image of a unifying nature that is formed by generalizing from particulars.

*conclusion*: A statement presumably established as true on the basis of certain other conditional statements included in an argument.

*confusing relations with things or qualities fallacy*: An argument in which a quality is fallaciously identified with a relation within the argument.

*consistent*: An argument where a complete set of statements has at least one interpretation that makes each statement appear to be true.

*content*: The essence of the intent of the ordered elements within the form of an argument.

*context*: The surrounding circumstances that necessarily accompany an argument.

*contextual meaning*: In contradistinction to a word's dictionary meaning, this is the word's meaning in a particular context.

*contingent statement*: A statement the validity of which must ultimately be determined by empirical investigation and not just its logical form.

*contradictory statement*: A statement that because of its logical form is always false.

*converse*: As used with syllogistic theory in informal logic, this means that the order, direction, or relationship of a statement is reversed.

*copula*: The copula is the word (or words--e.g., "are" or "are not") that connects the subject and predicate in a categorical statement that follows the standard form.

*cosmology*: A subdivision of that branch of philosophy known as metaphysics that treats theories about the origin, nature, and development of the cosmos.

*creationism*: A theory concerning the origin of the universe that states a Creative Cause was and is at work; hence, a category under cosmology (a subdivision of metaphysics).

*critical thinking*: The process of understanding, constructing, and criticizing arguments. See *logic informal*, as well as *logic formal or logic, categorical*.

*cynicism*: A type of philosophy founded in Greece about 400 B. C. that was characterized by the holder's exaltation of independence from the material world, its pleasures and conventions; hence, there was a strong tendency toward asceticism. (Today we describe a person as cynical who finds fault in a derisive manner and who denies the goodness of people's motives.)

**D**: An abbreviation for the term that is distributed in a



distribution pattern.

***deduction:*** A method of reasoning and/or problem-solving that involves the drawing of inferences from the general to the specific. The reasoning process (or result of same) that may result in a valid conclusion (i.e., one which may be inferred from the truth of the premises employed). (Induction would be just the opposite; scientific investigation is largely an inductive process.)

***deductive argument:*** A logically consistent argument established not by empirical investigation, but because the premises employed in standard form entail the truth of the conclusion.

***deductive entailment:*** See immediately above.

***definition:*** The words (or symbols) and/or the process used to explain the meaning of a word, phrase, or formula.

***deism:*** A belief in God as the Personality who originally established natural and moral laws, but who is quite separate from the workings of our universe. (This is contrary to the position of Christianity.)

***denying the antecedent fallacy:*** An argument in which one infers the falsity of the consequent from the truth of a hypothetical statement and the falsity of its antecedent. (If p then q, also not p, therefore not q; contrast with affirming the consequent fallacy above.)

***deontological ethics:*** An aspect of ethics in which philosophizing is carried out concerning which acts of an ethical nature *must* or *must not* be done. It is in opposition to teleological or consequentialist theory.

***derived belief:*** A belief that has supporting reasons.

***determinism:*** A belief that individual behavior and natural events are predetermined because of antecedents; hence, a human does not have complete freedom of will. (Note differentiation with *fatalism* below.)

***dialectic:*** A subdivision of logic; the process of reasoning that involves systematic analysis of conceptions that conflict in order to arrive at the truth (i.e., thesis, antithesis, resolution).

***dichotomy:*** A division of a class into two subheadings (e.g., mind and body).

***dictionary meaning:*** The standard meaning that a word has based on current language conventions; contrast with *contextual* meaning.

***dilemma:*** A situation where two or more alternatives presented for a decision seem plausible.

***dilettantism:*** A superficial approach to some branch of knowledge or phase of life.

***disconfirmatory instance:*** A situation where a generalization based on a number of identical occurrences is disconfirmed by one instance.

***distributed term:*** A subject or predicate term in a proposition or an argument that refers to *every* member of the set or class concerned.

*divine command ethics*: A theory stating that all moral strictures emanate from the wishes of the Creator.

*division, fallacy of*: What is true of the whole is asserted to be true of its parts. See *composition fallacy*.

*dogma*: A doctrine that has been laid down authoritatively in a formalized manner.

*dogmatic authority*: An authority that asserts his/her/its positions in a way that brooks no challenge except perhaps by person or group within the hierarchy concerned.

*dualism*: The theory that the universe was founded on the basis of two irreducible elements such as good and evil, which are in opposition to each other. Typically, one refers to a dualism as a twofold division.

**E**: A letter used as an abbreviation for a negative *universal* proposition.

*eclecticism*: The practice of combining a variety of theories from different philosophical schools or stances into a body of fairly compatible beliefs. (The question arises as to the defensibility of such a position.)

*egoism*: The belief that furtherance of the individual's own interests is an acceptable approach for moral action; this motivation of conduct is one of a number of categories under ethics.

*elimination, proof by*: A situation in which, usually by indirect argument, one of a number of evidently confirmatory propositions is shown to be true; the other propositions are presumably thereby shown to be false.

*emergence theory*: The theory that mind is a relative newcomer on the world scene and will undoubtedly develop further in the eons that lie ahead.

*emotive language*: Words employed in a statement that are suited to and/or for the communication of personal feelings.

*emotive theory of ethics (emotivism)*: The position that the underlying emotive element has to be employed when appraising a moral act because reason alone cannot provide the answer.

*emotivism*: The response of proponents of analytic philosophy stating that ethics is normative (i.e., moral *standards*) and therefore cannot be a science; the term "good" appears to be indefinable.

*empirical statement*: A statement in which truth or falsity is determined by means of experimentation and sensory observations.

*empirically verifiable*: A statement that can be validated through scientific investigation (or mathematic reasoning).

*empiricism*: The theory that the human's knowledge originates in experience and not from theories about presumed facts; hence, knowledge is *a posteriori* and comes from sense experience.

***enumerative induction:*** A simple method of induction in which case after case of confirmatory instances is cumulated without effort being made to discover whether disconfirmation is also possible.

***environmental ethics:*** An effort by those concerned to include the earth itself, including its flora and fauna, within the domain of ethical consideration.

***epicureanism:*** A hedonistic approach to living whereby humans seek to satisfy their desires for a variety of sensual pleasures.

***epiphenomenalism:*** The theory that the mind functions as part of the brain but that it does not influence occurrences; hence, it accompanies bodily activity.

***epistemology:*** The branch of philosophy that treats the nature and possibility of the acquisition of knowledge.

***equivocation, fallacy of:*** An argument where an ambiguous word or expression is used in one sense in a premise, but then is used in a different sense in the other premise or conclusion.

***essentialism (in education):*** The educational position that there is a fundamental core of knowledge and ideals that should be transmitted to all students while maintaining high achievement standards; individual freedom is seen as a goal rather than a means; educational values are objective and intrinsic in the universe.

***eternity:*** A never-ending state of time such as implied by the concept of immortality.

***ethical code:*** May be defined as "a systematic collections of rules and regulations (i.e., what's right and what's wrong, and good and bad) determined in relation to the values espoused *in a given society.*" (Values expressed as norms are often converted to laws as well.)

***ethical creed:*** A creed is similar to a code, but is typically shorter. It can be defined as a *short* idealistic (in the non-philosophic sense) statement of belief, while a code is a longer set of detailed regulations.

***ethical naturalism:*** a position in which it is argued that ethical sentences can be translated into non-ethical ones without losing their meaning (usually a difficult accomplishment).

***ethical non-cognitivism:*** a position in which it is argued that ethical sentences do *not* express any propositions at all.

***ethical non-naturalism:*** a position in which it is argued that at least some some ethical sentences cannot be translated into any other kinds of sentences (i.e., an autonomous class).

***ethics:*** The aspect of philosophy under the branch of axiology (the study of values) that investigates the norms (i.e., generally acceptable societal practices and correct patterns of conduct). Interest in *applied ethics*--as opposed to metaethical analysis (i.e., analyzing the meaning of moral terms largely)--began

to develop again starting in the 1980s. Defined, also, as "a pattern or way of life," "a listing of rules of conduct or a moral code," or "an inquiry about rules of conduct in a society or culture."

*ethics, normative:* Normative ethics involves the analysis or development of a set of moral norms that explains the practices deemed as good or evil in a given society.

*ethics of belief:* Any rules that are used to assess states of mind such as beliefs and doubts as opposed to the assessment of such acts as violence, injury, and murder.

*evil:* Anything, including moral badness, that negates the human's happiness or welfare, the opposite of good.

*evolutionary ethics:* That aspect of the study of ethics in which adherents seek to discover grounds for moral considerations within the evolution of humans on earth.

*evolutionism:* The metaphysical theory that the cosmos evolved and is evolving of itself toward some end.

*existentialism:* An approach to philosophy that is said to have started as a revolt against Hegel's idealism in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It included the postulate that ethical and spiritual realities are accessible to humans through reason. Basically, the human's task is to create his/her own essence (i.e., ideals and values).

*existential role of the syllogism:* The conclusion in a valid syllogism cannot be particular unless one of the premises in the argument is particular (i.e., one of the propositions has the quantifier "some" in it). (Note that *universal* propositions are regarded as being non-existential.)

*experimental reasoning:* A scientific problem-solving approach used to answer "unknowns"; after a hypothesis is postulated, primarily inductive (but usually also deductive to a degree), reasoning is used to gather and test data before arriving at conclusions. (Experimental group method uses a control group as part of the total experiment.)

*experimentalism:* A term used synonymously with pragmatic naturalism and instrumentalism during the 20th century to describe the progressive educational philosophy initiated by John Dewey and others; it is characterized by naturalistic education based on change and novelty using a problem-solving approach to educational problems.

*fallacy:* Reasoning that is illogical, inconsistent, or incomplete.

*false cause fallacy:* An argument where a person attributes causality to a series of events, but does not investigate possible alternative causes.

*fatalism:* The theory that all events are predetermined as are the acts of humans; hence, volition on the part of people is negated. This

doctrine is *not* completely synonymous with determinism. (For example, a fatalist might argue that an ill person is fated to die whether a physician is called or not; a determinist could envision a cure occurring in this instance.)

*faulty analogy fallacy*: Some analogies seem stronger than others, but all arguments from analogy are not deductively valid; hence, they are fallacious.

*feminist ethics*: An area of study within ethics in which attempts are being made to rectify past inadequacies within the field of study because of male domination. It is argued that a complete re-evaluation should be carried out to determine what ideal sexual equality should be.

*figure*: The figure of a syllogism describes the arrangement of terms in a syllogism that is in standard form.

*form, logical*: The term "logical form" describes the pattern or arrangement of parts in a correct syllogism.

*formal fallacy*: A fallacy in which the truth of the premises in a deductive argument having such a form does not guarantee the truth of the argument's conclusion.

*free will*: The belief that the human is capable of true initiative in a world that offers him or her freedom of choice insofar as actions are concerned.

*generalization*: A principle (or law or proposition) that covers all or some instances of the items or phenomena being considered.

*gestalt*: A German word (capitalized!) meaning form or shape. The term is used in psychology to describe the theory that formed patterns of sensations or reflexes are responsible, through interrelation, for the occurrence of events. The whole is therefore greater than the sum of its parts, and the parts receive their character because of the total configuration.

*God*: A term interpreted in various ways; in philosophy and religion, it usually means a Supreme Being, the infinite Spirit, or the Creator of the universe. There are various arguments and beliefs about the existence of God. Some religions believe that there is more than one god (note the "g" is not capitalized).

*good*: That which is considered to be beneficial to humans, and which is right and fitting in the moral order of the universe (however conceived). Pragmatism, for example, denies built-in moral order that decrees good for humans. A "good" is a term used frequently in ethics.

*"good reasons" approach*: An approach in ethics that argues (implies) that ethical action should be supported by best reasons (*good* reasons--facts superior to others; *moral* reasons superior to other types).

*guilt by association fallacy*: An argument in which an individual is attacked indirectly--for example, by including that person in with a group of malcontents.

*hasty (inductive) generalization fallacy*: A fallacy where a person seeks to generalize from one or several instances of an occurrence to a conclusion.

*hedonism*: An ethical doctrine that states humans should guide their ethical conduct on the basis of the personal pleasure such conduct will bring. It should be kept in mind that there are many different conceptions of pleasure.

*humanism*: A non-theistic position that "begins with humans not God, nature not deity." A basic tenet is that "science affirms that the human species is an emergence from natural evolutionary forces." Humanists argue further that "ethics is autonomous and situational, needing no theological or ideological sanction." (Quoted statements are from the *Humanist Manifesto II*.)

*hypothesis*: Typically a tentative solution proposed to solve a problem; in informal logic, an hypothesis is a true or untrue proposition held up for examination to determine what conclusion might follow if it is true.

*hypothetical syllogism*: See *chain argument*.

**I**: A capital letter used to abbreviate a *positive particular* proposition.

*idea*: A concept or percept existing in the mind as the result of comprehension.

*ideal*: A model or standard of perfection or excellence serving as a goal; often conceived, however, in relationship to *idea(l)ism*.

*idealism*: A term which describes a philosophical position of long standing that envisions a rational order in the universe, since all reality is basically spirit or idea. It is the opposite of materialism and is sometimes used to connote an ideal system or doctrine. There has also been an idealistic philosophy of education.

*ignoratio elenchi*: See *irrelevant conclusion, fallacy of*.

*illicit process, fallacy of*: In a syllogism, the fallacy of illicit process is committed when a term is distributed in the conclusion but was undistributed in the premise where it first appeared. (This fallacy has been subdivided by some into a major or minor one [i.e., the term *major* as predicate of the conclusion is used when the term is distributed in the conclusion but not where it appeared first, and the term *minor* is employed when the term *minor* as subject of the conclusion is distributed in the conclusion but not where it was included in a premise].)

*illusion*: A condition in which a human's senses do not react in

typical fashion (i.e., a false perception).

***Immanent:*** When applied to God, this means that He functions within or is actually present in the cosmos.

***immortality:*** The belief that a human's soul will exist after death throughout eternity.

***imperative:*** A command that may not be evaded. (See categorical imperative.)

***inconsistent premises fallacy:*** A fallacy in which a position is asserted as sound despite incompatibility evident in certain of its statements.

***indefiniteness:*** A proposition may be considered indefinite when details that could be supplied to shed further knowledge on the subject at hand are omitted.

***individualism:*** A theory that the freedom of an individual should not be curtailed, as such freedom is most important to society's development. Some would go so far as to state that the individual's welfare should be the chief aim of the state or society.

***induction:*** A method of reasoning and/or problem-solving that involves the gradual forming of generalizations or principles from specific instances; hence, the opposite of deduction. (This is sometimes called *enumerative induction*,

***inductive argument:*** An inductive argument is one in which evidence is presented concerning *some* members of a set or class to support an assertion about more of all members of the set. Thus, in an inductive argument, the truth of the premises employed do not logically entail the truth of the conclusion.

***inference:*** That which appears to be a reasonable conclusion based on certain premises. See, also, how the term is used as a verb in the heading *deduction* above.

***infinite:*** The quality of being without limits as to space or duration.

***infinite regress:*** A situation that develops when premises in an argument depend upon other premises indefinitely (*ad infinitum*)--thus permitting no valid conclusion.

***inquiry:*** A proceeding in which the party or parties concerned set about discovering facts or reliable beliefs about a topic under consideration.

***instrumentalism:*** A term coined in educational philosophy around 1930 to describe progressivism in education; the pragmatic naturalism of John Dewey in which theories are put to the test of experience experimentally; thought is instrumental in improving conduct; a term often used interchangeably with *experimentalism* (another coined term), both of which were superseded by use of the term *pragmatic naturalism*.

***interactionism:*** The theory that explains mind and body as separate entities within reality, although each may have a direct influence

on the other.

**interest theory:** A belief under the nature of value relating to the branch of ethics that the existence of value depends on interest shown by the individual concerned; hence, if something is desired, it has value.

**introspection:** To look (or the act of looking) within one's own mind or thought processes.

**intuitionism:** A theory in metaphysics and ethics (axiology) that self-evident truths and moral values respectively may be gained through immediate awareness or insight. (See *non-naturalism*.)

**invalidity:** A deductive argument is invalid when all the premises could be true, but the conclusion is false.

**irrelevant conclusion, fallacy of:** A fallacy where the argument results in a conclusion other than the one it presumably was created to establish. (See *ignoratio elenchi* above.)

**"is" to "ought" fallacy:** A fallacy in which a person uses descriptive ("is" or "are") phrases in the premises of an argument, but then follows with an "ought" in the conclusion. **Note:** Some have challenged calling this a fallacy in connection with matters of environmental degradation.

**justice:** A quality of fairness and righteousness. It is a morality principle as well. The legal system presumably provides justice to all who come before it. (See the term *benevolence*, also.)

**Kantian ethics:** Moral theories developed from the moral philosophy of Kant. He theorized that moral judgment is found within the rational nature of the human being.

**legalism:** An approach in ethics with the underlying proposition that absolute good or rightness are either present in the world, or have been determined by custom, law, or code. (See *authoritarianism*, also.)

**linking generalization:** When an argument from analogy is employed, the *linking* generalization is the generalization employed to justify the move from the known situation to the one or more similar situations where similarities have been detected that make comparison seemingly possible.

**logic:** The branch of philosophy that treats the exact relating of ideas; known also as the science of inference and proof. The *a priori* study of descriptive language forms; also known as *formal* or *categorical* or *deductive* logic.

**logical entailment:** Two or more statements where, if the first is true, it logically entails that the second statement is also true.

**logical form:** The make-up or format of an argument or statement



involving premises and a conclusion in which such descriptive words as "all," "some," "no," "not," "and," "either....or," etc. are used.

**logic, informal:** While not seeking to deny the *results* of the *a priori* study of descriptive language forms, "informal logic is not formal logic without the symbolic apparatus, nor is it applied formal logic. It is the 'logic'--the criteria of probity--of arguments and argumentation" (Blair and Johnson, 1991, p. 38). Thus, informal logic is more than the study of fallacies; it teaches skills involved in argument construction, analysis, and criticism.

**major premise:** In a categorical syllogism, the major premise is the premise that contains the major term. See also *minor premise*.

**major term:** In a categorical syllogism, the major term is the predicate of the conclusion. See also *minor term*.

**materialism:** The theory that matter is the ultimate reality in the cosmos and that denies the presence of spiritual substance. Speaking ethically, it is an ethical doctrine that places the individual's well-being uppermost.

**mechanism:** The theory that there are natural laws in the world that operate in machine-like fashion regardless of any human and desires.

**medical ethics:** An aspect of ethics in which problems of right and wrong (and good and bad) are studied as they relate to the medical profession with its attendant duties and responsibilities.

**meliorism:** The theory that people can and should work to improve their situation in the world even though it is not possible to know anything final about the goodness or evil of existence.

**meta-ethics:** Philosophical inquiry (*meta-ethical analysis*) about *ways* of life or rules of conduct especially as to the *meaning* and *significance* of moral terms.

**metalanguage:** Language used in talking about or analyzing one element of language compared to another.

**metaphor:** A figure of speech in which a term or phrase is applied to something in another context to which it is not literally applicable in order to suggest a resemblance or likeness. A starting point is whether a metaphor is paraphrasable in literal terms.

**metaphysics:** The branch of philosophy that considers theories about the nature of reality.

**middle term:** In a syllogism, the *middle term* is the term occurring in both premises. See also *major term* and *minor term*.

**minor premise:** In a syllogism, the premise containing the minor term.

**minor term:** In a syllogism, the subject of the conclusion. See also *major term*.

**monism:** The theory that the cosmos, or ultimate reality, is unified and qualitatively of one type of matter or energy (as opposed to

two types [dualism]).

*moral law*: A set of principles or standards that exist ("have been laid down by the Creator") for humankind to follow. This idea is basic to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (e.g., his "categorical imperative").

*moral philosophy* (history of) The study of the background and development of human thought about what is good and bad and what actions are right or wrong (e.g., Greek ethics, Christian ethics, ethical naturalism).

*mysticism*: The belief that a human can know ultimate truth intuitively through direct insight.

*naturalism*: A term that describes an early philosophical position that has persisted to the present day; the philosophical theory that emphasizes the physical nature of the universe is self-explanatory and denies the presence of any teleological system; also a philosophy popularized by Rousseau and Spencer that served as a foundation for progressive education.

*naturalism, ethical*: A theory (i.e., series of views) that ethical terms may be defined in natural terms and that (accordingly) ethical conclusions may be derived from *natural* ethical premises and properties.

*naturalistic fallacy*: A so-called "philosophical fallacy" in which a person has sought to equate *goodness* with a natural characteristic. This position is accepted by those who decry the fallacy because their position is that the term "good" is indefinable.

*natural law*: A "higher law" considered universally valid and derived from the basic nature of the human; a principle in ethics that a person may derive through reason alone.

*nature*: The sum total of all phenomena or physical experiences in the universe; sometimes referred to as those forces that control the physical universe.

*necessary condition*: A condition that is stated as the *consequent* of a hypothetical statement.

*negation, logical*: See *contradiction*.

*negative proposition*: A proposition with a *subject-predicate form* in which the copula (connecting verb) delimits or excludes some of the subject from the predicate.

*Neoplatonism*: This term coined fairly recently was used to describe a later form of Platonism in Rome's third century (C. E.). It challenged Plato's dualistic thought with a highly monistic one.

*neutral language*: Words that are non-emotive and/or not expressed in an emotive manner.

*non-sequitur, fallacy of*: A fallacy where a conclusion is consistent with the premises provided, but does *not* follow from their meaning. Also

known as *fallacy of argumentative leap*.

**norm:** In the sense used here, a (sociological) norm in a society relates to one of a series of cultural standards. Thus, normative inquiry relates to the study of societal norms (e.g., the right of privacy or freedom).

**noumenon:** An object that is apprehended rationally (i.e., non-empirical); the object of a pure, non-sensual intuition (Kant).

**O:** The letter used as an abbreviation for a *negative particular proposition*.

**objectivism or subjectivism, ethical:** The belief that there is a range of views and beliefs about judgments of an ethical nature. On the one hand, *objectivists* argue that a moral judgment can be defended rationally. Conversely, on the other hand, *subjectivists* believe that moral judgments are simply assertions by a person of what is felt to be right or wrong.

**ontology:** That subdivision of the branch of philosophy known as metaphysics that treats and inquires into the nature of being or reality.

**operation:** In logic, a word employed to refer to the way in which complex entities are related to the more basic entities of which the more complex entities are composed (e.g., such-and-such an entity, through the *addition* of a second element, provides sufficient proof. ...).

**optimism:** The belief that this is the best of all possible worlds in which reality is essentially good, and that this goodness shall win out over any and all evil.

**ordinary language philosophy:** A term often used synonymously with *linguistic philosophy* and/or *analytic philosophy*; they typically bespeak an approach to doing philosophy by analysis of language misunderstandings as opposed to a more traditional approach.

**pantheism:** A doctrine that makes God and the universe identical; in other words, God is *immanent* in nature.

**parallelism:** A belief under the nature of man in the branch of metaphysics that treats the problem of the relation of body and mind; the theory is that mind and body are corresponding aspects of reality but separate.

**particular proposition:** A proposition of typical subject-predicate form in which the term "some" is used as a quantifier.

**perfectionism:** The belief that ultimate perfection of the individual and the society is possible and should, therefore, be a goal.

**pessimism:** A belief engendered by observation of life in this world that sees more evil than good, and which accordingly questions the desirability of struggle against the elements and forces present; people with this attitude frequently seek an escape mechanism. (The

opposite of optimism.)

**phenomenon:** An object that is known empirically (i.e., through the senses) and not through intuition or thought.

**philosopher, moral:** A philosopher who is concerned with the analysis of the morals or ethical conduct of people in society.

**philosophy:** The "love of wisdom" (literally); a (social) science that investigates the facts, principles, and problems of reality in all its phases in an attempt to describe, analyze, and evaluate them.

**pluralism:** The belief that reality is composed of a number of ultimate substances such as mind, matter, energy, process, etc.; all these are real and may be either quantitative or qualitative.

**polar words:** Words that in the nature of the language used have direct opposites (e.g., "best" and "worst").

**polytheism:** The theory that there are many gods who may, or may not, have an effect on the destiny of humans.

**positive proposition:** A proposition of subject-predicate form in which the copula creates a condition of inclusion; thus, that proposition is *positive* (as opposed to being a *negative* proposition).

**positivism:** A belief popularized by Comte that a human can only know that which can be proved through the sense experience of applied scientific method; this would eliminate metaphysical speculation. Later *logical positivists* sought to subject statements to a *verifiability principle*.

**post hoc fallacy:** In this fallacy, it is reasoned that, because one thing precedes another, the former must have caused the latter to occur.

**pragmatism:** The philosophical theory (promulgated by Peirce, James, and Dewey) that truth may only be known through the logical and physical consequences of experiences embodying the theory to be tested; applied to education, for example, it means that we truly learn only by involvement or doing.

**predicate, logical:** When a subject-predicate proposition is expressed in proper form, the *logical predicate* is the second class mentioned following the copula (i.e. connecting verb). The predicate may be said to be a characteristic, property, trait, or something similar said to be true of, or false of, an individual. See *subject, logical*.

**premise:** A premise is a proposition in an argument that involves a process of reasoning. It is also a statement assumed in an argument that is designed to provide evidence for a conclusion. A *premise set* is the sum (perhaps only just one) of the arguments provided to warrant a conclusion.

**problem-solving situation:** A situation that appears to require an answer, as yet undetermined, to a question or issue that has arisen.

**process-product shift of meaning:** A situation where the same word is used to *both* explain the *process* of doing something and the *product* or result of doing the same thing.

***progressivism:*** The educational position that there are individual differences inherent in nature, growth and maturation patterns, and therefore "readiness to learn" mandates a need for great emphasis on individualistic aims. This position is tempered by a demand for social welfare rather than purely individual welfare. Educational aims are relative and experimental in a changing world; specific educational objectives emerge as life goes on, and we learn from this experience.

***proof:*** In this connection, evidence provided to establish the truth or validity of an assertion.

***proposition:*** A proposition is a statement in the form of a sentence where something is asserted that must be true, doubtful, or false.

***quality:*** A property that approves or disapproves (affirms or denies) the negative or positive character of a relationship holding between two sets in an argument.

***quality, rule of:*** One of the fundamental (*three*) rules of a valid syllogism (i.e., from two positive premises, only a positive valid conclusion can be derived, etc.).

***quantifier:*** The word or phrase used to indicate the *distribution* (i.e., how many things) of the subject in a proposition; for example, "all" or "some".

***quantity:*** One of the fundamental (*three*) rules of a valid syllogism relating to the distribution of terms (i.e., in a valid syllogism, the middle term must be distributed at least once, etc.).

***questionable statistics fallacy:*** A fallacy in which a causal connection is directly inferred from a positive statistical correlation; other variations of this fallacy are possible.

***rationalism:*** The philosophical theory that knowledge may be derived through the human's reasoning power as opposed to the application of sense-experience.

***realism:*** A term used to describe many different, but related, positions; accordingly, it is difficult to classify. There does appear to be general agreement on the objectivity, or independent reality, of the world apart from the conscious mind of the human who attempts to know it. It is in direct opposition to the traditional philosophy of idealism on this point. In educational philosophy, its aim is that the human should acquire verified knowledge of the world in order to adjust in the best way to his or her environment.

***reason*** (for a belief used as a noun, not a verb): A proposition that the person honestly holding the belief can use for its support.

***red herring fallacy:*** An argument in which the person making the assertion introduces a premise that has no real relevance to the matter under consideration in order to make a point toward

validating the argument

*reductio ad absurdum*: The refutation of a proposition by demonstrating the absurdity of its conclusion if carried to its logical end. Such refutation may involve showing that if not-P were true, two mutually contradictory propositions could be deduced.

*relevance*: A connection with, or bearing upon, the matter at hand.

*relativism*: Metaphysically, this theory is that no measurement standard has complete objectivity, since all things, including truth, are relative in space, motion, and time. This has definite implications for epistemological theory, since knowledge, not being intrinsic, depends on comparison with other data.

*relativity of definition, principle of*: The principle that a definition should be formulated intelligibly and usefully in regard to the specific person addressed.

*Revelation*: The belief that the Deity has communicated to humans in a variety of ways relative to His will.

*right*: In ethical discourse, the terms right and wrong apply only to the acts of persons.

*Scholasticism*: The main Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages, which embraced all activities of the medieval schools; it is based on tradition and revealed religion--a method as well as a system of thought.

*scientific ethics*: An approach to ethics in which the scientific method is applied to the making of decisions. There is no distinction between moral goods and natural goods. Science can bring about complete agreement on factual belief about human behavior.

*semantics*: The study of the relationship between signs or symbols and the objects which they represent. Also, an investigation of language as it relates to the world independent of any speaker.

*sentence*: A specifiable class of speech-types of a particular language that uses words for communication.

*set*: A word that is also called "class" or "universe"; a delineated collection of distinguishable items or people.

*simple proposition*: A proposition so elementary that none of its parts are themselves propositions.

*singular statement*: A statement that asserts that a given property is true of (or false of) an individual. It may also mean that a particular person is (or is not) a member of a certain set.

*situationism*: An approach to ethics in which the underlying proposition is that God's love (or some other *summum bonum*) is an absolute norm; reason, revelation, and precedent have no objective normative status. (This position should not be confused with what has been called "situation ethics" [i.e. "anything goes" depending on the merits or demerits of the present situation].)

*skepticism*: The belief that absolute truth and knowledge are not available to humans, although partial knowledge may be possible.

*slippery assimilation fallacy*: An argument in which it is argued that, because there are only slight differences in separate cases, they are both the same.

*slippery precedent fallacy*: An argument in which it is argued that an argument or case may be sound when considered individually, but it should be rejected because its acceptance would set an example for less deserving cases.

*soul*: The belief that there is an essence of substance that is possessed by humans and endures after mortal life on Earth is over; presumed as the "vital principle" of an organic body; believed by some that this part of the human is also part of God. (In ancient Greece, the term soul was conceived as mind (i.e., achieving excellence of body and soul).

*sound argument*: A deductive argument in which a conclusion is reached reliably through the use of true premises and a valid conclusion. A deductive argument may be valid but unsound because of the quality of its premises.

*speculation*: The contemplation about a subject in regard to its different aspects and relations; there is the implication that such theorizing is taking place without sufficient scientific evidence to support any conclusions reached.

*Spiritualism*: In philosophy, the belief held by most idealists that the ultimate nature of the universe is spirit; God, in this interpretation, would be *absolute* Spirit, while humans are *finite* spirits.

*sport ethics*: An area of study within applied ethics that considers the morality of athletes, coaches, officials, administrators, etc. as they are involved with competitive sport at all levels.

*statement*: An explicitly formulated assertion or judgment that is either true or false, but not both. In a *relevant* statement, the facts contribute or count positively toward the strength of the assertion made.

*stipulated definition*: A detailed explanation of how some word or term will be used in an argument.

*Stoicism*: Originally a school of early philosophy; it is now interpreted as a belief where a human practices devotion to duty and remains impassive to pleasure or pain.

*straw person fallacy*: An argument in which one person misrepresents the another's claim or theory.

*subject term*: In a categorical statement characterized by standard form, the term following the quantifier and preceding the copula (or connecting verb).

*subjectivism*: See *objectivism*.

*suggestion*: A thought that is conveyed by an utterance, though not explicitly formulated.

*summum bonum*: A Latin phrase meaning the highest or supreme good; usually applied to the highest goal for the human's conduct as being intrinsically good.

*suppressed evidence fallacy*: In this fallacy a person deliberately omits or deletes evidence that seemingly would have an influence on the consequent.

*syllogism*: An argument consisting of two premises and a conclusion all in prescribed subject-predicate form that involves three classes altogether. Describes a type of deductive reasoning invented by Aristotle in which certain judgments, called major and minor premises, result in a particular conclusion only if they are true.

*syntax*: The purely formal properties of language and its usage without reference to the social setting in which it is used.

*tabloid formula, fallacy of*: A fallacy in which some catchword or overly simplified phrase is accepted without critical examination.

*taking a dilemma by the horns*: The action of a critic who rejects a dilemma by denying and/or refuting one of the argument's conditional premises.

*tautological statement*: A statement that is always true due to its logical form (i.e., a statement that permits no other logical possibilities because of its structure). For example, "Either you agree with me, or you don't."

*teleology*: The study of whether the universe is purposeful as opposed to a theory of mechanism; the past and present may be interpreted by the future.

*terms*: In syllogistic theory, the class(es) mentioned by the conditional propositions of the argument (i.e., the words or clauses designating the sets).

*testimony*: A report of personal experience made as an assertion (or set of assertions) by another individual.

*theism*: A religious philosophy that is unitary (monotheistic) in regard to the nature of God; God is seen as distinct from humans and is regarded as immanent rather than external to the world.

*theorist, ethical*: A philosopher concerned with the theory and practice of moral or ethical conduct in society. (See *philosopher*, *moral* as well.)

*Transcendentalism*: The belief, when applied to God, that He is beyond and apart from the world or universe.

*two wrongs make a right fallacy*: An argument where there is a misplaced appeal for consistency; for example, a person is asked to condone an action that is wrong because something similar, also wrong, has been condoned.



**U:** A letter used for a term in a distribution pattern to show that it is undistributed.

***undistributed term:*** An object or predicate is undistributed when the proposition does not refer to every member of the class in question.

***undistributed middle fallacy:*** a syllogistic argument in which the middle term is not distributed in at least one of the premises it is meant to connect (or is undistributed in each premise).

***universal proposition:*** A proposition of subject-predicate form in which the quantifier "all" is employed. Contrast with *particular proposition*.

***universalizability criterion:*** Kant's fundamental moral principle ("Act only on that maxim which you can will to be a universal law").

***utilitarianism:*** The belief that the right act for a human is the one that will result in the greatest amount of happiness (net good) in the world; it has subsequently been interpreted as the greatest amount of "intrinsic good" and has also found an interpretation in pragmatic ethics.

***utopia:*** This word means literally the "land of nowhere"; generally conceived as the ideal society, perhaps of the future; also interpreted as that ideal state or condition, but which the next step whereby it may be attained is not presently known.

***utterance:*** A statement involving words actually pronounced by a speaker. Also, such statement may be written with words or signs.

***vagueness:*** A word is vague when, in a certain circumstance, it is not possible to determine whether the word does or does not apply to the situation at hand.

***value:*** May be defined as a quality that is important to a person or a society; the study of a general theory or nature of values (axiology) is one of the four branches of philosophy. The term value is of great importance in social theory as well. Value can be explained roughly as something that is regarded as "worthwhile" and "good" by a person or group. For example, the values of a democratic society might read as follows: (1) governance by law, (2) autonomy or freedom, (3) protection from injury, (4) equality of opportunity, (5) right to privacy, (6) concern for individual welfare, etc.

***validity:*** The property of a deductive argument if the premises logically entail the conclusion (i.e., if all of the premises are true, the conclusion *must* also be true).

***Venn diagram:*** A geometrical design involving overlapping circles used to show the facts indicated in the premises of a syllogism as they relate to each other. Note that each circle represents a distinct set or class.

*verification, public*: The confirmation of one scientist's findings and/or conclusions by other qualified scientists. The so-called *verifiability principle* as the goal of the logical positivist consisted of the arrangement of regular language statements in logical, consistent form to discover if they were *empirically verifiable* through scientific investigation of mathematical reasoning.

*virtue*: A quality ascribed to humans who lived their lives according to reason in the days of Aristotle; with the Romans it meant strength of character; now, it generally applies to qualities of moral excellence (such as the Christian virtues). (See the terms *goodness* and *benevolence*, also.)

*voluntarism, ethical*: The ethical position that states an act is right or wrong depending on whether the act is so willed; the same idea applies to whether the consequences of an act are good or bad.

*will*: The human's conscious process at work resulting in a decision--voluntary action (i.e., conation).

*wrong*: In ethical discourse, a term that applies to the act of a person as being incorrect or immoral.

## APPENDIX

### LEARNING TO REASON CLEARLY: A REQUIREMENT FOR ANY CENTURY

One necessary aspect of personal and professional competency is the ability to reason clearly--to employ natural argumentation. The ability to reason clearly is necessarily vital also to sound ethical decision-making. Of course, most people would argue strongly that they have this ability or competency to at least a reasonable degree. However, it is often obvious to relatives, friends, and business associates that this is not always the case. This is especially true when emotion is a strong factor in a problematic or contentious issue. Therefore, helping people to achieve the ability to understand, criticize, and construct arguments should be part of the formal education program offered to all in a general education program.

Shifting the focus to a young person's professional preparation specifically, the future of all occupations and professions will depend on the way programs of a public, semipublic, semiprivate, and private nature are administered and supervised in the years ahead. Obviously, highly competent professionals are needed at all levels to insure that sound programs are implemented effectively and efficiently. It is vital, therefore, that well-planned, effective professional preparation of the various subprofessional categories be carried out as well. Within such preparation programs the achievement of the necessary competencies and skill in reasoning and argumentation should be ensured, also. To guarantee this, prospective professionals in any recognized field should be evaluated for such competency before a license to practice or required certification is granted. (This is especially important if a course including laboratory experience in reasoning or argumentation is typically not required or elected within a program of professional preparation.)

This **Appendix** on critical thinking based on informal logic was included because it is so important to people seeking to make ethical decisions so intimately connected with both their personal and professional lives. A cursory historical background of the topic will be offered, including a brief statement about the elements of more formal, categorical logic. This is necessary, since you should recognize that any argument must be placed in reasonably standard argument format. However, the bulk of this chapter is concerned with a discussion of more practical critical thinking, or informal logic. The discussion will include only selected topics, however, such as (a) the need to think clearly, (b) a brief discussion of the background of formal logic, and, finally, (c) a limited discussion of critical thinking including such sub-topics as definitions, ambiguity, sound arguments, relevant statements, and an introduction to fallacies (e.g., black or white fallacy, too-quick generalization fallacy).

#### THE NEED TO THINK CLEARLY

It is a truism to state that the way people think really does make a difference. This is true because all articulate people throughout the course of their lives are necessarily involved every day in what may be called natural argumentation. Cohen (1991, pp. 5-7) states that thinking can affect your pattern of living in three different ways that can actually influence

your happiness in life. First, he explains that thinking "shapes and molds one's view of reality." Second, thinking "largely determines a person's feelings and emotions" as life is confronted during waking hours. Finally, as a result of reasons one and two, thinking influences and actually governs actions and behavior toward others.

A good case can be made, therefore, that achieving ability with natural argumentation should be part of the formal education program offered to all children. However, a course experience in argumentation or a philosophy course that includes some experience in argumentation is still a rarity in elementary education--*at any educational level for that matter*. However, there is hope for the future. The College Board (1983) stated that "reasoning" (here called critical thinking\*) should be one of seven basic academic competencies resulting from formal education. It is encouraging, also, that philosophy for children is currently being taught in thousands of schools in the United States, as well as to thousands of prospective teachers. It is a graduation requirement in the California state college and university system (Paris, 1991, A20). At the university and college level with the above exception, however, unless one specializes in the discipline of philosophy, courses in formal logic\*, informal logic\* or critical thinking\* and argumentation are elective courses that are unfortunately chosen only by a relatively small percentage of students involved in higher education.

Keeping the present controversy about education in mind, Weinstein (1991) argues that education is now confronted by postmodern theory and multicultural reality. He believes that critical thinking can serve an important function in the dialogue currently taking place between the traditional educational establishment and those who want to offer a "principled challenge to education business as usual." He suggests further that worthwhile, meaningful discourse simply cannot take place unless people know how to think clearly and responsibly based on explicit criteria coupled with sensitivity for the particulars of the context in which the discussion is being carried out.

All of the above points up what amounts to a large task for all educators--i.e., to determine if we can somehow be of assistance in making an intellectual process such as critical thinking part of all general education programs from kindergarten through university level. A primary, concomitant task would accordingly be the subsequent adaptation of such competency in critical thinking to the professional preparation experience. Throughout their professional lives, men and women will be called upon continually--and perhaps more than ever before--to justify and rationalize the place or status in people's lives of competency in ethical decision-making. Thus, this presentation on critical thinking is being offered for consideration at this time by people in all professions in the hope that applied experiences leading to such competency might be introduced as a core subject in all professional curricula.

## BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Most people use what might be termed "common-sense" logic to get answers to their everyday problems. However, common sense is usually highly suspect and does not necessarily provide correct answers. Literature, radio, and television have entertained us with

the exploits of Sherlock Holmes and the infallible reasoning that he displays in every mystery he encounters as a detective. Yet, thinking about it, the deductive logic\* he displays has actually been concocted in reverse by Sir Conan Doyle (although it is indeed a limited form of deductive logic).

More formal logic, however, has historically been one of the major subdivisions of philosophy. It treats the exact relating of ideas as a science, and in its more advanced forms has become extremely complex. Basically, it is concerned with distinguishing correct thinking from incorrect thinking. When one reasons from certain particulars or instances to a general conclusion, or from the "individual to the universal," that is called induction\*. Conversely, deduction\* follows the same manner of reasoning as other approaches to logic in that statements or premises are listed and considered prior to the establishment of a conclusion. Commonly it has been thought of as an "opposite" type of reasoning from induction since the deductive process moves from general premises to their necessary conclusions, or from the universal to the individual. The syllogism\*, a form once used much more extensively for deductive reasoning, is an analysis of a formal argument in which the conclusion necessarily results from the given premises. It uses only categorical statements\* and includes two premises and one conclusion (i.e., the exact formula for deductive logic).

Modern scientific investigation now uses what may be called experimental reasoning or problem-solving. This thought process is largely inductive, but may revert to deduction from time to time as well. The scientist starts with a problem about which she may have a hypothesis\*. Then, after considering all related information, the scholar decides upon the method of research that is most applicable to the type of problem involved (i.e., historical, descriptive, experimental (the latter ideally with a control group\*), and finally--what some have called--philosophical method). Each broad research method has now achieved a variety of specific techniques or approaches that are employed at this point to gather data relating to the problem. Finally, after analysis and interpretation of the results have been completed, the investigator arrives at some conclusions that may bear out or negate the original hypothesis. If it isn't possible to conduct detailed research as described above, then reflective thinking of the highest type is often used instead, an approach that employs a similar type of sequential reasoning.

Historically, the first great treatment of the process and technique of argumentation or reasoning was the "Organon," a name given after Aristotle's death to a series of treatises that he had written on the subject after 334 B.C.E. (i.e., before the common era). In that year he opened the Lyceum as a school of rhetoric and philosophy in ancient Athens, possibly with financial assistance from the youthful Alexander the Great whom he had tutored previously for four years. Aristotle, presumably the first great scientist in world history, was most anxious to think clearly; so, he went to great lengths to define the terms that he used in his lectures and writings. Accepting the senses as the only source of knowledge, Aristotle could well be called the "father of scientific method" because of the great emphasis he placed on careful observation and experimentation.

In the "Organon" (later also called the "Instrument"), he began to identify some of the

basic principles of logic (e.g., the principle of contradiction--that is, it is "impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing in the same relation"). He also sought to explain away many of the fallacies into which Sophists led men and women to trick them in argumentation. (Sophists were itinerant teachers in fifth-century Greece who received their name originally as a mark of respect. Subsequently, they were looked down on to a degree because their emphasis was more on teaching the political art of persuasion than the pure pursuit of truth.)

Perhaps Aristotle's greatest contribution along these lines was the formulation of syllogistic (deductive) reasoning\*, a line of argument involving three propositions the third of which necessarily follows from the other two. Here he had the insight to see the formal relationships between certain terms such as "all," "none," "some are." and "some are not." Proceeding from this, he developed rules and inferences\* in categorical forms for relatively simple arguments. Interestingly, this contribution--one that is still valid today--involves deductive reasoning\*. However, Aristotle obviously placed great stock in induction as well. This is evident by virtue of the great number of specific observations required for his monumental *History of Animals* (in which, interestingly, humans are also included) (*The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967, Vol. 4, p. 514).

The discipline of logic\* invented by Aristotle was extended somewhat by the Stoics\*. It was also studied by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages and developed further in the thought and writings of Leibniz (1646-1716). However, its development really blossomed in the late 19th century. Both of the great Western philosophic traditions, idealism\* and realism\*, placed basic emphasis on formal logic and its development because of the significance of mind and its various perceptions and conceptions. The mind was thought to employ (supposed) truths in support of other supposed truths.

## THINKING CRITICALLY

The reader should understand, of course, that there are many different types of logic. So, assuming that people are not all the same, there is the possibility for an individual to find a particular type of logic that suits his or her ability. Any approach necessarily must be grounded in the principles of formal logic discussed briefly above. The use of what has been called critical thinking\* (or informal logic\*) is recommended here. However, it should be helpful to the reader to understand that certain other approaches or types of logic are available, the hope being that one or more of these variations will strike a chord and become a useful tool that is more effective than common sense.

Before dispensing with the idea of common sense, however, consider it briefly. Ordinarily it might be argued that a conclusion that doesn't make sense is wrong, and one that does seem "logical" is right. This is how most people reason daily, because such an approach provides instant answers to the uninitiated, answers that they know are correct. Don't ask these folks for positive proof that coincides with established rules of logic. They are simply using what knowledge they have based on what they believe to be facts. They then proceed by a type of induction to arrive at their common-sense conclusion. It is our hope here that the

approach recommended here will lead you somewhat further along than looking for instant answers on a common-sense basis.

### Aspects of Critical Thinking (Informal Logic)

To put the term "critical thinking" in some perspective, we should also realize that it is not negative thinking in the sense that some person might always tend to "be critical of" or criticize fellow workers. As used here, it is more a question of an approach to thought in which ideas are analyzed and evaluated carefully (and skeptically). A business manager might state, for example, that a marketing plan has been formulated after much discussion whereby his or her program would show greater profitability in the upcoming budget year. Stated succinctly: "Critical thinking is the process of forming an opinion through careful analysis and judgment" (Agnew, 1985, p. 1).

Agnew's definition was a simplified one, of course. McPeck was much more precise on the subject when he stated that "the core meaning of critical thinking is the propensity and skill to engage in an activity with reflective skepticism\*" (1991, p. 8). He then explains what he means even more precisely by describing reflective skepticism\* as "the disposition and skill to do X in such a way that E (the available evidence from a field) is suspended (or temporarily rejected) as sufficient to establish the truth or viability of P (some proposition or action within X)" (p. 13).

Interestingly, McPeck (1991) has some doubts about the applicability of critical thinking to lifelike situations. Based on an earlier distinction by Soltis (1970) among three types of learning--that is, learning *that*, learning *to*, and learning *how*--McPeck concludes that "there is a large gap between the rhetoric and promotional material for informal logic and what it can actually deliver" (p. 34). He questions whether informal logic teaches students how to argue effectively. Kaplan (1991) also has misgivings about whether critical thinking teaches intellectual autonomy; her inclination is that it teaches conformity more than autonomy (p. 361). Conversely, Blair and Johnson (1991) believe that McPeck's "arguments do not support their conclusions" (p. 35). They argue that "informal logic is not formal logic without the symbolic apparatus, nor is it applied formal logic." It does deal with the "criteria of probity" (p. 38). Blair and Johnson insist further:

What informal logic courses can and do teach, among other things, are the following: (a) skill in argument recognition, (b) skill in argument pattern or scheme identification, including the recognition of argument patterns used in specialized fields (e.g., statistical arguments, various kinds of causal arguments\*, arguments relying on authority, arguments supporting policy proposals), (c) skill in context sensitivity in the identification of arguments and their schemes, (d) skill in identifying problematic premises and inferences in such arguments, (e) skill in drawing on general knowledge in assessing arguments, and (f) skill in recognizing the sorts of additional information needed to settle questions about the premises

and inferences of arguments (p. 49).

In conclusion, Blair and Johnson do believe that critical thinking does indeed teach students how to formulate more effective arguments. I agree with them.

Continuing with the matter of arguing effectively, Govier sought to "combine some elementary formal logic with an informal approach to natural argument\*" (p. ix). Here, then, is an explanation of what an argument is (and what it is not). It will not be possible here, of course, to discuss argumentation fully. However, presented concisely, here are some of the absolutely necessary ideas that are required in elementary argumentation. Additionally, a format is offered that may be followed in several basic argumentation laboratory experiences.

First, an argument is similar to, but not the same thing as, an explanation. An explanation merely explains how something happened or came to be as it is. An argument, however, is much more precise and exact; it includes premises that serve as grounds to justify a conclusion. In argumentation, an explanation that presents an account of an occurrence and its causes is usually what is called a non-argument. A non-argument is, therefore, really only a description.

### Developing an Argument

It is important to understand that informal logic and argumentation do not represent a way to avoid thinking a problem through to its conclusion carefully and critically. An argument must still be placed in reasonably standard argument format, and techniques for standardizing argument formats must be applied. It is vitally important to identify the conclusion, even more so initially than determining the premises of the argument. It is an unfortunate fact of life that the conclusion of another person's argument, for example, is not always readily apparent. There may be an unstated conclusion, or it may not have a strong degree of certainty or commitment. A sound argument states a conclusion and provides supporting reasons.

Another reason for standardizing arguments is that sometimes some premises are missing. Listening to another person's argument (or even when preparing one's own arguments), a person may suddenly sense that something seems to be lacking. There is a gap in the argument that needs to be filled--filled, that is, with ample justification for the conclusion being drawn, and not merely supplemented with verbiage that adds up to nothing concrete or conclusive.

### Ambiguity\*

In addition to what has just been stated, there are other problems that may be encountered because of the nature of the actual language used (i.e., its precision or imprecision). What is stated may often be ambiguous in the sense that it is difficult to comprehend exactly what is meant because of imprecise conclusions and possible missing premises. Also, increasingly the words or terms that are used today have many and varied



meanings because people have tended to use them in different ways. For example, the word "play" is used approximately 72 different ways in an unabridged dictionary.

Still further, the following statement is heard occasionally: "He raised his voice when he should have reinforced his argument." What is meant here is simply that the person in question in discussing a situation tended to get emotionally involved to the extent that his language became emotionally "overlaid." This situation is repeated daily: someone castigates a person he or she dislikes by the use of an emotional word or phrase instead of presenting a rational argument for such downgrading. This person is using his or her emotion as a substitute for reason.

### A Sound Argument\*

Attempting to discover whether an argument is sound, it is necessary to determine that two considerations have been met: (a) the premises of the argument are acceptable, and (b) the premises used must be connected to the conclusion in a proper way (Govier, 1985, p. 53). Govier continued with a concise statement that explains correct and incorrect connections between the premises and the conclusion in a valid argument. This illustrates how absolutely essential it is in an argument for the premises used to logically entail the conclusion that is drawn (i.e., the establishment of a "proper connection"):

Arguments can have unacceptable premises not properly related to the conclusion; unacceptable premises properly related to the conclusion; acceptable premises not properly related to the conclusion; and acceptable premises properly related to the conclusion. There are four different possibilities here, and only the last case is a sound argument (p. 56).

The elements of a sound argument must first be **Acceptable** in the sense that there is at least fairly good evidence that the premises are sound or true. Secondly, these presumably correct or true premises are presented in such a way that they are **Relevant** to the conclusion that is being drawn. Further, these acceptable premises appear to offer **Adequate Grounds** (i.e., sufficient reason) for the person presenting the argument to believe that the conclusion should be accepted (p. 61). For ease of remembrance, these are called the necessary ARG Conditions.

As simple, or as complex, as a situation may be, so-called logical (deductive) entailment is not the sole way to satisfy the latter two conditions or elements of a sound argument (i.e., relevance and adequacy of grounds). Another way, for example, is a situation where inductive reasoning is employed--i.e., generalization based on past and present experience. Also, we often encounter a case where an analogy is drawn to prove a point (e.g., "Everyone is doing it, why not you?"). Further, people often present a cumulative list of factors to back the drawing of a certain conclusion, but in the process "conveniently" omit one very great deterrent factor.

It should be kept in mind, also, that there are strong inductive arguments\* and weak inductive arguments. The distinction here rests with the quantity of evidence provided to

support the conclusion drawn. The more evidence (i.e., cases examined that lend support) that one provides, the stronger the argument is for the conclusion that is being drawn. However, quantity only is not sufficient. The cases examined must also be representative of all possible cases. What is evident here is the importance of a "representative sampling of all possible cases."

(Note: The term *conductive argument*\* should be explained briefly. If there are separate premises, each of which seemingly entails the same conclusion, the support for the conclusion in this instance is not cumulative as much as it is convergent. It could be argued that a person is really capable with personal computers because (a) she passed a computer course with a high grade, (b) she has a computer on her desk at work and at home, and (c) she buys books on the subject regularly. These premises do not cumulatively add up to the conclusion drawn (she is capable); they "converge" on it, so to speak. Also, if one of the separate premises turns out to be false, this does not necessarily deny the conclusion. (See Agnew, 1985, pp. 259-261.)

Despite what has just been stated, it is important to understand that, conversely, a conclusion is not proven wrong simply because it can somehow be shown that the arguments (premises) offered do not adequately support the conclusion drawn. Further, it is extremely important to be as flexible and open-minded as possible. Being reasonable when defending one's viewpoint, or when one is criticizing other people's arguments effectively, is a goal for which all should strive. Most important in the present discussion, of course, is that people learn to argue logically and effectively.

#### Acceptable Premises\*

If a person hopes to argue logically and effectively, the premises of arguments offered to prove a point must be acceptable. One of the major branches of philosophy is *epistemology*\* that relates to the theory of knowledge (i.e., how does a person know that she knows?). The following are only several of the leading standards that are accepted by people as providing adequate substantiation for the inclusion of a premise in an argument.

*Common knowledge*\* is one term that is used daily by people as "proof" of a point that is being made. This involves a statement or assertion that is readily accepted by all--at least in the culture where the argument has been presented. However, so-called common knowledge is not as strong in an argument as a "necessary truth." In the latter case, there can be absolutely no question about the truth of the statement. A necessary truth is so strong, for example, that a person would find himself or herself in a contradiction if a denial of such a truth were made (McPeck, 1981, pp. 136-137).

From this point on, assessment of the acceptability of the premise becomes more difficult. The criterion in question here is that of *testimony*\*. So-and-so testifies (perhaps under oath) that such-and-such took place. Now two questions arise: (a) is the testimony appropriate

in relation to the premise involved, and (b) does the person offering the testimony have credibility in the eyes of those to whom such evidence is being presented? Here the question of the knowledge or expertise of the person offering testimony may come into question as well. This individual may (or may not) be an authority on the subject. Another technique that is employed often is a variation of direct testimony from an authority: An authority is quoted so as to strengthen a point being made. Such vicarious "testimony" must be scrutinized carefully, however, to determine (a) whether the person is being quoted out of context, or (b) whether the authority may have a bias in connection with the subject under discussion.

### Unacceptable Premises\*

Turning the coin over, so to speak, when are premises unacceptable? Briefly, a premise in an argument that is false negates the subsequent conclusion. Secondly, if two premises are true but they contradict each other, then the whole argument becomes inconsistent. A third problem arises when a premise is based upon a false assumption. This is why occasionally the underlying or background assumption must be considered carefully. A fourth weakness arises when a person "begs the question" in his or her argument. This is a common situation where an individual actually avoids the question at hand by employing a premise that already grants the conclusion. This problem can be avoided if the premises used in an argument are stronger and more certain than the conclusion.

### A Relevant Statement\*

In this section, consideration of acceptability (A) changes to that of relevance (R). To be sure the reasoning employed in the premises of an argument must be acceptable, but such reasoning must also be relevant. Here it is a question of a statement counting positively toward the strength of the assertion proffered. Obviously, a negatively relevant statement would count against the argument included in the premises. If, however, the statement did neither, it is an *irrelevant* statement (i.e., it has no bearing whatsoever on the argument being made).

### Assuring Relevance\*

Simply stated--to the extent that it is possible not to be vague--a person can assure relevance by making certain that the premises employed in an argument contribute positively to the conclusion that he wishes to support. This may be done in a number of ways that will be discussed here briefly. Here the terms "induction" and "deduction" are again encountered, and it is important to reiterate their meanings specifically. Generally speaking, in deduction\* the reasoning proceeds from the general to the specific, whereas the opposite is the case with induction\*. A more formal definition of deduction is that it is a method of reasoning and/or problem-solving that involves the drawing of inferences from the general to the specific. Induction, conversely, involves the forming of generalizations from specific instances. However, it is often puzzling in scientific research--or in the solving of a murder (!)--where one leaves off and the other begins.

Often in life a person encounters a number and variety of seemingly unrelated occurrences. Then, at some point, she or he finds that it is possible to draw a (tentative) conclusion about what has been happening. This is inductive thought. If, however, a person is confronted with an accomplished fact or occurrence, a *fait accompli*, then he may be faced with the necessity of retracing or investigating the occurrences or phenomena that led up to the present state of affairs. An instance of deduction would be if a Sherlock Holmes episode began with a corpse, and he then sought to discover the cause of death through deduction. Conversely, if in the course of a second episode, he discovered a number of specific circumstances that led his thinking to suspect that a murder might have occurred, he would expect eventually to discover a corpse before the day was through. His thought processes were being led inductively\* to that conclusion.

In such a situation with informal logic, the term "deductive entailment"\* is encountered. This means that the premises of the argument being presented logically entail the conclusion. If the premises are true, they logically entail that the conclusion is true because they are relevant. Keep in mind some of the various rules about the construction of a valid syllogism\* : (a) if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true, and (b) in a deductive argument the truth of its premises is sufficient to establish the truth of its conclusions if the premises do logically entail the conclusion (Harrison, 1969, p. 12). Consider a situation where a worker speaks to the foreman about a problem that he has been having because of certain equipment that had been ordered by the business manager after bids had been taken the previous year. Evidently the worker had recommended one brand, but cheaper ones had been ordered because the bid was lower. An example of deductive entailment presented to the foreman was as follows:

1. Unless workers' heads are well-protected at all times while actively engaged, a condition may develop that requires treatment by a physician (and possibly a dermatologist).
2. Also, when workers use ill-fitting headgear and/or are careless in the use of properly fitting equipment, the result is that a painful condition may soon result requiring medical treatment.
3. Therefore, there is a strong probability that some of our workers haven't been protecting their ears with properly fitting headgear, or they have been careless in their use. It has turned out that five of the workers have developed the beginning condition that may lead to painful and costly medical treatment unless (1) the best (by test!) headgear are purchased, (2) they are used carefully, or (3) they stop their regular type of work for a period of time.

Premises "a" and "b" provide at least some significant reason to believe that workers are having problems keeping their head from irritation and injury. Thus, there seem to be adequate grounds (G) (i.e., provable statements of fact) and relevant premises or arguments (R) to warrant the acceptance of the argument (A) as sound.

As mentioned above, a second way of showing relevance is through the use of induction (or inductive reasoning). There is no claim that the truth of an argument follows only from the verity of the premises (Harrison, 1969, p. 12). Keep in mind that here the reasoning process moves more from the specific to the general. A conclusion is reached or a hypothesis\* is confirmed on the basis of circumstances or occurrences that lead in the direction of a conclusion. These regularities of experience give every indication that such-and-such will be the eventual result.

An example of inductive reasoning, this time related to the wearing of headgear in the sport of wrestling, might proceed as follows:

When wrestling with another team member, a wrestler occasionally uses a hold (e.g., a headlock) where pressure on either side of the skin of his opponent's ear rubs it against the ear's cartilage. Despite the use of protective headgear, this type of external pressure, as well as the rubbing of the opponent's ear against the mat when he is in the bottom position, cause further abrasion with the result that protective fluid enters the space created between the skin and the ear's cartilage. This same wrestler discovers that a similar swelling and soreness results when his opponent executes a similar hold on him. The wrestler discovers further that, even after being most careful in the use of his headgear--but not having the resultant fluid aspirated regularly--the result was still that his ear was becoming "cauliflowered" (i.e., that permanent hardening of that portion of the ear was occurring).

There are two other means of ensuring relevance that will now be discussed. The first is called "normative relevance\*," and this has to do with understanding of the existing values and norms of the society--and therefore what should be done. Here, for example, we might argue for continuation and/or expansion of the music program in a school (a) because it had a tradition, (b) because it provided stimulating activity for all interested persons--activity that many people generally accept as highly desirable, and (c) because it provided a necessary recreational outlet to let off steam in the course of a busy day (catharsis). These ideas and others can be linked to make a case for the ongoing support of a music program in schools (adapted from Govier, 1985, pp. 101-124).

Finally, a fourth very important way of demonstrating relevance is that of analogy\*, or showing that two items or approaches have a number of similarities. On this basis it might then be argued relevantly that still other or further similarities can be demonstrated. Applying this to the field of developmental physical activity might be carried out through an analogy of the effects of certain types of physical activity on laboratory animals. The analogy would be that because certain results were observed on such animals after rigorous exercise that the results would be (might be?) similar if humans were also active in a strenuous manner.

A further word about analogies seems desirable. Many people employ analogies loosely, leading some people to downgrade their use, claiming they are simply rhetorical devices. Nevertheless, the fact that analogies are used frequently in everyday life to influence people toward the acceptance of a variety of important policies cannot be escaped. One type of analogy is known as the *a priori* analogy in which an arbiter is urged to make a similar decision in a case because cases had been treated in such-and-such a way in the past. (In law, of course, the discovery of a precedent [an earlier legal decision] is most important.)

Another important type of analogy is known as an inductive analogy\*. This is a common way of reasoning by humans that, when used properly, can be most influential. For example, it can be argued that strict amateurism in sport simply has not worked in the past: witness the downfall of the ancient Olympic Games. Thus, the answer to this problem should be to deny any experimentation with professionalism throughout the jurisdiction of what has been called amateur sport. However, this appears to be too simple a treatment of the problem. An analyst needs to know ever so much more about the factual background of the situation before an intelligent decision can be made. Permitting semiprofessionals (or now professionals!) to play in the Olympic Games may or may not be a better solution because of the difficulties of maintaining strict amateurism. Nevertheless, permitting this to happen without careful examination of evidence from the past and consideration of future eventualities may bring about the ruin of a glorious series of international competitions. (Now, of course, professional basketball and hockey players who have multimillion dollar contracts are being permitted to play in Olympic competition!)

What is vitally important here is that one should evaluate the logic of an analogy by looking for the differences between the primary subject and the analogue. A key idea that should help in determining the argument's validity is to check the acceptability of the premises being used. The similarities between the two situations may be highly superficial, for example. Also, people will often argue that "two wrongs make a right!" All of this simply points out that analogies can be both loose and misleading! A professional person must be alert to recognize such deficiencies in argument (*The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967, Vol. 5, pp. 41, 57).

In all of these ways of demonstrating relevance, the question should be asked, "Would the truth of my argument be strengthened by the use of this presumably relevant information?" A negative answer settles the question. Obviously, someone who is building his or her argument on irrelevant premises is in difficulty if his or her opponent can convince the audience that such is the case. The Latin phrase here is *non sequitur*\*, which simply means that the person's conclusion doesn't follow from the irrelevant premises used. A *non sequitur* can itself be considered a fallacy, which is the next subheading to be discussed. From this point, therefore, the next step is to move ahead to specific examples of ways that people "invoke irrelevance" through the employment of obvious fallacies.

#### Fallacies (Inadequate Reasoning)\*

Critical thinking usually includes a consideration of fallacies. Any mistaken belief

might be called a fallacy, but that definition is too wide for this limited discussion. Here mistakes in reasoning will be considered; so, a fallacy may be defined as a misleading or unsound argument. It may also be defined as a defective argument that appears to have true premises and a sound conclusion. Fallacies may be deceptive because some are often convincing and are therefore persuasive. This discussion will treat mainly arguments where the conclusions are unsound--but where they seem to be sound.

The goal is to avoid fallacies in one's own thinking and to detect fallacies in the thinking and expression of others. As individuals in an increasingly complex society, it is most important to be aware of at least the types of mistaken reasoning that might be encountered daily. When a manager uses a fallacy in arguing, for example, it is up to the listener to expose (to herself at least) the reasoning error that is being employed. (Of course, conversely the colleague may discover the same weakness in the listener's arguments whether she recognizes such weakness or not.) Sometimes a fallacy is simply a weak argument that is relevant; at other times a fallacy is simply irrelevant.

Quite naturally, the fallacies that may creep into one's own everyday statements and arguments will not be immediately apparent. In fact, because a person may have been committing certain fallacies for many years, it will take some effort to find out exactly what they are. Cohen (1991, pp. 8-10) recommends that a person ask himself certain specific questions about his thinking in relation to a proposed basic decision that must be made in his life: (a) when confronted with reasoning about a problem or issue, keep asking oneself "Then what?" until it can be discovered what the end result will (or may) be or a fallacy in one's thought process; or (b) just ask "Why?" several times to uncover possible soft spots in thinking; or (c) ask "Why is that a reason?" to try to get beneath a possibly superficial layer of reasons in order to hopefully uncover an irrational idea that has been included.

Several different classificatory schemes have been used over the years to make any discussion of fallacies more easily understandable. Some fallacies occur when fact-gathering is wrong or inadequate, and some occur because the basic logic of the argument is incorrect. In other cases fallacies occur when the meaning of words or phrases is stretched too far, whereas others include value judgments where facts are needed. Finally, the question often arises whether the premises of an argument are relevant or irrelevant.

Building on the foundation provided by his colleagues (e.g., Govier, 1985), Schlecht (1991) devised what he believes is a satisfactory logical classification of fallacies, one that will also be helpful in the teaching/learning process. His scheme is based on the acceptability, of lack of same, of premises in the arguments in which they are included. Thus, he offers a new classification based on whether the premises in the argument are unacceptable, irrelevant, or insufficient. A fourth category added here is designated simply as a philosophical fallacy (e.g., the "is to ought" fallacy).

In this chapter, therefore, it was decided to follow this recently recommended approach. Schlecht's plan is persuasive, and also it correlates to a considerable degree with the way fallacies are introduced in contemporary textbooks. A fairly complete listing of typical

fallacies that are encountered daily will be presented (some taken from Zeigler, 1994; Zeigler, 1989, pp. 94-97; from Govier, 1985, pp. 351-356; from Black, 1952, Chap. 12; and from *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1967, 5, 64).

**(Note: If the term used formerly to describe a fallacy is in Latin, to the greatest possible extent that term will be translated into English--unless the resulting English phrase is too awkward.)**

### Examples of Common Fallacies

In a brief treatment such as this is, it seemed advisable to include only a detailed, categorized listing of defined fallacies (as explained above). However, it was finally decided to include at least some examples of the more common fallacies that are committed daily. The following are examples of typical fallacies that are encountered frequently in everyday living (Zeigler, 1994, pp. 41-44):

1. "Argument from Authority"\* (relevant). Here the person arguing expects the listener to accept a premise simply because the person quoted is in favor of the conclusion being drawn.

Thus, the argument is as follows:

- a) Bear Bryant was a great United States football coach.
- b) Bryant insisted that his players sleep eight hours nightly.
- c) Therefore, all players should follow this practice.

2. "Argument Grossly Distorted"\* (relevant). Even though an argument presented is relevant to the conclusion, its effectiveness can be negated if gross distortion occurs to the extent that "relevance becomes irrelevant":

Girls' and women's sport was downgraded in importance in the United States for decades because of the strong political activity of well-intentioned women physical educators who managed to maintain control of the situation in schools, colleges, and universities. It is obvious to the profession now that their concerns were largely unfounded and, in fact, to some extent were actually ridiculous. In the process, women's sport in the United States was set back for half a century. These professional women did the field a great disservice and deserve condemnation for their actions. Therefore, we should make every effort to make certain that history texts place blame where it is due. We should also keep women from control and administrative involvement with women's sport at the present.

**(Note: The author does not believe the conclusion of this argument, although it is true that it has turned out that many women physical educators of this era were overly zealous in their condemnation of intercollegiate sport competition for young women. However, their intentions were of a high order, and it has indeed turned out that the**



development in women's sport has become a sort of "Catch-22" situation for college and university women today. However, it is undoubtedly most important that women have a greater voice in what is taking place in this area.)

3. "Argument Against the Person"\* (irrelevant). In this situation the argument is direct against the individual, not the position that he or she is defending:

- a) The city engineer said that the recreation department's budget is insufficient.
- b) Everyone knows that the city engineer doesn't know what's going on any more.
- c) Therefore, the recreation department probably has a sufficient budget.

4. "The Guilt by Association Fallacy"\* (irrelevant). This is a variation of fallacy #3. Instead of attacking the individual specifically, he or she is attacked indirectly (for example) by lumping the person in with a group of coaches who may indeed be doing harm to their sport by their adoption of a particular coaching philosophy:

- a) Coach A said that his hockey team must be aggressive with their opponents at the outset of a contest if they hope to win.
- b) Coach A belongs to a group of hockey coaches that is irrational about the importance of intimidating the opposing team at the beginning of a contest.
- c) Therefore, Coach A is not a sportsman and is doing harm to the sport that he coaches.

5. "The Straw Person Fallacy"\* (irrelevant). Here the person arguing misrepresents the other person's claim or theory.

6. "The Black or White Fallacy"\* (partially relevant). The assumption is made here that there are only two choices or courses of action open to the listener. One of these choices is rejected; accordingly, the listener is obligated to choose the other course of action (even though further consideration could demonstrate still further alternatives):

Women's ice hockey has a right to receive as large an appropriation in the recreation budget as men's ice hockey. However, it is a new sport for women, and a comparable amount of money is not available for this season. Therefore, if the size of the women's budget is not as large as that for the men, there should be no women's ice hockey this year.

7. "The Too-Quick Generalization Fallacy"\* (partially relevant). In this instance the person arguing seeks to move from an insufficient sample to generalization about an entire class of subjects:

- a) A is an outstanding forward in basketball; he can shoot well with either hand.
- b) B is also an outstanding forward, and he hooks well with either hand, too.
- c) C, a forward, can only shoot well with his right hand. He will never become an outstanding forward.

8. "The Appeal to Emotions Fallacy"\* (irrelevant). People are often convinced of the rightness of an argument because they truly want to believe that such-and-such is the case:

- a) Good old Coach McNamara at his retirement banquet said, "Baseball is a sport that belongs in every high school; Sutton High should always field a team."
- b) Even though we have to travel miles to find a good field on which to practice and play home games, and even though no other school in our league has a team because the spring season is so short, nevertheless, because of our love for, and loyalty to, the late Coach McNamara, we should always sponsor a baseball team here at Sutton.

(Note: Applicable here also is the concept of a *non-sequitur*\*. Sometimes a series of arguments (premises) are offered to prove a point. Some of these may be weak, but others may simply have no application to the question at hand. For example, Argument No. 3 in a series of five premises may have no relevance to the topic at hand whatsoever. Thus, it "does not follow" <non-sequitur> from No. 3 that such-and-such a conclusion is warranted.)

## CONCLUDING STATEMENT

If you analyze this material carefully, and then practices its lessons, you will develop a certain level of fundamental competency in critical thinking. You will presumably also be more convinced than previously that an educated person in this society, from both a personal and a professional standpoint, needs competency in argumentation and informal logic. Granting that it is probably impractical and unrealistic to expect every university graduate to have an experience in formal logic, I am recommending here that some experience with critical thinking and the necessarily accompanying informal logic is essential.

Not only will you find it advisable and desirable to evaluate the spoken and written word of others whom you may encounter, you will also find it most helpful to be able to think more critically and effectively than previously in all of life's undertakings. In this way you should be able to avoid related undue stress in his or her life. Finally, achieving competence in critical thinking will help you to accomplish more as a professional person through the employment of positive assertiveness as a means of achieving greater professional competency.

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dual citizen of Canada and the United-States, **Dr. Zeigler** has taught, researched, and administered programs at four univs. (Western Ontario [twice], Illinois, Michigan and Yale.) He has published 34 books and monographs and 400 articles. The top four awards in his field in North America have been bestowed on him. He has received two honorary doctorates and is listed in Who's Who in Canada, the U.S.A., & the World.

This book asks the provocative question **"Who Knows What's Right Anymore?"** It is a guide to ethical decision-making. North Americans have gotten themselves into this crazy situation because a

broadly based, multi-ethnic culture is developing rapidly. This means that any former idea that there is one "GOOD" and one "BAD" doesn't apply anymore. A new standard is needed to distinguish between "right" action and "wrong" action as we strive to survive and prosper in the 21st century.

Actually, the entire world needs a cross-cultural approach to ethical decision-making now that rapid communication has created what has been called a "global village." The "good" and the "bad" need somehow to be better differentiated as the world seeks to live in harmony while still improving the living standard of untold millions.

Meeting this challenge—i.e., helping the reader with a three-step "formula"—the author brought together initially the ideas of four twentieth-century philosophers (Fox, Toulmin, Bayles, and Kekes) These he blended with time-proven ethical advice from three great earlier philosophers (Kant, Mill, and Aristotle). The result is a three-step approach that can be applied successfully to ethical decision-making of either a personal, professional, and environmental nature, one that could well be broadly acceptable on a cross-cultural basis.

After explaining the approach clearly on a step-by-step basis, the reader is presented with 30 case situations—10 each of a personal, professional, and environmental nature—where the approach can be tried out. (Interestingly, as time permits, this initial approach can be then be supported or "verified" by superimposing it on a law-court [jurisprudential] argument.)



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